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Summary
This thesis considers the importance of spatial patterns and the use of geo-localized
data in panel and repeated cross-section data econometrics by addressing causality issues
to obtain further insights into the causes and consequences of conflict in a globalized
world. Chapter Two analyzes the link between globalization and the incidence of civil
conflict in a panel dataset of 159 countries over the period 1972-2009. Distinctions
are drawn between several dimensions of globalization identified in political economy
literature, i.e. economic, social, and political globalization. I address the potential
endogeneity of the globalization variables by introducing country-fixed effects into the
analysis. I also use a novel spatial instrumental variable based on the degree of
integration of neighboring countries. Chapter Three uses geo-localized information to
study the ethnic drivers of food-related income shocks and their effects on conflict in
Africa to explain underlying conflict processes. Thus, I propose the use of a panel
database of a full grid of African countries divided into sub-national units of 0.5 per
0.5 degrees of latitude and longitude (10,638 cells) that covers the period 1998-2013.
The study contributes to the relevant literature by analyzing several competing theories
on the effects of income shocks on conflict, using geo-localized data which considers
the interaction between those income shocks and ethnic diversity. Finally, Chapter
Four examines the environmental damage that conflict may cause, such as oil spills in
Nigeria and their impact on agricultural production. Thus, I use a consumer-producer
household framework to explain how oil-spill pollution might result in changes in the
optimal behavior of households. I estimate an agricultural production function using
repeated cross-sections of micro-data geo-referenced for farming households and four
iii
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waves of data from 2009 to 2018 taken from the Nigeria General Household Survey
(GHS-Panel). To calculate a proxy for oil spill pollution, I create a function that uses
geospatial data with information on around 12,000 oil spills from the Nigerian Oil Spill
Monitor.
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According to The World Bank (2018), “Fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) is a
critical development challenge that threatens efforts to end extreme poverty, affecting
both low- and middle-income countries. By 2030, up to 2/3 of the world’s extreme
poor could live in FCV settings. Conflicts also drive 80% of all humanitarian needs”1.
Looking at the scale of this challenge, it is easy to understand why the study of the
causes and consequences of conflicts has been an influential subject for scholars for
decades. Blattman and Miguel (2010) summarize the relevant literature up to the first
decade of the 21st century, emphasizing both limitations and areas of future research.
Among other issues, they highlight the importance of different definitions of conflicts, the
collection of new data, the role of political divisions, the proper identification of models
in empirical analysis, the importance of geographic patterns, the role of institutions, and
the legacies of conflict. The fact that income has a role as a determinant of conflict is
one of the most robust conclusions (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Fearon and Laitin, 2003),
but conflict has also been found to hurt development (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003).
For these reasons, most conflict is expected to be prone to concentrate in low-to-middle
income countries. However, the direction of causality between different mechanisms and
conflict remains an open question among academics. The evidence as to direction is
inconclusive in some cases, despite the fact that new data analysis and new methods




have been proposed to clarify the effect (Berman and Couttenier, 2015; Berman et al.
2017).
This thesis brings together three research topics that span the fields of political
economy, development, and environmental economics. Bearing in mind the gap in the
literature mentioned above, I consider the importance of spatial patterns and the use of
geo-located data in my research by addressing causality issues to obtain further insights
into both the causes and the consequences of conflict in a globalized world. There is
currently a wide consensus that globalization wears down the significance of national
borders, leading to complex relations between multiple actors on a multicontinental
scale (Norris, 2000). The complexity of these relations has numerous consequences in
many major areas ranging from the highly positive (economic growth) to the highly
negative (conflict and poverty). Understanding the interactions between the actors in
the globalization framework is thus essential to determine who wins and who loses both
within countries and across countries. I consider these aspects in all the chapters of this
thesis, looking at different actors, perspectives, and approaches.
In particular, Chapter 2 takes a macro-level perspective in studying the role of
globalization in conflict. In this chapter, entitled, “Is there a link between globalization
and civil conflict?”2 my co-adviser Roberto Ezcurra and I address the question of how
globalization affects the incidence of civil conflict in a panel dataset of 159 countries
over the period 1972-2009. We distinguish several dimensions of globalization identified
in the political economy literature, such as economic, social, and political integration.
This perspective enables us to derive a broader picture than most earlier studies, given
that the various dimensions of globalization do not necessarily affect conflict in the same
way. To that end, we use the KOF Globalization Index as a measure of globalization.
3 As a baseline measure of conflict incidence, we use the variable PRIO25,4 developed
by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.5 The KOF Globalization Index is based
2This chapter has been published in The World Economy (2017), vol. 40(12), pp. 2592-2610.
https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12514
3The KOF Globalization Index was constructed by Dreher (2006) and updated by Dreher et al.
(2008).
4PRIO 25 reports all internal conflicts with 25 or more battle-related deaths in a year.
5Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at the department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala
3 Introduction
on a set of 23 variables that connect different aspects of globalization. In particular,
it distinguishes the social and political dimensions of integration from an economic
perspective. By contrast with previous literature, which has also considered the three
dimensions of globalization mentioned above, we also address the potential endogeneity
of the globalization variables. This is particularly important for establishing a causal
link between the effect of integration and conflict. To that end, we use two strategies:
The first is to introduce country fixed effects into the analysis, which leads to control
of those time-invariant aspects that affect both globalization and conflict. In fact, the
introduction of country fixed effects is useful for determining the impact on long-run
determinants of both globalization and conflict. The second strategy is to use an
instrumental variable approach to estimate the causal effect of the degree of integration
on conflict. Thus, for each globalization index used in the study, we construct a novel
spatial instrumental variable based on the degree of integration of neighboring countries.
The results show that the introduction of country fixed effects eliminates the statistical
relationship between the degree of integration of the world and the conflict incidence.
Moreover, the use of instrumental variables shows no causal effect between globalization
and civil war. These results are independent of both the dimension of globalization
considered here and the definition of civil conflict.
The conclusions of the chapter cast doubts on whether there is a direct link
between globalization and civil conflict. Nevertheless, the presence of factors (such as
ethnic heterogeneity, horizontal inequalities or natural resource abundance) that could
potentially interact with globalization could better explain this relationship. Moreover,
mechanisms that explain how globalization leads to conflicts are far from simple and
could act in opposite directions.
Therefore, although a macro level analysis is interesting in helping to understand
credible identification, it might not be sufficient to explain some underlying conflict
processes . For example, as mentioned above, the impact of income on violence has been
widely studied in the literature. A frequent practice has been to use commodity price
University and the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) have
collaborated to produce a dataset of internal and external armed conflicts from 1946 to the present.
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fluctuations to capture external income shocks to isolate the effect. However, previous
literature shows mixed results at country level. For instance, Bazzi and Blattman (2014)
conclude that a significant link between commodity price shocks and conflict incidence
is only detected when specific samples, estimators or definitions of civil war are used.
Berman et al. (2017) note that one of the reasons for these contradictory effects is that
using country-year data as a unit of observation is just too aggregate. Many country
conflicts are concentrated in specific regions (such as the Kurdish area in Turkey or the
Niger Delta in Nigeria). By contrast, in analyzing the nexus between commodity prices
or natural resources and conflict, the results at the micro-level point to a more robust
causal relationship (for example, the use of disaggregated data for a single country, as
in Dube and Vargas (2013) for Colombia, or in Aragon and Rud (2013) for Peru).
Recently, a new generation of researchers in the area of conflict has taken the cell-year
level as a unit of observation. For instance, Fjelde (2015), Berman et al. (2015 and
2017), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2017), and McGuirk and Burke (2020), among
others, use this unit of observation, which is based on detailed information on the date
and location of conflict events. They work with full grids of African countries, divided
into sub-national units of 0.5 per 0.5 degrees latitude and longitude, so the unit of
observation is the cell-year. There are two specific reasons for using such a unit of
observation. First, taking grid-cell level data instead of administrative boundaries is
appropriate to ensure that the unit of observation is not endogenous to conflict events.
Second, the possibility of analyzing disaggregated cells that relate main crops, natural
resources, climate variables, etc. to information on conflicts over a whole continent (for
example Africa) yields a big gain in terms of external validity.
For these reasons, I turn to the micro level analysis in the next two chapters of my
thesis. Taking this approach, I seek to study underlying mechanisms and consequences
of conflict. In particular, in Chapter 3 I focus on the whole of Africa, working with
grid-cells. In Chapter 4, I concentrate specifically on Nigeria.
I have chosen Africa because it is a very vulnerable part of the world with a relatively
low capacity for adaptation. It is the region most affected by conflicts since World War
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II. According to Francisco Ferreira, the World Bank´s Chief Economist for the Africa
Region,6 “The shifts in the nature and geographical distribution of conflict across Africa
make identifying both the causes of conflict and the ways to help countries avoid and
end these conflicts, ever more challenging”.
In Chapter 3 entitled, “The role of ethnic characteristics in the effect of income
shocks on African conflict”7 my coauthors Fidel Pérez-Sebastián and Miguel Angel
Campo-Bescós and I use geo-localized information to study the ethnic drivers of the
effect of food-related income shocks on African conflict. The role of ethnic cleavages in
generating conflict has been studied in depth by both economists and political scientists,
but there have been no previous studies at cell-year level focused on the role of ethnic
status in the propagation of income shocks. This is a clear gap, given that both ethnic
political marginalization and diversity could act as amplifiers of perceived economic
cost and benefits. We suggest that a positive income shock might have different impacts
that depend on the political status of ethnic groups and the degree of ethnic diversity
of a cell. We contribute to the literature by analyzing several competing theories on the
effects of income shocks (the opportunity cost, the state-is-a-prize, and the state capacity
theories) on conflict, using geo-localized data which consider the interaction between
these income shocks and ethnic diversity. Thus, we propose the use of a panel database
of a full grid of African countries divided into sub-national units of 0.5 per 0.5 grades
latitude and longitude (10,638 cells) that covers the period 1998-2013. The identification
strategy is based on the use of income shocks that can be considered at exogenous at
cell level. To that end, we combine sub-national, time-invariant maps of crop suitability
and production capacity from the FAO’s global agro-ecological zones (GAEZ) with
information on movements in global commodity prices and four different variables of
ethnicity (fractionalization, polarization, ethnic groups excluded from central power, and
monopoly ethnic groups). We also move the topic onwards by introducing the spatial
6Keynote address for the second edition of the Annual Bank Conference on Africa
(ABCA), 2015. Source: https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2015/07/05/
confronting-conflict-and-fragility-in-africa
7This chapter was published in World Development,137 (2021)105153
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105153
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ethnic fractionalization index developed at cell level by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
(2017) and by adapting the spatial ethnic polarization index at cell level.8No previous
studies have introduced ethnic political inequality in conjunction with ethnic diversity
in a grid-panel data context.9
Following McGuirk and Burke (2020), we also differentiate between factor and output
conflict, and between producing cells and consumer cells. Large-scale conflict, such as
battles for control of territory and means of production, are classed as factor conflict.
Smaller-scale conflicts aimed at appropriating surpluses are classed as output conflict.
Food prices in food-producing cells are captured through a producer price index, and
in food-consuming cells through a consumer price index. We also consider droughts
as another proxy for income shocks and estimate their effect jointly with food prices.
This is because we expect the SPEI drought index to capture variations in the quantity
of local crop production much more closely than international prices. Finally, we also
take a step further and distinguish between output conflict comprising violence against
civilians (which also requires organized armed force) and comprising riots (which is by
definition non-organized conflict). We use different measures and datasets of conflict
events (such as the ACLED and UCDP-GED datasets),10 to test the theories behind
the models and the robustness of our results.
The results show that distinguishing between organized armed force (battles and
violence against civilians) and non-organized conflict (riots) can be more informative
than between factor and output conflict. In line with the competing theories, we show
evidence that conflict is driven by the opportunity cost and state capacity mechanisms.
Furthermore, ethnic cleavages have a larger role in the transmission process of income
shocks in organized armed-force conflict than in non-organized violence. The sensitivity
8The spatial ethnolinguistic fractionalization and polarization indexes are computed with the
Geo-referencing Ethnic Power Relation (GeoEPR) 2014 database. In turn, excluded groups are based
on the number provided by the PRIO-GRID 2.0 dataset, while the monopoly groups dummy variable is
built up by matching the settlement areas from Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Dataset Core 2014 with
the grid structure provided in PRIO-GRID v.2.0.
9To the best of my knowledge, there are no studies at country level.
10The Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset or ACLED (Raleigh Dowd, 2015); and the Uppsala
Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Event dataset or UCDP-GED, version 5.0 (Sundberg Melander,
2013; Croicu Sundberg, 2016).
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to ethnic heterogeneity is much greater for producer-price and droughts shocks than for
consumer-price changes.
Finally, in Chapter 4, entitle “Addressing oil spillages and agricultural productivity.
Evidence of pollution in Nigeria”, I examine the environmental damage that might be
caused as a consequence of particular types of violence, such as oil spills in Nigeria
and their impact on agricultural production. There is a large body of literature that
argues that natural resources might be more of a curse than a blessing for economic
and political development in weakly institutionalized countries. Nigeria, which is the
largest oil producer in Africa, is a case in point of a territory cursed by natural resources
(Bruederle and Hodler, 2019; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2013). Crude oil accounts
for more than 90 per cent of the revenues generated by the government. Nevertheless, the
gains from oil exports have created a highly enriched small minority, while most of the
population has become increasingly impoverished (Nriagu, 2019). Frequent oil spillages
in pipeline networks also represent major ecological disasters which have exacerbated
economic, environmental, and social problems. According to Madu et al. (2018), ”[..]
about 70 per cent of the oil spillages events in the Niger Delta area can be attributed
to vandalism or theft of oil from the pipelines of major oil companies like Exxon,
Chevron, and Shell, among others. The success or failure of the implementation of any
sustainability-related initiatives still dominates major debates in the public arena. There
is significant policy resistance in the area culminating in the formation of the militant
groups that have adopted the strategy of blowing up the oil pipelines”. Therefore, several
socio-political factors are associated with pipeline vandalism. Issues related to resource
control and the revenue allocation formula used by the government in the distribution
of oil revenues to the states are often cited as particular causes of such sabotage. The
call for the right of self-determination in the Niger Delta area is another determining
factor in the increase in violence targeting oil pipelines.
Communities near pipelines bear the brunt of the oil spill pollution derived from
this vandalism. The same polluting effects are also generated due to operational spills
(such as corrosion, engineering equipment failures, and human errors). However, the
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proportion of oil spills caused by sabotage in Nigeria, in the context of vandalism
associated with conflict, gives me the chance to study this issue in Chapter 4 of my
dissertation and link it as one consequence of conflict. In particular, farmers are included
in the analysis of how pollution from oil spillages affects agricultural production of nearby
farmers by reducing the agricultural total factor productivity.
To that end, in my identification strategy I follow the methodology proposed
by Aragón and Rud (2016), who study the effect of air pollution on agricultural
production given the expansion of mining activities in Ghana. Thus, I use a
consumer-producer household framework, where households are both consumers and
producers of agricultural goods in the context of incomplete input markers, to
understand how oil spill pollution might generate adjustments in the optimal behavior
of households. Then I approximate an agricultural production function using a repeated
cross-sections model of micro-data geo-referenced for farming households, taken from the
Nigeria General Household Survey (GHS-Panel). I use four waves of data: 2010-2011,
2012-2013, 2015-2016, and 2018-2019. To calculate a proxy for oil spill pollution, I
create a function that uses geospatial data with information on around 12,000 oil spills
from The Nigerian Oil Spill Monitor. 11 In order to estimate the model, I apply a
difference-in-difference strategy with continuous treatment, in which the treated group
comprises locations within 10 kilometers of oil spill events and the control group is made
up of the rest of the places from my dataset.
I find that farmers located less than 10 kilometers from oil spills experience a relative
reduction in total factor productivity of around 2.73%. I also examine alternative
mechanisms and find that oil spill pollution may explain my results. I also detect less
owner-occupied land and a drop in labor income in urban areas close to oil spills that
could also be explained by a decrease in the labor productivity component. This study
highlights an externality through which the oil industry affects the living conditions of
rural areas and the importance of clean-up aspects in areas close to oil spillages.
11The Nigerian Oil Spill Monitor provides the data collected by the National Oil Spill Detection and
Response Agency (NOSDRA).
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In short, the subsequent chapters of this dissertation analyze some causes and one of
the consequences of conflict linked to globalization , using various methodologies related
to spatial patterns and geo-localized data.

Chapter 2
Is there a link between
globalization and civil conflict?
[Authors: Roberto Ezcurra and Beatriz Manotas. This chapter has been published
in The World Economy (2017).1]
2.1 Introduction
The consequences of globalization are nowadays the subject of an active public debate
in different forums (Rodrik, 2012; Milanovic, 2016). The interest surrounding this issue
is clearly related to the increasing relevance of the process of globalization currently
underway. This does not imply that globalization is a new phenomenon, as its origins go
back to at least the 19th century (Findlay and O’Rourke, 2007). Nevertheless, during
the last few decades the world has experienced unprecedented levels of integration,
surpassing the peak reached before the First World War. This process is characterized
by the opening of national borders to a variety of flows, including people, goods and
services, capital, information and ideas (Clark, 2000). Although it is difficult to agree
on a precise definition, there is wide consensus that globalization tends to erode the
relevance of national borders, generating complex relations among different actors at
multi-continental distance (Norris, 2000). These increasing mutual interactions have




important consequences on many relevant facets of contemporary societies, including
economic, social, cultural and political aspects. Accordingly, understanding the effects
of globalization is essential to address the numerous challenges posed by this process,
and be able to identify who wins and who loses, not only within each country but also
across countries.
Against this background, numerous studies have been published in recent years
on the impact of globalization on economic development and growth (Frankel and
Romer, 1999; Dreher, 2006), income inequality and poverty (Dollar and Kraay, 2004;
Milanovic, 2005), labour markets (Dreher and Gaston, 2007; Tomohara and Takii, 2011),
environmental quality (Antweiler et al., 2001; Frankel and Rose, 2005), or democracy
and human rights (Rudra, 2005; Dreher et al., 2012). Likewise, there are various
contributions that examine the potential link between globalization and civil conflict
using different indicators of trade openness and foreign direct investment to measure
the relevance of globalization (e.g. Bussmann and Schneider, 2007; Martin et al.,
2008; Sorens and Ruger, 2014). From a policy perspective, the relationship between
these variables and civil conflict is clearly important, as it provides information on the
role that economic integration plays in this context. Nevertheless, the degree of trade
openness and foreign direct investment are not useful to capture the incidence of other
dimensions of globalization identified in the political economy literature, such as social
integration and political integration (Prakash and Hart, 1999; Keohane and Nye, 2000).
This is potentially important, given that it is not evident that the various dimensions of
globalization affect internal conflict in the same way. Bearing this in mind, and in a quest
for empirically well-founded stylized facts, this paper aims to provide a comprehensive
analysis of the relationship between globalization and the incidence of civil conflict. We
adopt a broader perspective than that found in most of the existing studies on this
topic and investigate in a systematic way the consequences that the economic, social
and political dimensions of globalization have on civil conflict.
To the best of our knowledge, only Nieman (2011), Olzak (2011), and Flaten and
de Soysa (2012) have thus far considered the multidimensional nature of the process
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of globalization in this context. Nieman (2011) finds that changes in the degree of
integration imply greater risk of internal conflict. The results of Olzak (2011) show
that economic and cultural globalization is positively associated with the intensity
of ethnic conflicts, while sociotechnical aspects of integration increase fatalities from
ethnic conflicts but decrease deaths from non-ethnic conflicts. Finally, the empirical
evidence provided by Flaten and de Soysa (2012) suggests that globalization, particularly
economic and social globalization, leads to lower risk of civil war.
These results are potentially important. Nevertheless, previous studies do not
adequately address the potential endogeneity of the globalization variables, which is
particularly important to establish a causal link between the degree of integration with
the rest of the world and civil conflict. In this paper we use two strategies to tackle
this issue. Our first strategy is to include in the analysis country fixed effects in order
to control for those time-invariant factors affecting both conflict and globalization, such
as geographical and historical features. This is a first important difference between our
paper and Nieman (2011), Olzak (2011), and Flaten and de Soysa (2012). While the
fixed effects estimation is useful in removing the influence of long-run determinants of
both conflict and globalization, it does not necessarily estimate the causal effect of the
degree of integration with the rest of the world on civil conflict. For this reason, unlike
existing studies, our second strategy is to use an instrumental variables approach in this
context. To that end, we construct an instrument for globalization based on the degree
of integration of neighbouring countries.
The paper also differs from Nieman, (2011), Olzak (2011), and Flaten and de Soysa
(2012) in the definition of conflict used in the analysis. Nieman (2011) and Flaten and
de Soysa (2012) examine the impact of globalization on the onset of civil war and respect
for human rights, whereas the dependent variable used by Olzak (2011) is the number
of fatalities from conflict, which is a measure of the intensity of conflict. In contrast, we
are interested in the effect of integration on the incidence of civil conflict. This allows
us to relate our paper to the abundant literature on the determinants of the incidence of
intrastate conflicts (e.g. Miguel et al. 2004; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Esteban
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et al., 2012a,b). Nevertheless, we also explore the robustness of our results with respect
to conflict onset.
Unlike existing studies, we find no evidence of a significant impact of globalization
on civil conflict. The results of the paper show that the inclusion of country fixed effects
removes the statistical association between the degree of integration with the rest of the
world and the incidence of internal conflict. Our instrumental variables estimates also
show no causal effect of globalization on civil conflict. These findings do not depend
either on the specific dimension of globalization considered or the measure of conflict
used in the analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, section
2 reviews several of the theoretical arguments proposed in the literature to justify the
possible connection between globalization and internal conflict. Section 3 describes
the measures used in our study to quantify the relevance of globalization and internal
conflict in the various countries. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis undertaken
to investigate the link between globalization and civil conflict. The robustness of our
findings is examined in section 5. The main conclusions of our work are discussed in the
final section.
2.2 The relationship between globalization and civil
conflict
From a theoretical perspective, there are several arguments to believe that globalization
and civil conflict may be related. Nevertheless, this is a complex relationship, as
attempting to explain how globalization affects conflict implies taking into consideration
multiple factors and mechanisms that often work in opposite directions. Specifically, it
is important to note that economic, social and political integration can have different
effects on conflict (Nieman, 2011; Olzak, 2011; Flaten and de Soysa, 2012).
Most of the existing literature has focussed exclusively on the link between
international trade and civil conflict. According to Martin et al. (2008), there are
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two mechanisms relating trade and the opportunity cost of internal conflict, which
work in opposite directions. The first of these mechanisms is the deterrence effect.
This effect is based on the idea that the opportunity cost of conflict is positively
associated with the degree of trade openness of the country in question, as the economic
benefits generated by international trade can be threatened by the existence of intrastate
violence. According to this effect, trade openness reduces the potential risk of civil
conflict. However, Martin et al. (2008) also recall that international trade can be a
substitute for internal trade during civil conflict episodes, thus acting as an insurance
and reducing the opportunity cost of conflict. This insurance mechanism also implies
the weakening of the degree of economic interdependence of the various regions and
ethnic groups within a country, which in turn increases the feasibility of conflict (Martin
et al., 2008). The final impact of international trade on the incidence of civil conflict
depends ultimately on the magnitude of both effects, which may be related to the degree
of intensity of conflict. The deterrence effect should be more relevant in high intensity
conflicts, whereas the insurance effect should be less important in this type of conflicts
(Martin et al., 2008).
The opening of national economies to world markets has led to greater inequality
in numerous countries (Milanovic, 2016). According to the traditional view, economic
inequality is perceived as a major driver of social conflict. As pointed out by Sen
(1973, p. 1), “the relationship between inequality and rebellion is indeed a close one”.
Yet, intuitive and natural as it might seem, the link between income inequality and
conflict has not yet received conclusive and definitive empirical support (Esteban et al.,
2012 a,b). However, other dimensions of inequality are also potentially important in this
context. For example, economic globalization contributes to increasing spatial inequality
(i.e. inequality across the various regions of a country) (Ezcurra and Rodŕıguez-Pose,
2014). This is particularly relevant in this context, since a high level of spatial inequality
may lead to internal conflicts about the territorial distribution of resources (Østby et
al., 2009; Deiwiks et al., 2012). Furthermore, the impact of economic globalization
is often unevenly distributed across the members of different ethnic groups, favouring
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some groups over others and affecting ethnic inequality (i.e. inequality across ethnic
groups) (Olzak, 2011). The implications of economic globalization on ethnic inequality
are especially important in lower income countries, where the benefits from the process
of integration tend to improve the relative situation of ethnic groups that hold a political
dominant situation (Chua, 2003). In order to keep their privileged situation and limit
the degree of mobilization of disadvantaged groups, the dominant ethnic group usually
adopts practices including the deterioration of civil and political rights of minority
groups. This setting leads to an intensification of social unrest based on ethnic cleavages
(Wimmer et al., 2009), which is consistent with the increasing relevance of violent ethnic
conflicts in the last decades (Chua, 2003).
The social dimension of globalization can also affect conflict. The flows of information
and ideas that characterize social integration boost internal movements based on
claims for self-determination and expanded minority rights (Olzak, 2011; Flaten and
de Soysa, 2012). Social globalization contributes to reducing the cultural distance
between countries, thus providing an ideological platform and an international audience
predisposed to support these claims (Olzak, 2011). In this setting, minority groups
have a greater capacity to mobilize against repressive regimes that deny them their
rights, which in turn raises the risk of armed conflict. Moreover, the advances in this
dimension of globalization give rise to an increase in migratory flows across national
borders (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007). These migratory flows often lead to a negative
reaction of native citizens and the aggravation of existing ethnic tensions.
Social globalization also exerts greater international pressure on repressive regimes
as a result of the increasing information available nowadays via the Internet and other
global communication media (Dreher et al., 2012). In this context, the existence of a
violent conflict within a country negatively affects the likelihood of receiving foreign
investment and international aid. Indeed, this effect is particularly important in
countries highly dependent on tourism, as the economic gains generated by tourism
are put at risk due to the negative publicity of internal violence. This argument seems
to suggest that this aspect of social globalization increases the opportunity cost of civil
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conflict. However, at the same time, the advance of the new information technologies
also enhances the mobilization capacity of insurgents.
Finally, political globalization may also be connected with the incidence of intrastate
conflict through different mechanisms. An important aspect of this dimension of
globalization has to do with the increasing relevance of supranational organizations
such as the WTO, the IMF, or regional trade unions. The decisions adopted by these
organizations tend to be based on asymmetric trade and financial relations, which can
affect the internal situation and the economic performance of low- and middle-income
countries (Stiglitz, 2002). This may have implications on the level of dispersion of
the income distribution, the degree of ethnic inequality or the magnitude of spatial
disparities within these countries. As outlined above, all these factors are important in
explaining the potential for social unrest and civil conflict.
Empirical research is key to illustrating the potential link between globalization
and conflict. In recent years, several studies have investigated this relationship
empirically, paying particular attention to the impact of international trade and financial
liberalization on civil conflict (e.g. Bussmann and Schneider, 2007; Martin et al., 2008;
Sorens and Ruger, 2014). These analyses are doubtless useful to examine the effect of
economic globalization on internal conflict, but they do not provide any information
on the role played by social and political globalization in this context. Although
the different aspects of globalization are often positively correlated, this omission is
potentially important, as the various arguments discussed above show that social and
political globalization may have a direct effect on the incidence of conflict. Accordingly,
the impact of economic integration on conflict observed in the literature may be affected
by the omission of social and political globalization from the analysis. Bearing this in
mind, in this paper we follow the strategy adopted by Nieman (2011), Olzak (2011),
and Flaten and de Soysa (2012) and use an extensive concept of globalization, which
allows us to comprehensively examine the overall effect of economic, social, and political
integration on civil conflict. Nevertheless, our research does not aim to propose a new
theory or to test empirically the relevance of a specific channel linking globalization
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and internal violence. As pointed out in the introduction, our main contribution to the
literature has to do with the strategies adopted to investigate the causal link between
the degree of integration with the rest of the world and civil conflict.
2.3 Measuring globalization and civil conflict
Our empirical analysis requires comparable and reliable information on the incidence of
globalization in the various countries. Nevertheless, this is not an easy task because, as
discussed above, globalization is a multidimensional process and cannot be captured by a
single variable (Clark, 2000; Keohane and Nye, 2000). The measure of globalization that
we use is the KOF index of globalization constructed by Dreher (2006) and updated by
Dreher et al. (2008). This is a composite index widely employed in the recent literature
to examine different aspects of the consequences of globalization.2
The KOF index is based on a set of 23 variables associated with different dimensions
of globalization. These variables are used to obtain three indices on the incidence of
economic, social and political integration by means of principal component analysis
(for further details see Dreher et al. (2008)). The information provided by these
three indices is employed to calculate an overall index of globalization. The index of
economic integration is a weighted average of two subindices that respectively measure
actual economic flows and existing restrictions on trade and capital. The index of
social integration is a weighted average of three subindices that respectively capture
the importance of personal contacts, information flows and cultural proximity. The
degree of political integration is proxied by the number of embassies in a country,
membership in international organizations, participation in UN peacekeeping missions,
and the ratification of international treaties. Finally, the overall index of globalization
is obtained as a weighted average of the three indices of economic, social and political
integration.3 Table A.2 in the Appendix A displays the correlation coefficients between
2A comprehensive list of papers based on the KOF index of globalization can be found at
http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/.
3Table A.1 in the Appendix A includes further details on the different components of the KOF index,
as well as the weights attached to each individual variable to derive the various indices.
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the overall measure of globalization and the three indices of economic, social and
political integration. As expected, all the correlation coefficients are positive and
statistically significant at the 1% level. Their magnitude, however, reveals the existence
of discrepancies between the various dimensions of globalization identified by the
KOF index. This shows that the distinction between economic, social and political
globalization is empirically relevant and is not only a conceptual issue.
In order to conduct the analysis, we also need to quantify the incidence of civil
conflicts in the various countries. This information is drawn from the UCDP/PRIO
Armed Conflict Dataset. We follow the common practice in the literature and take as
our baseline PRIO25, which reports all internal conflicts with 25 or more battle-related
deaths in a year (e.g. Miguel et al., 2004; Esteban et al., 2012a,b; Nunn and Qian, 2014).
According to this criterion, 92 countries experienced at least one episode of civil conflict
between 1972 and 2009, which shows that intrastate violence is not concentrated in a
small number of countries.
2.4 Is there an empirical link between globalization and
civil conflict?
2.4.1 The model
In this section we investigate the relationship between globalization and civil conflict in
159 countries over the period 1972-2009. To that end, we estimate different versions of
the following model:
Cit = α+ βCit−1 + γGit−1 + δ
′
Xit−1 + ηi + λt + εit (2.1)
where C is a binary variable that takes a value of one if a civil conflict occurred in
country i during year t, zero otherwise. The lagged value of this variable is included
on the right-hand side to capture the inherent persistence in conflicts. G is the KOF
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index of globalization described above, and X denotes a set of variables that control
for additional factors that are assumed to have an influence on civil conflict. In turn, η
stands for country-specific effects, while λ are year dummies common to all countries.
Finally, ε is the corresponding disturbance term. The coefficient of interest throughout
the paper is γ, which measures the effect of globalization on the incidence of civil conflict.
The control variables included in vector X have been selected on the basis of existing
studies on the explanatory factors of civil conflict.4 Thus, there is an increasing body of
research that shows the association between economic conditions and internal violence.
The level of GDP per capita can be interpreted as a proxy for “a state’s overall financial,
administrative, police and military capabilities” (Fearon and Laitin, 2003, p. 80), which
suggests that rebels can expect a greater probability of success in low-income countries.
Furthermore, episodes of conflict tend to be preceded by negative income shocks (Miguel
et al., 2004). In fact, the lower the growth rate, the lower the opportunity cost of
enlisting as a rebel and engaging in a civil conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Taking
these arguments into account, we control for the level of GDP per capita and the growth
rate of this variable, using data taken from the Penn-World Table (Heston et al., 2011).5
Democratic and autocratic states tend to have few civil conflicts, while intermediate
regimes are the most conflict-prone (Hegre et al., 2001; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). In
view of this, we use a democracy index drawn from the Polity IV Project to construct
two dummy variables in order to identify anocratic and democratic regimes (autocratic
states are the omitted category).6 Natural resource abundance may also be related to
civil conflict (e.g. Ross, 2006; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009). An unfair distribution
of gains from natural resources could lead to social unrest and violence. Moreover,
natural resources may provide an important source of funding for rebel forces, making
conflict more feasible (Collier et al., 2009). Bearing this in mind, we include in our
4See Hegre and Sambanis (2006) and Blattman and Miguel (2010) for surveys of this literature.
5Note that the inclusion of the level of GDP per capita and its growth rate in model (2.1) is debatable,
as these variable may be considered as proximate outcomes of globalization (Frankel and Romer, 1999;
Dreher, 2006). Nevertheless, the results of the paper are unaffected if we remove the level of GDP per
capita and its growth rate from model (2.1).
6Although there are arguments suggesting that globalization may also affect democracy, the available
empirical evidence is far from being conclusive (Rudra, 2005; Doces and Magee, 2015). In any case, we
checked that our main findings still hold if we remove these dummies from the list of controls.
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model the data on total natural resources rents (as a percentage of GDP) provided by
the World Development Indicators.7
When considering the specification of model (2.1), it is important to note that the
inclusion of country fixed effects allows us to control for those time-invariant elements
relevant in this context, such as geographical and historical factors. As pointed out by
Sunde and Cervellati (2014), country fixed effects should also account for all potential
determinants of civil violence in which most of the variation throughout the study period
is across countries rather than over time. This is the case, for example, of the degree of
ethnic diversity, population size, or regional disparities. Many of these factors are also
likely to be correlated with globalization, which implies that removing the country fixed
effects from model (2.1) may lead to biased and inconsistent estimates.
2.4.2 Results
Table 2.1 presents the results obtained when various versions of model (2.1) are estimated
with the KOF index as our measure of globalization. Taking into account the approach
adopted by Nieman (2011), Olzak (2011), and Flaten and de Soysa (2012), we begin by
estimating the model without fixed effects, using a probit model and a linear probability
model. As can be observed in columns 1 and 2, in both cases the coefficient of the
globalization index is negative and statistically significant, which seems to suggest that
a higher level of integration with the rest of the world is associated with a lower incidence
of civil conflict. This result would be consistent with those arguments defending that the
advances of globalization can help to promote stability and peace, and reduce the risks of
internal conflicts (Bhagwati, 2004; Barbieri and Reuveny, 2005). Nevertheless, although
statistically significant, the effect of globalization is quantitatively small. For example,
the estimates in column 2 indicate that, conditional on the remaining covariates, a one
standard deviation increase in the globalization index is associated with a reduction
of around 2% in the probability of conflict.8 However, if this pooled OLS regression
7Table A.3 in the Appendix A shows some descriptive statistics for the different variables used in the
analysis.
8The impact derived from the probit model in column 1 is very similar.
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identified the causal effect of globalization on the incidence of civil conflict, then the
long-run effect would be larger than this, because of the inclusion of the lagged dependent
variable on the right-hand side. The implied cumulative effect of a one standard
deviation increase in the globalization index would reduce the probability of conflict by
around 10%. These findings should be treated with caution, as column 3 shows that the
coefficient of the globalization index is no longer statistically significant once country
fixed effects are included in model (2.1). This suggests that the association between
globalization and civil conflict observed in columns 1 and 2 is driven by time-invariant
omitted variables, such as historical and geographical factors.
Table 2.1: Globalization and conflict incidence: Main results.
Pooled Pooled FE- FE-
Probit OLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged conflict 2.805*** 0.796*** 0.599*** 0.599***
(0.126) (0.025) (0.038) (0.037)
Overall index of globalization -0.014*** -0.001** -0.001 -0.002
(0.005) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003)
GDP per capita (log) 0.019 0.004 0.017 0.021
(0.060) (0.006) (0.016) (0.020)
Economic growth 0.434 0.051 0.022 0.022
(0.495) (0.076) (0.076) (0.074)
Democracy 0.160 0.015 0.004 0.005
(0.113) (0.011) (0.019) (0.019)
Anocracy 0.285*** 0.029** 0.044** 0.043**
(0.087) (0.011) (0.019) (0.019)
Natural resources 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Country fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.588a 0.654 0.694 0.693
Root mean square error – 0.221 0.212 0.207
Countries 159 159 159 159
Observations 4,864 4,864 4,864 4,864
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes a value of one for conflicts
with 25 or more battle-related deaths in a year, zero otherwise (Prio25). Robust standard
errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. a Pseudo R-squared. * Significant at
10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
As mentioned in the introduction, fixed effects regressions do not necessarily
identify the causal effect of globalization on civil conflict. In fact, it is possible that
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Cov(Git−1, εit) 6= 0 because of the potential reverse impact of conflict on the spread
of globalization. The empirical evidence provided by Martin et al. (2008) shows that
the destruction of trade due to civil conflicts can be quantitatively very important and
persistent over time. In particular, in the case of civil wars with reported casualties
over 50,000 deaths, these authors observe a fall in trade around 25% from its natural
level in the first year of the war. The destruction of trade increases with time and it
is still present at around 40% 25 years after the conflict’s onset. The effect is lower in
magnitude but still present and persistent in the case of less-intensity conflicts (Martin
et al., 2008). In addition to this reverse causality problem, there may be time-varying
omitted determinants of conflict correlated with the degree of integration. Finally, the
values of the globalization index may be affected by measurement errors. All of these
problems could be solved if we had a suitable instrument for globalization. Such an
instrument must not be correlated with the disturbance term in model (2.1), but account
for the cross-country variation in the incidence of globalization.
As pointed by Flaten and de Soysa (2012), finding an instrument that fulfils these
two conditions is not an easy task in our context given the nature of the KOF index.
While we do not have an ideal source of exogenous variation, we consider that the
(weighted) average of the incidence of globalization in neighbouring countries can be a
plausible instrument. To calculate this average the values of the globalization index are
weighted by a spatial weights matrix, W , which describes the spatial interdependences
among the sample countries. In particular, W is defined as follows:
W =






if i 6= j
(2.2)
where dij is the geographic distance between countries i and j, which in itself is strictly
exogenous. As can be observed, W is row standardized, so that it is relative and not
absolute distance which matters. Analogously, one can calculate the (weighted) average
of the degree of economic, social and political globalization in neighbouring countries.
The rationale for using this instrument has to do with the notion that geography and
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spatial interdependence are important factors for the spread of globalization, which is
consistent, for example, with numerous theoretical models developed in the so-called
“New Economic Geography” (e.g. Krugman, 1998; Fujita and Thisse, 2002). There
is abundant evidence showing that trade flows are more likely between neighbouring
countries, as transport costs increase with geographic distance (e.g. Anderson and Van
Wincoop, 2004; Disdier and Head, 2008). Similarly, the cultural distance between two
countries depends directly on the geographic distance between them (Disdier et al.,
2010). These arguments suggest that a country’s level of globalization tends to be
higher, the higher the degree of integration of its neighbouring countries with the rest
of the world.
The first stage regressions in Table 2.2 confirm the relevance of the instrument in
explaining the cross-country variation in the incidence of globalization. The coefficient
of the instrument is in all cases positive and statistically significant at the 1% level,
regardless of the specific dimension of globalization considered. The partial regression
plots displayed in Figure A1 in the Appendix A indicate that the association between
the instrument and the degree of globalization is not driven by potential outliers.
Furthermore, the values of the F-statistic for the excluded instrument shown in Table
2.2 suggest that there is no reason to believe that our estimates are biased by a weak
instrument.
To be a valid instrument, however, the degree of globalization in neighbouring
countries should not affect the incidence of conflict in any given country beyond its
impact on the level of globalization of that country. This condition cannot be tested
formally in the absence of other instruments, but we consider that it is a plausible
assumption. Nevertheless, one may argue that the degree of integration of neighbouring
countries may influence the dependent variable in model (2.1) through cross-border
conflict spillovers. However, as can be seen in section 5, our main results still hold when
we control for the incidence of conflict in neighbouring countries.
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Table 2.2: First stage regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Overall Economic Social Political
globalization globalization globalization globalization
Overall globalization in neighbouring countries 0.346***
(0.053)
Economic globalization in neighbouring countries 0.348***
(0.070)
Social globalization in neighbouring countries 0.433***
(0.069)
Political globalization in neighbouring countries 0.395***
(0.109)
Lagged conflict -0.266 -0.126 -0.448 -0.482
(0.367) (0.740) (0.431) ( -0.837)
GDP per capita (log) 2.731*** 1.425 4.037*** 2.400
(0.995) (1.403) (1.063) (1.516)
Economic growth 0.491 5.211** -2.718** 1.476
(1.082) (2.035) (1.176) (1.971)
Democracy 1.189* 1.812 -0.154 3.003**
(0.616) (1.040) (0.821) (1.333)
Anocracy -0.677 -0.678 -2.300*** 2.054*
(0.479) (0.745) (0.548) (1.052)
Natural resources -0.030 0.079** -0.068** -0.042
(0.024 ) (0.033) (0.027) (0.033)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.970 0.939 0.965 0.907
Root mean square error 3.232 4.910 4.126 6.900
F-test excluded instrument 43.17*** 24.38*** 38.88*** 13.25***
Partial R-squared 0.110 0.070 0.155 0.040
Countries 159 139 159 160
Observations 4,864 4,431 4,864 4,884
Second stage results Table 1, Table 3, Table 3, Table 3,
col. 4 col. 3 col. 6 col. 9
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. * Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5%
level, *** significant at 1% level.
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Column 4 of Table 2.1 reports the 2SLS estimates of model (2.1).9 The results
reveal the absence of a significant relationship between globalization and civil conflict,
thus confirming the information provided by the OLS estimates with fixed effects in
column 3 of Table 2.1. Therefore, our analysis shows no evidence on the existence of
causal effect of the degree of integration with the rest of the world on intrastate conflict,
which should be taken into account by policy makers and international organizations
when considering the consequences associated with the process of globalization currently
underway.
With respect to the control variables included in model (2.1), Table 2.1 reveals that
conflict incidence is deeply affected by the existence of previous episodes of violence.10
In turn, civil conflict is more likely in anocratic regimes, which is consistent with the
empirical evidence provided by Hegre et al. (2001) and Fearon and Laitin (2003), among
others. The remaining covariates are not significantly related to conflict incidence in our
regressions.
So far we have investigated the overall impact of globalization on the incidence of
civil conflicts. In order to complement our results, in Table 2.3 we use the information
provided by the KOF index to examine the role played in this setting by economic,
social and political integration. This is particularly interesting, given that it is not clear
a priori that these three dimensions of globalization affect civil conflict in the same
way. We begin the analysis by discussing the OLS estimates of model (2.1) without
country fixed effects. This specification shows that the measures of economic and social
globalization seem to be negatively and significantly associated with conflict incidence.
The existence of a negative relationship between economic globalization and intrastate
conflict is in line with the findings reported by Barbieri and Reuveny (2005), Bussmann
and Schneider (2007) or Flaten and de Soysa (2012), but it contrasts with the results in
9As pointed out by Miguel et al. (2004), 2SLS is typically preferred even in cases in which the
dependent variable is dichotomous (Angrist and Kreuger, 2001), as strong specification assumptions are
required to justify the use of alternative methods, such as those proposed by Rivers and Vuong (1988).
10Note that including the lagged of the dependent variable on the right-hand side is unlikely to result
in the Nickell (1981) bias, as the time dimension of our panel is relatively large (T = 38). Using Monte
Carlo simulations, Judson and Owen (1999) and Beck and Katz (2004) show the limited influence of the
lagged dependent variable on other covariates when the time dimension is moderately large.
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Martin et al. (2008) and Olzak (2011). The empirical evidence provided by Olzak
(2011) indicates that cultural and sociotechnical aspects of integration increase the
number of fatalities in ethnic conflicts. However, in the case of non-ethnic conflicts,
she finds that sociotechnical aspects of globalization are negatively correlated with
casualties. In turn, the results reported by Flaten and de Soysa (2012) suggest that social
globalization reduces the risk of conflict onset. Table 2.3 also shows that the measure of
political globalization is positively and significantly related to the dependent variable.
Nevertheless, the employment of alternative estimation strategies sheds considerable
doubt on these findings. In fact, the estimates in Table 2.3 reveal that, once country
fixed effects are introduced in the model and 2SLS regressions are used, the relationship
between the various measures of globalization and civil conflict disappears, which is
consistent with our previous findings.
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2.5 Robustness checks
The analysis carried out so far suggests that the degree of integration with the rest of the
world does not exert a significant effect on conflict incidence, regardless of the specific
dimension of globalization considered. In this section we investigate the robustness of
this result.
Influential countries
We begin by examining whether our findings are robust to the elimination of regions
that can be considered especially conflictive. As is known, civil conflicts have been
particularly persistent during the last decades in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin
America. We carry out different estimations of model (2.1) in which we exclude the
countries in these regions in turn. Table A.4 in the Appendix A shows that our findings
are not driven by countries located in the most conflictive regions in the world. Table A.4
also reveals that the results still hold when we remove from the sample the high-income
countries according to the World Bank classification.
Cross-border conflict spillovers and the exclusion restriction
The exclusion restriction implied by our 2SLS regressions is that, conditional on the set
of controls included in the baseline specification of model (2.1), the instrument has no
effect on the incidence of civil conflict, other than their impact through globalization.
As mentioned above, the validity of this assumption may be problematic in the case of
the globalization of neighbouring countries, as one may argue that this variable could
be correlated with the level of violence registered by neighbouring countries within their
borders, which could in turn affect the risk of civil conflict in a particular country. In this
line, the international relations literature has highlighted that conflict in one nation can
cause violence in neighbouring countries in many different ways (Brown, 1996; Lake
and Rothchild, 1998). As an example, we might mention the existence of refugee
flows or armed rebel groups seeking protection or wreaking havoc on neighbouring
2.5. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 30
states to internationalize the conflict, alliances between transnational ethnic groups,
or territorial demands involving two different nations. In fact, the empirical relevance of
these cross-border conflict spillovers has been confirmed by several studies (e.g. Hegre
and Sambanis, 2006; Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008; Bosker and de Ree, 2014).
In view of this, we now control for the incidence of conflict in neighbouring countries
in the previous year.11 Table 4 presents the results obtained when this additional
covariate is included in our baseline specification. As can be seen, the presence of a civil
conflict in neighbouring countries seems to have a positive and statistically significant
effect on conflict incidence, which is consistent with the existence of cross-border conflict
spillovers. Nevertheless, Table 1.4 shows that the inclusion of this additional control in
model (2.1) does not affect the previous results on the impact of globalization on civil
conflict, thus confirming the robustness of our findings.12
11This variable has been constructed following the same method described in section 4.2 to calculate
the degree of globalization in neighbouring countries.
12As shown in Table A.5 in the Appendix A, the main results of the paper remain unaffected if we
consider alternatively the average incidence of conflict in neighbouring countries over the last five years.
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Alternative measures of conflict
As mentioned above, the dependent variable in model (2.1) is Prio25, a binary variable
that reports conflicts with 25 or more battle-related deaths in a given year. Our
findings, however, may be affected by the choice of this specific threshold of deaths.
For this reason, as an additional robustness check, we now examine to what extent the
previous results depend on the definition of civil conflict used to construct the dependent
variable in model (2.1). To that end, we now use two alternative indicators based on
the UCDP/PRIO data. The first one is Prio25 augmented by the requirement that
the conflict must yield at least 1,000 deaths over its course (Priocw). The second one
considers exclusively conflicts with 1,000 or more deaths per year (Prio1000), which
allows us to focus on high-intensity conflicts. Table A.6 in the Appendix A presents the
results obtained when Priocw and Prio1000 are used as dependent variables. As can
be seen, the estimates continue to show no significant relationship between globalization
and conflict incidence.
The analysis performed so far examines the effect of the degree of integration with
the rest of the world on conflict incidence. However, globalization may also affect the
outbreak of conflicts (Nieman, 2011; Flaten and de Soysa, 2012). In order to explore
this issue, we use an alternative dependent variable which is coded one for the first
year of a conflict episode (Prio25 definition) that follows at least two years of peace,
zero otherwise. The onset regressions are displayed in Table A.7 in the Appendix
A. The results are very similar to those described above for conflict incidence. Our
estimates reveal that there is no evidence for a significant effect of globalization on
conflict outbreak. The only exception is the measure of social globalization, whose
coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level in column 3 of Table
A.7. This suggests that this aspect of globalization may contribute to reducing the risk
of conflict onset, although its effect is not statistically significant in the specification
including all dimensions of globalization jointly (column 5 of Table A.7).
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2.6 Conclusions
Civil conflicts account for an enormous share of deaths and hardship in the world today.
In addition to the direct impact on battle-related deaths, intrastate conflicts give rise to
an important number of indirect deaths due to disease and malnutrition, as well as the
forced displacement of refugees. It is estimated that civil wars have caused three times
as many deaths as wars between states since the end of the Second World War (Fearon
and Laitin, 2003). Intrastate conflicts also have a negative impact on political stability
and economic development. Therefore, the analysis of the explanatory factors of internal
conflicts is particularly relevant. In view of this, in this paper we have investigated the
link between globalization and civil conflict using data on 159 countries over the period
1972-2009. Unlike most of the existing studies on this issue, this paper employs an
extensive notion of globalization including its three main dimensions: economic, social
and political integration.
The results show that the inclusion of country fixed effects removes the statistical
association between the degree of integration with the rest of the world and the incidence
of internal conflict. We present instrumental variables estimates that also show no
causal effect of globalization on civil conflict. These findings do not depend either on
the specific dimension of globalization considered or the measure of conflict used in the
analysis. Likewise, the absence of a relationship between globalization and civil conflict
is not driven by countries located in the most conflictive regions in the world.
The conclusions of the paper shed considerable doubt on those arguments that claim
the existence of a direct link between globalization and conflict. Nevertheless, some
caution is necessary in interpreting our results. First, it is important to note that
our findings do not allow us to dismiss the possibility that the impact of globalization
on conflict might be conditional on factors such as ethnic heterogeneity, horizontal
inequalities, or natural resource abundance. Further research is required to explore
the relevance of these potential interaction effects. Second, the various arguments laid
down in section 2 show that the relationship between globalization and civil conflict is far
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from simple and involves multiple factors and mechanisms that often work in opposite
directions. Additional analyses are required to isolate and quantify the relevance of the
different transmission channels which may link the degree of integration with conflict.
Only by pursuing these strands will we be able to attain a more complete understanding
of the relationship between globalization and civil conflict.
Chapter 3
The Role of Ethnic
Characteristics in the Effect of
Income Shocks on African
Conflict
[Authors: Beatriz Manotas Hidalgo, Fidel Pérez Sebastián and Miguel Angel
Campo-Becós. This chapter has been published in World Development, 2021.1]
3.1 Introduction
Conflict is among the most robust determinants of low economic growth and high
mortality (see, e.g., Collier and Hoefler, 2004, and Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). It
causes unemployment, human capital loses, reductions in income and displacements of
the population, and is a leading cause of hunger and general food insecurity in several
parts of the world. Therefore, understanding the determinants of conflict is an important
objective that investigators have integrated into their research agendas.
Among those determinants, the impact of income on conflict has been widely studied
in the literature.2 Economists and political scientists have also emphasized the role of
1World Development, Volume 137, 2021, 105153 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.
105153
2A common approach has been to employ external shocks captured by fluctuations in commodity
prices in order to isolate the effect. At the country level, as Berman and Couttenier (2015) argue,
results have been mixed. At the micro-level, on the other hand, the analysis points out a more robust
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ethnic cleavages on the generation of violence.3 However, much less attention has been
devoted to the study of the role of ethnic status in the propagation of income shocks.
This is an important gap, because ethnic marginalization and diversity may work as
amplifiers of the perceived economic costs and benefits—through for example a sense of
grievance—and also as means of filtering areas where governments might be stronger.
We fill this gap focusing on Africa, a very vulnerable part of the world with a
relatively low capacity of adaptation. In fact, Africa is the region most affected by
conflicts after the Second World War. In early January of 2016, twenty-eight countries
and 201 militias-guerrillas were involved in conflicts. More specifically, we answer the
following question. How do the diversity and political status of ethnic groups affect
the impact of income shocks on conflict? We focus on shocks coming from agriculture,
because of its importance in food security, and because the agricultural sector still
employs more than 50% of the total labor force in Sub-Saharan Africa according to
ILO (2019). Unlike previous literature, we work with a full grid of African countries
divided into sub-national units of 0.5 x 0.5 degrees latitude and longitude, and consider
different measures of ethnic status, namely, spatial polarization and fragmentation, and
monopoly and excluded political power. Our approach exploits the arguably exogenous
nature at the cell level of variations in income shocks related to international commodity
prices and climate conditions.4 To further preserve exogeneity, international prices are
weighted at the cell level using information about crop suitability from the FAO’s global
agroecological zones (GAEZ) as in Berman and Couttenier (2015), and ethnic variables
are measured before the start of the sample period.
Nevertheless, even though the effect of this interaction on conflict is still far from
causal relationship. For instance, Dube and Vargas (2013), Fjelde (2015), and Berman et al. (2017) find
that agricultural price shocks are negatively correlated with conflict, whereas mineral and oil prices are
positively correlated.
3In particular, the role of ethnic fractionalization and ethnic polarization in civil wars have been
studied, among others, by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), Esteban and Ray (2008 and 2011) and
Esteban et al. (2012); and the importance of the presence of ethnic groups excluded from political power
and ethnic groups that enjoy monopoly over the state have been analyzed, for example, by Cederman
et al. (2009) and as Cederman et al. (2011).
4Bazzi and Blattman (2014) argue that several African nations produce a large volume of commodity
output, leading to a potential endogeneity problem related to prices. For example, from the supply side,
a conflict could lead to reduced production, and hence, increase commodity prices. Even though this
can be important at the country level, it is much less so at the cell level.
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being well understood, it has already received some interest. Janus and Riera-Crichton
(2015) analyze it, but at the country level, focusing on the onset of conflict instead
of its incidence, employing fully aggregated price shocks, and considering only ethnic
polarization and fragmentation.5 We change the level of observation and consider
additional variables. More specifically, our analysis concentrates on a grid-country cell
level, combining sub-national, time-invariant maps of crop suitability with information
on the movement of global commodity prices, climate conditions, and the four different
ethnic-status variables mentioned previously (fragmentation, polarization, excluded
groups and monopoly groups). We also make a step forward by introducing the spatial
ethnic fractionalization index developed at the cell level by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
(2017) and by adapting the spatial ethnic polarization index to the cell level.
Following the work of McGuirk and Burke (2020) (MB from now on), which also
employs geocoded data, we differentiate between two sources of violence—factor conflict
and output conflict—and between two types of locations—food-producing cells and
food-consuming cells. Factor conflict is related to large-scale conflict such as battles over
the control of territory and production means. Output conflict, in turn, is associated to
smaller-scale conflict over the appropriation of surplus. Food prices in food-producing
areas are captured through a producer price index, and in food-consuming cells through
a consumer price index.
MB estimate a negative impact of food prices on factor conflict in food-producing
cells but a positive one in food-consuming cells. As argued by MB, this opposing-effects
result is difficult to reconcile with theories that emphasize a one-direction impact such
as the state capacity mechanism or the rapacity effect, and provides evidence that the
opportunity-costs channel, whose direction can vary depending on whether agents are
producers or consumers, is a main source of conflict. They also find that food prices
have a positive impact on output conflict in both food-producing and food-consuming
areas, which gives also support to the opportunity cost mechanism.6
5Albeit not focusing directly on violence, Brückner and Gradstein, (2015) find that, across countries,
the marginal effect of oil price changes on political risk increases with ethnic polarization.
6See Section 2.5.5 for a more detailed discussion.
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Our findings reinforce the ones obtained by MB but add new aspects and point out an
important role of state-capacity (as in Bazzi and Blattman, 2014) and ethnic grievance
as determinants of conflict. More specifically, results reproduce the ones obtained
by MB for factor and output conflict even when ethnic heterogeneity is considered
in the regression. Support for the state capacity channel, on the other hand, comes
from the interactions of the agricultural-commodity income shocks with the ethnic
diversity variables. The sign of the estimates is always positive across price indices
and conflict definitions. That is, the effect of food-price shocks tends to be less negative
(or more positive) in more ethnically fractionalized and polarized areas. The lack of
opposing effects in food-producing and food-consuming areas on factor conflict makes
the result inconsistent with the opportunity cost mechanism. Moreover, the necessary
dominance of opportunity costs over the rapacity effect to get the MB results leads us
to interpret this finding as pointing to an important role of state capacity, given that
more fractionalized or polarized societies signal weaker states suffering more from social
tensions (Esteban and Ray, 1999).
Additionally, our estimates imply that the effect of the interaction between food
prices and political ethnic cleavages depends on the type of cell and conflict. In
food-producing areas, the impact is negative with battles and with output conflict.
In food-consuming areas is, on the other hand, positive with both types of violence as
well. These results provide evidence and add a location dimension that supports the
argument put forward by Roessler (2011) that excluded ethnic groups can have different
effects depending on the type of conflict. He sustains that the gain in government’s
power (or state capacity) from the exclusion of certain groups may come at the cost of
displacing the conflict from politics to society, due to the feeling of grievance induced on
the excluded population. It could be argued that this trade-off shows in our estimates:
in food-consumption cells, the grievance mechanism dominates, possibly exacerbating
the perceived opportunity cost, and due to a larger capacity of excluded-group members
to get organized in urban areas. In food-producing cells, on the contrary, the state
capacity effect dominates at least in the output conflict regression; otherwise, the sign
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would have to be positive.
We also disaggregate the measure of output conflict, which is the one considered by
MB, in its two components: riots and violence against civilians. Both measures are taken
from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED). Riots represent
violent events where rioters engage in disruptive acts. Violence against civilians, in turn,
refers to an organized armed-group inducing violence upon unarmed civilians. Hence,
violence against civilians is an intermediate type of conflict that lies between organized
armed-group battles—which in the main analysis is taken from the Uppsala Conflict
Data Program (UCDP) to proxy factor conflict—and riots. This distinction shows up
clearly in our estimations. In particular, the response of violence against civilians to
the income shocks shares with factor conflict more than twice the number of coefficient
signs and significance than with riots. They share, for example, with one exception, all
signs of the coefficients related to both producer and consumer prices, possibly signaling
that in both cases conflict is exerted by organized armed groups. However, like riots and
unlike factor conflict, violence against civilians responds positively to consumer prices
in urban areas; thus, implying that this type of output conflict has an important urban
component. It is also interesting that, unlike violence against civilians, riots respond
much less to political ethnic heterogeneity.
Another interesting result from the disaggregation is that the estimated direct effect
of food-prices on riots is negative; and although the coefficient is not significant in
the main analysis, it becomes significant in some of the robustness tests, and the rest
of robustness exercises retain the sign. This negative direct impact of food prices in
food-consuming cells suggests an increase in state capacity to control insurgence, because
the other two theories (i.e., opportunity cost and surplus predation) are not consistent
with the estimated sign, and because the employed consumer price is a country-wide
index that should reflect, at least in part, the capacity of local and central governments
to raise revenues.
We consider droughts as another proxy for income shocks and estimate its effect
jointly with food prices. The reason is that we expect that droughts capture variations
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in the quantity of local crop production much more closely than international prices.
Following Harari and La Ferrara (2018) (HF from now on), we employ the SPEI Global
Drought Monitor database that provides estimates of the potential evapotranspiration
(PET). Without ethnic variables, the regression gives a positive impact of droughts
on conflict. However, this direct effect tends to disappear once the political ethnic
variables are included. In general, the qualitative results are the same than for producer
prices, although as expected, with the opposite sign—notice that higher food prices
and levels of droughts represent positive and negative income shocks, respectively. Our
results are consistent with von Uexkull et al. (2016) who find, using georeferenced data,
that droughts help sustain civil conflict battles, especially for agriculturally-dependent
politically-excluded groups. We confirm their factor-conflict findings with our sample
and methodology. In addition, when we look at the determinants of output conflict,
the existence of excluded groups turns out insignificant for riots, whereas excluded and
monopoly groups raise the marginal effect of droughts on violence against civilians.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the mechanisms
proposed in the literature to justify a possible connection of income shocks and ethnicity
with conflict. The data and the econometric methodology are presented in sections 3
and 4, respectively. Section 5 shows our main results. Several robustness checks of the
results are conducted in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Theories of Conflict
There exist several competing theories of the effect of income shocks on conflict. All
of them are based on the economic insight that rational individuals weight the relative
returns, costs, and risk for choosing between to produce or predate (Becker, 1968).
One of them is the opportunity cost theory. Models of rebellion suggest that civilian’s
incentives to rebel rises as economic opportunities and household’s real income decline
(Grossman, 1991). As MB show, the effect can be positive or negative depending on the
type of shock and conflict definition. If labor productivity (e.g., due to proper weather)
or producer prices increase, real wages will go up and individuals will have less incentives
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to join armed groups. This predicted strong inverse relationship between commodity
prices and conflict have been used in several papers such as Dal Bò and Dal Bò (2011).
However, as MB argue, if consumer prices go up, the real wage of workers will go down,
and individuals will have more incentives to fight.
A second theory, based on the state-is-a-prize mechanism suggests that rising prices
should increase the risk of insurrection as a mechanism to capture rents or the surplus.
This channel is also known as predatory behavior or the rapacity effect. It is especially
relevant in the case of mineral and oil and gas that are many times controlled by the
state. Nevertheless, as MB show, even though surplus predation can be also present in
the case of agricultural income shocks in food-producing areas, its effect is dominated
by the opportunity costs mechanism.
A third channel, the state capacity theory (see, e.g., Ross, 2012), states that rising
rents provide the state with a stronger capacity to buy off the opposition, counter
insurgents and strengthen control, and therefore, help prevent conflict. In addition,
we argue that the state capacity effect does not need to show up only at the country
level. All different layers of government—central, regional and municipal—have, many
times, transferred revenue-collection and expenditure discretionary powers. Therefore,
the capacity to buy off opponents and control rebellion and violence can vary between
different cells that experience different shocks. Notice that predictions based on the
state capacity mechanism are the opposite to the ones from the state-is-a-prize theory.
Moving now to the impact of ethnic diversity, papers such as Blattman and Miguel
(2010) have emphasized ethnic nationalism as a preeminent source of group cohesion.
Conflict can be rooted in intense emotional reactions based on deep biological, cultural
or psychological nature of ethnic cleavages (Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara,
2000). Consequently, indexes of fractionalization and polarization as measures of
diversity have been used in several empirical studies with the idea that ethnically diverse
societies have a higher probability of ethnic conflicts (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon
and Laitin, 2003; Miguel et al, 2004). Whereas ethnic fractionalization measures the
probability that two randomly selected individuals from a given location do not belong
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to the same ethnic group, the polarization index assesses how far the distribution of
the ethnic groups is from a bipolar distribution. Results using fractionalization indexes
are surprisingly murky. However, papers like Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) have
found polarization as significant to explain the incidence of civil war.
Finally, political sciences have emphasized the potential importance of ethnic
political diversity and political marginalization of ethnic groups in the incidence of
conflict (Gurr, 1970; Horowitz, 1985; Baseadu and Pierskalla, 2014; Cederman et al.,
2009, 2010, 2011; Wimmer et al. 2009). For example, Cederman et al. (2011) find the
political inequality affects positively civil wars through grievance-based mechanisms.7
Other authors argue that the effect may depend on the type of conflict and political
inequality. Roessler (2011) argues that the exclusion of certain ethnic groups from
politics increases the government’s power, reducing the risk of a coup, but raises the
threat of suffering a future ethnoregional rebellion. Baseadu and Pierskalla (2014),
focusing on the interaction with the oil and gas endowment, hypothesize that ethnic
exclusion should amplify the risk of conflict, while monopoly power of ethnic groups
should cause the opposite effect through an state-capacity channel; they find evidence
of the latter effect but not of the former.
In this paper, we consider both excluded groups from the central power and monopoly
groups. Excluded groups are defined as relevant ethnic communities that are excluded
from government relevant processes, whereas monopoly groups mean that elite members
hold monopoly power in the executive that leads to the exclusion of members of other
ethnic groups. Both excluded and monopoly ethnic groups can or cannot be at the same
cell at a given point in time.8 Few papers (e.g., Baseadu and Pierskalla, 2014; and von
Uexkull et al., 2016) have used these variables in a grid-panel data context and never in
conjunction with other measures of ethnic diversity.
Our key contribution is analyzing whether a plausible effect of ethnicity on conflict
7von Uexkull et al. (2016) point out that politically excluded groups are more likely to be barred
from government-sponsored compensation programs or even aid in the case of negative income shocks
such as floods and severe droughts.
8As we can see in Figure B.3 in the Appendix B, most African countries have excluded ethnic groups,
whereas only Angola, Mali, Rwanda, Libya, and Egypt have settled monopolist ethnic ones.
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can be indirect. That is, we hypothesize that a positive income shock might have a
different impact depending on the degree of ethnic diversity and the political status of
ethnic groups. For example, a positive agricultural shock can decrease the probability of
incidence of battles because of the opportunity cost mechanism. However, if trade among
different ethnic groups involves monitoring costs because of the lack of trust between
them, this opportunity cost effect will be weaker in cells with a higher degree of ethnic
fragmentation. Another example, social tension that leads to weaker governments in
more ethnically fractionalized or polarized societies can also cause a lower state capacity
to benefit from positive income shocks. A third one, the presence of monopoly groups
might exacerbate income inequality within the cell, thus reducing the opportunity cost
of poor individuals, or alternatively allow the dominant tribe to more tightly control
natural-resource rents that can provide the means to repress military threats or buy
peace. Therefore, the type and degree of ethnic heterogeneity can affect the impact
of income shocks on the probability of conflict, but the sign and magnitude of this
effect is uncertain; it will depend on how ethnic characteristics alter the state capacity,
state-as-a-prize and opportunity costs channels. We want to provide empirical evidence
that help advance in this direction.
In sum, the main hypotheses that we want to test are the following. (i) If the
opportunity cost channel dominates, positive income shocks reduce armed conflict in
food-producing cells, but increase it in food-consuming areas. (ii) If the state-capacity
mechanism dominates, positive income shocks decrease conflict in both food-producing
and food-consuming locations. (iii) If the rapacity effect predominates, positive income
shocks rise conflict in both locations. (iv) Ethnic fractionalization and polarization
signal weaker states with less capacity to deliver the possible conflict-reducing effects
of positive income shocks. (v) The existence of ethnic groups with monopoly political
power signals stronger governments that enjoy stronger state capacity to get advantage
of positive income shocks and reduce conflict. (vi) Political marginalization of ethnic
groups (either monopoly or excluded) may increase the sense of grievance, thus raising
the opportunity costs perceived.
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3.3 Data
Our baseline unit of analysis is a full grid of Africa divided into sub-national units
of 0.5 x 0.5 grades latitude and longitude (which corresponds to a cell of roughly 55
km x 55 km at the equator).9 This is the result of intersecting a grid of 10,638 cells
provided by PRIO-GRID (http://www.prio.no/Data/PRIO-GRID/) with a map of the
entire Africa and their national political borders provided by the Global Administrative
Unit Layers, 2010 release, a project from the United Nations Food and Agricultural
Organization (FAO). From the PRIO-GRID database, we download most of our
non-conflict variables. The level of aggregation is the cell-year rather than ethnicity
or administrative boundaries, in order to ensure that our unit of observation is not
endogenous to conflict events. The sample coverage of the conflict data goes from 1998
to 2013 across forty-nine African countries. In the rest of this section, definitions and
sources for the main variables employed in our regressions are given.10
3.3.1 Conflict data
We use two different datasets containing the geo-location of conflict events in Africa:
the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset or ACLED (Raleigh and Dowd, 2015);
and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Event dataset or UCDP-GED,
version 5.0 (Sundberg and Melander, 2013; Croicu and Sundberg, 2016). As will become
evident, the use of different datasets allows us to test different competitive theories and
the robustness of our results. UCDP defines a conflict event as an incident where armed
force was used by an organized actor against another organized actor, or against civilians,
resulting in at least 1 direct death at a specific location and a specific date.11 However,
UCDP records events related to battles in consecutive years between an organized
9See Figure B..1 in the Appendix B.
10The Appendix B provides this information in more detail, including several descriptive statistics
tables (Tables A1 to A9) organized by variable, country, crop and natural resource, and maps (Figures
B.2 to B6) that illustrate the different independent variables considered. The explanations for the
socioeconomic variables employed in the regressions mainly as controls (i.e., the commodity price indices
for oils and gas and mines, and urban area) are also relegated to the Appendix B.
11According to UCDP-GED, two-side armed force battles are classified as state-based conflict or
non-state conflict, and armed-force violence against civilians as one-sided violence.
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armed-group dyad only when they have caused at least 25 fatalities in at least one
of those consecutive years. In this case, events are included for the entire period, that
is, both for the years when such conflict crossed the 25 battle-related deaths threshold
and for the years when it did not.
The ACLED dataset, in turn, has a broader perspective and records violent activity
both within and outside the context of a civil war, and does not require any battle-related
deaths threshold. We will use as dependent variable three different ACLED aggregates:
political violence in the form of (i) battles and (ii) violence against civilians; and protest
events in the form of (iii) riots.
Given that factor conflict represents large-scale violence related with the permanent
control of territory, MB argue that the appropriate measure is the UCDP-GED one,
because it captures organized armed-force conflict. We later in the paper, for robustness,
employ also ACLED battles as an alternative proxy. Output conflict, on the other side,
captures conflict generated for the transitory appropriation of surplus. We are then
targeting events that are less organized than large-scale battles. Therefore, and again
following MB, output conflict will be measured using the ACLED categories riots and
violence against civilians.
To create the measure of conflict incidence, we follow Berman et al. (2017) and
MB and aggregate to the cell-year, coding with a value of 1 if cell c experienced a
conflict during the year, and zero otherwise. In the robustness section, we also employ
information on conflict intensity from the same sources.
3.3.2 Food-price indices
Our identification strategy is based on the use of income shocks related to agricultural
commodities that can be considered exogenous at the cell level. We employ three proxies:
an agricultural producer price (APP) index, a consumer price (CP) index, and a measure
a droughts. The construction of the first two follow MB and employ international prices,
and the construction of the third one follows HF and uses weather variables. Droughts
3.3. DATA 46
are introduced in the regressions jointly with prices, because local climate conditions are
more closely related to the quantity of production. Next we explain how we construct
them.
To construct the agricultural-production price shocks, we combine time-series data
on international commodity prices from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the
International Finance Statistics and the World Bank Global Economic Monitor with
cell-specific time-invariant data of crops suitability and potential production from the
FAO’s Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) dataset.12 GAEZ provides crop potential
production data constructed using location characteristics such as soil properties and
climate conditions (temperature and rainfall), considering the average climate during
the baseline period 1961-1990. This information is combined with crops growing
requirements to generate a global GIS raster on the potential suitability of a cell for
each crop potential production. A cell is considered suitable for crop production if it
could achieve at least 40% of its maximum capacity. For each cell, these data can be
used to have exogenous weights for agricultural-commodity prices, because the weights
are not based on actual levels of production and consumption. In addition, we take
the potential capacity in years before the starting date of our database sample. GAEZ
produces spatial detail at the 0.0833 decimal degree, which we aggregate to our 0.5
degree cell level.13
We cover the following crops: banana, barley, cocoa, coffee, coconut oil, groundnuts,
maize, oranges, oil palm, olive oil, rice, soybeans, sugar cane, sunflower, tea, tobacco and
wheat. The next step is aggregating the monthly international commodity prices to an
annual price series for each commodity, normalized to 1 in year 1990 (Fjelde, 2015; and
Bruner and Ciccone, 2010). At each date t, the APP index in cell i at time t (APPit)
is the average across the j = 1, .., n agricultural commodities of the international crop
prices (PAjt ) weighted by the time-invariant potential production shares (wij) of suitable
12http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/index.aspx, https://datacatalog.worldbank.
org/dataset/global-economic-monitor,and"http://gaez.fao.org/Main.html#.
13In the robustness section, we also try alternative data on crop production from the M3-Crops dataset









Our consumer price index is built using country-level data on food consumption
patterns from the FAO Balance Sheets following the methodology in MB. The measure
of food consumption is the calories per person-day available for human consumption
from each primary commodity. Data on food supply are calculated combining statistics
of production, imports and stock changes, corrected to eliminate the fed to livestock, the
use of seeds, and losses during storage and transportation.14 The resulting time-invariant
consumption shares represent averages over the period 1990-2013. The reason for taking
average shares is minimizing data issues based on gaps in the quality of the consumption
series across countries and time.15
From the consumption side, the aggregation of prices is performed in a similar way
as for the APP Index, although using the same time-invariant crop shares for all the
cells that belong to the same country. The time variability of our index is given by the
vector of commodity prices PAjt . In particular, the CP index in year t and a cell i that







where κjc represents the crop share of calories per day and person in country c; and
crops j = 1, ....n are contained in the set of primary commodities consumed for which
international prices exist. Most of the important staple food, like maize, sorghum and
wheat, are included in the index, along with more processed commodities such as sugar
cane, oil olive and palm oil. All together, these products represent a big proportion of
the calorie intake consumed by people in Africa.
14http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/data/FBSH.
15Notice as well that, in the case of the consumption shares, endogeneity issues should be much less
important due to the relative stability of consumer tastes and the possibility of importing products.
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3.3.3 Climate variables
We complete agricultural income shocks considering a measure of droughts, given the
dependence of agriculture on weather conditions. Following von Uexkull et al. (2016)
and HF, we focus on a crop-specific climate shock, the drought SPEI Growing Season,
which captures low SPEI episodes occurring during the growing season of the main crop
in a given cell.16 Higher values of this variable means low levels of SPEI in the growing
season in consecutive months, that is, a higher incidence of drought. We look at the
impact of climatology during the crop growing season because is then when crops are
more sensitive to adverse climate conditions, and hence, affect more intensively farms’
future agricultural income and food availability. Robustness checks are conducted also
for the climate variable adding the annual average SPEI.
3.3.4 Spatial ethnic diversity and political status
Our next task is describing the construction of the four different ethnic diversity
measures: ethnolinguistic fractionalization, polarization, monopoly groups, and
excluded groups. Their values in the regressions are maintained constant at their 1997
level, that is, one year before the starting point of the conflict data to mitigate possible
endogeneity issues. We follow Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2017) to compute the
spatial ethnolinguistic fractionalization index (EF ). Firstly, we use Vogt et al. (2015)
that codes the settlement patterns of politically relevant ethnic groups in independent
states based on the group list in the Geo-referencing Ethnic Power Relation (GeoEPR)
2014 database. Matching our grid structure and the regional and statewide ethnic groups
patterns for the year 1997, we estimate the share of the territory settled by a specific
16SPEI stands for Standardized Precipitation-Evapotranspiration Index. These data are provided
by the PRIO-GRID project from the Global Precipitation Climatology Center. The SPEI Global
Drought Monitor is based on the Thortnthwaite equation for estimating potential evapotranspiration
(PET). According to HF, PET depends on several factors, including most notably temperature but also
rainfall, sunshine exposure, latitude and wind speed. Variable definition from PRIO-GRID codebook:
https://grid.prio.org//codebook.
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j=1 πj(1− πj); (3.3)
where π is the proportion of area that belongs to ethnic group j (for j = 1, ......, N).17
The calculation of the spatial ethnolinguistic polarization index (EP ), on the other






These two ethnic diversity measures are bounded below by zero and above by one,
but differ in a key aspect: while fractionalization increases monotonically if existing
ethnic groups are divided into smaller groups, polarization is maximized when there are
precisely just two, equally large groups.
Moving now to the spatial political ethnic diversity proxies, we control for both
excluded and monopoly groups reflecting these political statuses. Excluded groups
is based on the numbers directly supply by PRIO-GRID 2.0. Specifically, the
excluded-group variable counts the number of excluded groups (discriminated or
powerless) in a particular cell. The monopoly group proxy feeds from the Ethnic Power
Relations (EPR) Dataset Core 2014. It is a dummy variable coded as 1 if there is at
least a monopoly group in cell i, and as 0 otherwise. To create this variable, we use
the groups identifiers provided by Cederman et al. (2011) and match our grid structure
with the information on the political status of monopoly ethnic groups from the EPR
2014 data.18
17Because the sum of the shares of the territory that are occupied by each ethnic group can sum to
more than one, they are re-scaled so that the sum equals one.
18These databases also provide information about ethnic groups that are part of power-sharing
arrangements and groups that are politically dominant. We have chosen the two extremes, like Basedau
and Pierskalla (2014) for example, because they seem more appropriate to capture the impact of grievance
and government power.
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3.4 Empirical Methodology
As we mentioned previously, the aim of the paper is to study the sensitivity of the
effect of agricultural-commodity income shocks on the likelihood of conflict to ethnic
diversity and political status. In order to achieve this goal, we build on MB and propose















This general estimation equation for conflict serves to explain all the different versions
employed in our regression. In the main estimations, Conflictict is a binary variable
that takes on one if there have been conflict incidents in cell i, at country c and time
period t and zero otherwise.19 When the outcome variable wants to capture factor
conflict, it will represent armed-force incidence from the UCDP-GED dataset in the
benchmark estimation, and later for robustness we will use battles from ACLED and
conflict intensity from UCDP-GED.20 If, on the other hand, the dependent variable
proxies output conflict, it will consist of the category social unrest from ACLED or its
components riots and violence against civilians.
The variableDi is a cell fixed-effect dummy. The term Tct controls for time effects and
can take two different formats. When the country-wide CP index is not included in the
regression, Tc,t corresponds to a set of country-year fixed effect dummies. However, when
the three income-shock proxies are present, the country-year dummies would subsume
the effect of the CP index, and consequently, to avoid this problem, Tct is formed
19According to Beck and Katz (2011), estimated coefficients can be biased when using incidence if
lags of the dependent variable are not included as additional aggressors due the persistence of conflict.
This problem is particularly important at the country level. Which has led some papers to explore
the robustness of their results to using conflict onset and conflict offset as dependent variables, because
they do not suffer from this potential problem. At a cell level, however, conflicts are less persistent. As
Berman and Couttenier (2015) for example argue, using cell-level observations, about 75% of conflict
events do not last more than 2 years. We therefore decide not to use onset and ending as dependent
variables.
20Conflict intensity is not a binary variable. It gives the number of events in a given year and cell.
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by two components—an year fixed effect dummy and a country-specific time trend.
Because shock variables could be correlated with other cell-specific characteristics such
as economic activity, our benchmark specification incorporates the matrix Zict, a set of
control variables that include the oil-and-gas price index and the mineral-commodity
price index described in the previous subsection. Later, this control matrix is expanded
to consider the fraction of urban area and its interaction with the CP index.21
The variable εict is the disturbance term. Because the shocks and the conflict
measures can be clustered in time and space, we allow for serial and spacial
correlation applying the method developed by Conley (1999) and Hsiang et al.
(2011).22 More specifically, the coefficients’ standard errors are estimated employing a
spatial heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) covariance matrix that
allows for both location-specific 5-year-lag serial correlation and cross-sectional spatial
correlation in a radius of 110 km. Following Berman et al. (2017), later we test the
robustness of our results to spatial kernels from 55 to 1000 km, and serial correlations
from 2 lags to assuming a temporal decay for the Newey-West/Bartlett kernel so slow
that makes the serial correlation vanish in an infinite amount of (i.e. 100,000) years.
Moving now to our main variables of interest. The agricultural-commodity income
proxy matrix ACIPict can include, depending on the version, the APP index, the SPEI
index for droughts, and the CP index. Because local weather events in producer countries
could generate a correlation between international prices and the error term if those
events are linked to global weather patterns such as the El Niño-Southern Oscillation
(see, e.g., MB) the climate variable is always present in our regressions. These price
and weather variables are incorporated over three consecutive years—the current period
and two lags—to take into account possible effects of past shocks. We do the same for
the control set Zict. Later in the paper we check results considering up to five lags. All
21Other standard controls employed by the literature include geographic characteristics, population
size and satellite night lights (see, e.g., Alesina et al., 2016). We do not use them as regressors because
the geographic characteristics are time invariant, and therefore, their effect is subsumed in the cell
dummy, and population and night lights suffer from strong endogeneity concerns with conflict and the
latter can also possibly generate a post-treatment bias.
22We use the STATA routine based on Hsiang et al. (2011) and its extension to multidimensional
fixed effects by Fetzer (reg2hdfespatial.ado).
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price indices are introduced in the regression taking logs as in Berman et al. (2017).
The set J provides indices for each of the four ethnic characteristics considered
in the paper. In particular, the different ethnic variables ECjic are the following:
the excluded group, the monopoly group dummy, ethnolinguistic fractionalization,
and ethnic polarization. Notice that in the regression the ethnic variables are time
invariant—we assign pre-sample values of the ethnic characteristic to all periods in
order to mitigate endogeneity concerns. Because of this, we exclusively focus on the
interactions with the income shock variables, and do not include in the estimation model
their independent effects, as they are captured by the cell fixed-effect dummies.
Finally, the vectors βt, γ
j
t and δt are composed of the coefficients that we want to
estimate. The βs capture the direct impact on conflict of the exogenous income shocks,
and the γs provide the effect of their interactions with the ethnic variables. Equation (7)
is estimated as a fixed effect linear probability model (LPM). We prefer this estimator
to alternative frameworks for binary dependent variables such as the probit or the logit
because it allows for a clear interpretation of the coefficients. The estimated coefficient
measures the change in the probability of conflict incidence if, ceteris paribus, the
explanatory variable of interest increases in one unit. Nevertheless, in the robustness
section, we also perform estimation employing a conditional fixed-effect logit.
3.5 Results
In all cases, the conflict variable is a binary measure of incidence. The tables (all of
them located in the Appendix B) report, for each independent variable, the sum of
the contemporaneous and lagged effects and the corresponding Conley (1999) standard
error.23 First, we describe the findings when the dependent variable is factor conflict.
Second, we search for the determinants of output conflict measured as a compound of
23Reporting the sum is desirable at least for two reasons. To start with, the sum gives a more direct
idea of the total effect of the shock. In addition, if the regressor is highly correlated over time or space,
the sum is estimated with much more precision (see, e.g., MB). In the Appendix B, Figures B.7 to
B.12 present the results for the different lags of interaction variables that are significant in the full
regressions—columns (10) and (12).
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riots and violence against civilians. Third, we analyze the determinants of each of the
two components of output conflict separately. Fourth, we test for the role of urban area
on the effect of consumer prices. Finally, we interpret the results in light of the existing
theories.
The structure of Tables B.10 to B.13 is the same. Column (1) provides results when
only the APP and the drought indices are considered as variables of interest. Column (2)
shows the results when the CP index is added to the other two agricultural-commodity
income-shock indices. Columns (3) to (12) search for the sensitivity of the income-shock
effects to ethnic heterogeneity. Ethnolinguistic fractionalization and ethnic polarization
are never jointly considered in the regressions because of the severe multicollinearity
problem that this brings—the correlation between the two variables in our sample is
0.98. The most important columns are the last four, which consider how estimated
coefficients and consistent standard errors in columns (1) and (2) change when the
political and diversity ethnic measures are included together.
Looking at the tables, it is immediate that results with fractionalization are almost
identical to the ones with polarization and quantitatively very similar.24 This high
similarity occurs in all regressions estimated in this paper, due to the high correlation
between the two ethnic diversity variables in our sample. The main difference between
including one ethnic diversity variable or the other is just the precision of the estimated
coefficients. In general, the coefficients of variables that contain polarization show
significantly narrower confident intervals that the corresponding ones that include
fractionalization. Given this, we will comment exclusively on the results obtained with
polarization.
Moving now to the figures, Figures 2.1 to 2.4 share the same structure as well.
Each figure consists of nine charts split in three columns of three charts. They are
constructed employing the estimated coefficients and standard errors provided by our
24Previous literature, however, has found different results. For example, at the country level, Janus
and Riera-Crichton (2015) and Gimenez-Gomez and Zergawu (2018) find that adverse changes in prices
increase the probability of political instability in countries with higher level of ethnic polarization,
whereas ethnic fractionalization has a mixed impact. In contrast, we find that both variables have a
well-defined effect for all definitions of violence.
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preferred regression, column (12) in the tables, which represents the most complete
model with polarization.25 The goal is to show the sensitivity of the income-shock
effects to the different ethnic measures separately. The first column of charts provides
the estimated marginal effect on conflict and its 90% confidence interval of a one unit
increase in the log of the APP index, as a function of the number of excluded groups
(first row), whether there is or not a monopoly group (second row) and the degree of
polarization (third row), assuming that the other ethnic characteristics take on zero.
The second and third columns of charts give the same information but focusing on the
drought index and the log of the CP index, respectively.
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Note: The charts give the estimated marginal effect of each income shock and their 90%
confidence intervals for each value of the corresponding ethnic variable.
25The model associated to column (11) gives very similar results.
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3.5.1 Factor conflict
We start by presenting in Table B.10 and Figure 2.1 results when in regression (7) the
dependent variable signals whether there have been large-scale organized-armed-group
conflict events according to UCDP-GED. We can see that without ethnic variables
columns (1) and (2) in Table B.10 reproduce the qualitative findings obtained by MB
and HF. As in MB, the coefficient for the APP index is negative and significant with
both time-effect formats, and the CP index is positive and significant. Additionally, as
in HF, the coefficient for droughts is positive and significant in both columns.26
26In HF, the estimated coefficient is negative because they use a reversed scale. That is, in our
regressions, SPEI growing season is introduced such that higher values of the variable imply a higher
incidence of droughts; whereas in their work, they imply lower drought incidence.
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Feeding on the results in column (12) of Table B.10, Figure 2.1 displays the sensitivity
of the income-shock effects to ethnic cleavages. Notice that the estimated values and
confidence intervals when the ethnic variables take on zero give the direct impact of
the income shocks and its significance. We can see that the APP and CP indices show
significant direct effects, the former with a negative value and the latter with a positive
coefficient, as in MB. The largest amplification effects are associated to the presence
of excluded groups, and its interaction is significant with APP and with droughts (see
Table B.10).27 For example, compared to cells without them, locations with two (five)
excluded groups multiply the negative effect of APP shocks on the risk of factor conflict
by 4.8 (10.6) times. This number for drought shocks is 20.0 (48.5) times.
The second row of charts imply that the presence of monopoly groups is important
for the transmission of a producer price shock. In particular, its negative impact is 7.4
times larger when these groups exist. The existence of monopoly groups also multiply
the positive effect of the CP shocks by 1.7 times. This difference in the case of consumer
prices and droughts is not significant.
The role of polarization (third row) is the weakest. In Figure 2.1, differences across
ethic diversity levels in the marginal impact of the shocks are only significant in the
case of APP. In particular, a sufficiently large degree of ethnic polarization makes the
estimated effect of changes in producer prices become positive. Looking now at Table
B.10, it is interesting to notice as well that the interaction between consumer prices and
polarization is positive and close to showing significance; later when we introduce urban
area, it will do so.
To further quantify the results, we again concentrate on column (12) of Table B.10
and measure, following a standard procedure in the literature, what we call from now on
the “implied total impact”. More specifically, we look at the effect, in percentage points,
of a one standard deviation change in an income proxy on the probability of conflict when
27A sufficient condition for the significance of the difference between the marginal effect when the
ethnic variable takes on zero and when it takes on positive values is that the corresponding confidence
intervals do not overlap over the range shown in the vertical axis. However, this is not a necessary
condition, because the two marginal effects are perfectly positively correlated.
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all the ethnic variables take on their average value.28 The impact measure, therefore,
tells us the estimated change in the probability of conflict incidence in the average cell.
The implied total impact of the APP index equals -5.33. That is, a one standard
deviation decrease in the log of the APP index raises the probability of armed conflict in
the average cell by 5.33 percentage points; with the direct effect and the interaction with
excluded groups contributing each of them about half of the impact. The interaction
of producer prices with monopoly groups also decreases the probability of conflict by
1.06 percentage points, but this effect is almost exactly offset by ethnic diversity. The
implied total impact of droughts is 0.23, due almost fully to the significant increase
in the risk of conflict caused in cells with excluded groups. Finally, the implied total
impact of consumer prices is 1.36. Hence, the strongest estimated effect is the one of
producer prices and the smallest the one of droughts.
3.5.2 Output conflict
Next, we look at the determinants of output conflict, measured as events where riots and
violence against civilians occur. Table B.11 and Figure 2.2 present our findings with the
ACLED incidence as the dependent variable. In columns (1) and (2) of Table B.11, all
the estimated coefficients are positive and, with the exception of the CP index, strongly
statistically significant. These results are consistent with MB and HF.29
Figure 2.2 tells us that, compared to the regressions without ethnic variables, the
direct effects maintain the signs, but only the drought index remains significant. It also
conveys the message that, for output conflict, the existence of monopoly ethnic groups
is the most important amplifier. Monopoly groups change the sign of the effect of an
APP shock to negative and increase its impact by 32.0 times in absolute value. They
28The impact is computed as a marginal effect as follows. For a single independent variable, it is given
by its standard deviation times the estimated coefficient multiplied by 100. For interaction terms X*Y,
where X is the variable of interest, the marginal effect follows the same procedure described previously
but multiplying also by the variable Y’s mean. Finally, the implied total impact is the sum of the
marginal effects across all the terms that contain the variable of interest.
29MB does not find significant the CP index, neither in the factor conflict regression, nor in the output
conflict specification when year fixed effects are included, which in our case are always controlled for.
They argue that consumer prices vary more over time than across space, and therefore, the inclusion of
year fixed effects absorb a big part of the impact.
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also multiply the effect of consumer prices by 4.0. The difference in the case of droughts
is not significant.
Excluded groups are, in turn, only significant for changes in consumer prices (see
Table B.11). The estimated marginal effect of the CP index experiences a 2-fold
(3.5-fold) increase when the number of excluded groups goes up from zero to two (five).
Finally, the sensitivity to polarization is only significant for the effect of producer prices.
A fully polarized society experiences a positive effect of producer prices on output conflict
that is 6.8 times larger than a society with zero polarization.
Quantitatively, employing the estimates in column (12) of Table B.11, the implied
total impact of a one-standard-deviation increase in the APP index is -0.41 percentage
points, much lower than in the case of factor conflict. The implied total impact of
droughts equals 0.33 percentage points. Lastly, the total impact of the CP index on
output conflict is 1.38.
Our estimates imply as well that the importance of ethnic cleavages in the risk of
conflict depends on the type of shock and conflict definition. If we look at the sum of the
absolute values of the different components of the implied total impact, the APP-index
direct effect amounts to 36.34% of the total for factor conflict and 17.30% in the output
conflict case. These figures for droughts are 16.45% and 50.56%, and for the CP index,
94.52% and 67.70%. Hence, looking at the sensitivity to ethnic heterogeneity, it is much
higher for producer prices and droughts than consumer prices, and droughts provides
the largest one in factor conflict, whereas producer prices gives the biggest in output
conflict.
3.5.3 Riots versus violence against civilians
We now disaggregate output conflict in its two components. This is important because
the ACLED category “violence against civilians” could be considered an intermediate
case of violence. Unlike the one-sided violence recorded in UCDP, ACLED considers
all events, independently of the number of casualties; and then, it can be considered
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a small-scale conflict measure. However, as the one-sided violence recorded in UCDP,
ACLED violence against civilians represents violence carried out by organized armed
groups. As will become evident in a moment, both subcategories respond differently to
income shocks and ethnic characteristics. The results with riots are closer to the original
MB’s output conflict findings, whereas the determinants of violence against civilians are
closer to the ones of factor conflict.
Tables B.12 and B.13 and Figures 2.3 and 2.4 present the estimation results based on
this disaggregation. Looking at the findings for riots in Figure 2.3 and Table B.12, the
direct effects of the APP index and droughts are positive and significant. Conversely, the
one of the CP index is not. The effect of excluded groups is statistically non-important;
whereas the one of monopoly groups matters for the impact of APP and CP shocks,
although not for droughts. In particular, monopoly groups flip the sign of the effect of
changes in both price indices. In turn, the significant interactions of polarization with
droughts and the CP index tend to offset their direct effects.
Column (12) of Table B.12 implies a total impact of a one-standard-deviation rise in
the APP index on the likelihood of riots of +5.11 percentage points; this is a consequence
of its direct effect (6.86 percentage points) and the interaction with monopoly (-0.61).
In turn, the implied total impact of droughts is 0.15 percentage points, and only its
direct contribution and the one of its interaction with polarization are significant and
equal to 0.28 and -0.12, respectively. Finally, the total impact of the CP index is -0.30
percentage points; as a consequence mainly of its direct effect, partially offset by the
incidence of the ethnic variables. The largest impact is then again the one of producer
prices.
In Figure 2.4 and Table B.13, we can see that, unlike in the case of riots, the direct
effect of producer prices on violence against civilians is negative, the one of consumer
prices is positive, and the one of droughts is insignificant. Also unlike in the case of
riots, excluded groups play an important role as transmission channel for droughts and
CP shocks. For example, the presence of two (five) excluded groups multiplies the effect
of the droughts and CP indices on violence by -3.6 and 2.0 (-10.6 and 3.5), respectively.
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Monopoly groups also play a larger role, and become important for the three types of
income shocks. When monopoly ethnic groups are present, the effects of APP, droughts
and CP on violence against civilians are 11.1, -13.6 and 3.5 times larger, respectively.
Contrary to the case of riots, ethnic polarization in the case of violence only matters
for APP shocks, making their effect go from negative to positive if ethnic diversity is
sufficiently large.
In terms of the implied total impact, column (12) of Table B.13 delivers that the
one of the APP index represents a decrease in the risk of violence of 3.12 percentage
points: its direct effect contributes -2.87; and there are opposite indirect effects of
politically-marginalized groups and ethnically diverse societies. The implied total impact
of droughts and its components are the smallest among the three types of shocks
and are always less than or equal to 0.20 percentage points. The total impact of
a one-standard-deviation increase in consumer prices, in turn, equals 1.62 percentage
points, with a direct effect of 1.20, and an amplifying effect of political ethnic variables
of 0.47.
Comparing the importance of ethnic cleavages in riots and in violence against
civilians, the direct effect in the case of riots represents 79.67%, 68.89% and 71.13% of the
sum of all (direct and interaction) effects in absolute values for the APP index, droughts
and the CP index, respectively. Thus meaning that ethnic differences are relatively less
important. However, in the case of violence against civilians, the corresponding direct
effects are 38.11%, 31.18% and 69.80% of the impact sum; that is, for producer-price and
drought shocks, the sensitivity to ethnic cleavages is key. This, again, makes violence
against civilians closer to factor conflict than to riots.
3.5.4 Consumer prices and urban area
We have not found MB’s positive direct effect on riots of food-price increases in
food-consuming cells. However, consumer prices for food should be relatively more
important in urban areas, where the weight of the agricultural sector on total
employment is significantly lower. Consequently, the last set of results that we present
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in this section correspond to the scenario in which the fraction of urban area and its
interaction with the CP index are included in the estimation model.
Table B.14 and Figure 2.5 display the findings. Table B.14 has a different format than
the previous ones. Columns (1) to (4), (5) to (8), and (9) to (12) give results when the
dependent variable is UCDP conflicts, riots and violence against civilians, respectively.
Figure 2.5, in turn, shows the marginal effect of the three shocks for different fractions of
urban area in the cell. We deduce from the figure that the the sensitivity of the effect of
CP shocks on riots (second chart) and violence against civilians (third chart) is positive
and strongly significant, whereas the one of factor conflict (first chart) is insignificant.
Thus confirming that, in urban areas, consumer prices do increase the probability of
output conflict as predicted by the opportunity cost mechanism.30 In addition, looking
at Table B.14, the urban area fraction shows up as negative and significant for both
output conflict variables.
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30This is consistent with the work of Hendrix and Haggard (2015) for example.
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Regarding the other regressors, most qualitative effects of the income shocks and
the ethnic variables remain more or less unchanged for all outcome variables. The only
remarkable changes are the following: in the factor conflict regression, the interaction
of consumer prices and polarization becomes positive and significant; and in the case of
riots, political ethnic variables lose power and only the interaction of the CP index with
monopoly groups remains significant.
In terms of the magnitudes, the implied total impacts only experience a significant
change in the case of both price indices for riots and the APP index for violence against
civilians. Nevertheless, for the APP index in violence against civilians this sensitivity
still explains 55% of the total.
3.5.5 Theories behind the results
Our results in the main analysis sections reinforce the economic mechanisms emphasized
by MB, but at the same time, add new aspects and point out a greater role of grievance
and state capacity as determinants of conflict. One difference is that we find that
the ACLED category violence against civilians has more determinants in common
with factor conflict than with riots. Therefore, differentiating between organized and
non-organized conflict can be more informative than between factor and output conflict.
To start with, producer prices in our sample have a negative effect on conflict that
involves any type of organized armed groups, namely, the UCDP evens and the ACLED
violence against civilians. This is also found by MB but only with the UCDP data.
Nonetheless, the interpretation suggested by MB is still valid. That is, the result suggests
an important role of the opportunity cost of becoming a soldier: in food-producing areas,
increases in food prices raise the real value of salaries and generate opportunity-cost
incentives for workers not to join armies engaged in organized violence. We also find, as
MB, a positive effect of consumer-price shocks on organized-group conflict (but not on
riots). Therefore, the decrease in real wages caused by food-prices in food-consuming
areas leads more workers to become organized fighters through an opportunity cost
mechanism.
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Droughts play a weaker role with all conflict definitions. We have defended that
international prices and local climate conditions should proxy different aspects of
agricultural income. Nevertheless, it cannot be fully discarded that prices at a certain
extent capture the effect of droughts. Focusing on the direct effect, droughts during
the growing season have a clear positive impact on riots. This effect has been already
found by previous literature, like Almer et al. (2017). An opportunity costs mechanism
is again more likely behind this result. As water, an important input of production,
becomes scarcer, the productivity of land falls and the incentives to riot in favor of the
appropriation of surplus increase.
The existence of politically excluded and monopoly groups reinforces also this
channel for organized armed-group conflict and, unlike in Baseadu and Pierskalla (2014),
amplify the risk of conflict in the same direction. More specifically, excluded and
monopoly groups push the effect of an increase in the APP index or a decline in droughts
towards a negative sign, and the one of a rise in consumer prices towards a positive
sign. Given that increases in producer prices and less intense droughts can be seen
both as positive income shocks that lead to higher real wages of farmers, the direction
of their effect can be interpreted using the same theories. In particular, these results
can be interpreted as an outcome of opportunity costs.31 A lower degree of ethnic
confrontation in government due to the exclusion or monopoly of certain groups can
increase the sense of grievance, and therefore, the politically-harmed groups can become
more sensitive to variations in the opportunity costs described in the previous paragraph
that make food prices affect organized violence in opposite directions in food-producing
and food-consuming areas. Notice that these opposing effects can be generated neither
by the rapacity effect theory nor by the state capacity channel.
By the same token, the stronger positive response of organized armed-force conflict to
both producer-price and consumer-price shocks that we find in more polarized societies
when urban area is considered is not consistent with the opportunity cost effect. It
cannot be either a consequence of a stronger predatory behavior in those areas, since
31The same effect is found by von Uexkull et al. (2016) for droughts in areas with excluded groups.
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as MB argues the opportunity cost effect dominates rapacity in the response of factor
conflict to producer-price shocks. Hence, this positive response of conflict must be a
consequence of state capacity; that is, a larger degree of ethnic diversity signals weaker
states suffering more from social tensions (Esteban and Ray, 1999) that are able to
benefit less from the violence-reducing opportunities offered by positive income shocks.
The generation of riots is also affected by the opportunity cost and state capacity
mechanisms but not in same way than factor conflict. The role of producer prices is now
the opposite than in organized violence, it is positive. As MB shows, this can be caused
by a combination of the opportunity-cost and predatory effects. To fully understand this,
let us briefly explain how the MB theoretical model works. Output conflict arises if the
individual reallocates effort from the production activity to the appropriation of surplus.
Prices in their model can be associated to three types of goods: agricultural-commodities
produced in the cell but exported to other cells; food-items produced and consumed
within the same cell; and crops imported from other cells for consumption. The
first two affect the producer-price index and the last two the consumer-price index.
Consequently, when the cell’s producer price goes up, this increase is larger than the
rise in the cell’s consumer price, because some commodities are imported. Therefore,
the real (consumer-price-deflated) value of the cell’s production rises if these food-items
are exported, but the real wage falls if the produced food is for within-cell consumption.
The former triggers a rapacity effect, whereas the latter describes an opportunity cost
channel. Both of these effects make output conflict increase, that is, generate additional
allocation of effort to steal goods.
Next, let us examine the impact of the CP index on riots. As discussed previously,
the opportunity cost channel can explain its positive impact in urban areas and cells
with monopoly groups, and the state capacity effect can be behind the estimated positive
effect in more polarized areas.32 We have also shown that, unlike in the case of organized
32There is, though, a possible alternative interpretation for the last result. The moderation of the
state-capacity effect by polarization/fractionalization might be stronger in food-producing cells, and
therefore, the positive sign in food-consuming areas can be still mainly capturing an opportunity cost
mechanism. Notice that this alternative argument, although possible for the CP index, cannot be applied
to food-producing cells, because there the negative sign is only compatible with the state-capacity
channel.
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armed-force conflict, political ethnic variables play a reduced role in the generation of
riots. The lack of significance of political ethnic variables is especially evident when
urban area is incorporated to the riots regression. Which suggests that the recruitment
activity of organized violent groups is more successful if there is a sense of grievance in
some ethnic groups, whereas this is much less important to become a temporary rioter.
Another interesting result is that the sign of the CP index is negative. Although
the CP index coefficient is not always significant in the benchmark regressions, it shows
again strong power and the same negative sign to explain riots in some of the robustness
checks that we present next. This can be explained neither by the opportunity cost effect
nor by surplus predation. Instead, it suggests an increase in state capacity to control
insurgence.
3.6 Robustness Analysis
We perform nine different robustness checks of our main results, which are contained
in the Appendix B. From them, we deduce that the findings obtained in Section 5 are
generally robust. The main exceptions are when we use actual crop yields to construct
the shares and when the size of our cells increases to 220 km x 220 km. However,
these two scenarios are less suitable for our purposes than our main specifications (see
explanations in the Appendix B). Overall, 72% of the estimated coefficients obtained
with the full regressions in the robustness section agree with the main analysis in terms
of either non-significance or sign and significance.
3.7 Conclusions
This paper has studied how agricultural-commodity shocks across ethnically-diverse cells
affect several definitions of conflict outcomes. To that end, information on the location
of conflict and social unrest for the entire African continent has been used, employing
a fine-grained panel data for the period 1998-2013 with a spatial resolution of 0.5 x 0.5
degree latitude and longitude (equivalent to 55 km x 55 km at the equator). Our main
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contribution has been to disentangle whether ethnic political status and diversity serve
as amplifying mechanisms of the effect of income shocks on conflict.
We have obtained multiple interesting results. First, violence against civilians
clearly arises as an intermediate type of conflict that lies between battles and riots.
Furthermore, we have shown that differentiating between organized armed-force conflict
(battles and violence against civilians) and non-organized violence (riots) is more
informative about the determinants of conflict than between large-scale factor conflict
and low-scale output conflict (violence against civilians and riots). Nevertheless,
differentiating the three categories seems to be preferable.
Second, our results emphasize an important role of opportunity costs in the decision
of getting involved in any type of violence and that the existence of excluded and
monopoly ethnic groups can amplify the perception of those costs. This shows up both
in the negative impact on organized armed-force conflict of the opportunity cost channel
in food-producing cells, and its positive impact on output conflict in food-consuming
areas.
Third, we also show evidence of the importance of state capacity. This is suggested
by our finding that more ethnically polarized or fractionalized societies tend to push
the effect on conflict of an increase in the APP and CP indices or a decline in droughts
towards a positive sign. The reason is that a larger degree of ethnic diversity signals
weaker governments that are able to benefit less from the rebellion-repressing capability
offered by positive income shocks. The state capacity channel seems to be stronger
in the case of riots. In particular, besides its indirect effect through ethnic diversity,
consumer food-prices in our sample also have a negative direct impact on riots, which
is again only consistent with an important role of state capacity.
Fourth, the consumer-price impact and the category riots respond to a much lower
extent to ethnic cleavages. In particular, the weight of ethnic variables in the total
effect of the CP index is always below 32%. Whereas for the producer-price index and
droughts, the average contribution of ethnic heterogeneity is 73%, 28% and 68% for
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battles, riots and violence against civilians, respectively. As a possible explanation of
the low contribution of political ethnic variables in the generation of riots, we have
suggested that a sense of grievance in some ethnic groups is much less important to
become a temporary rioter than permanent soldiers.
From a policy side, the results could be interpreted as demanding an agricultural
price-stabilization mechanism, because price fluctuations affect conflict. However, as
we have also shown, whether this is the case and the right type of policy should
depend on the nature of ethnic diversity and violence. This important issue clearly
deserves further investigation. There are also several factors that can be behind the
income-shock indirect-effect channeled through ethnic cleavages, and some of them have
been pointed out in the text: trust, monitoring costs, labor market frictions, and quality
of institutions. Incorporating these aspects into the analysis can represent as well a
promising source of future research.

Chapter 4
Addressing Oil Spills and
Agricultural Productivity.
Evidence of Pollution in Nigeria
4.1 Introduction
Food insecurity1 is driven by multiple factors. Understanding what they are and
how they are related to one another is a challenge for scientists working in this
field. Specifically, the main variables include conflicts, environmental degradation of
livelihoods, climate change, and high volatility in commodity prices. Nigeria is Africa’s
most populous country and its largest oil producer. It is a particularly suitable example
for studying the links between some of these variables and indicators. Nigeria is a country
cursed by natural resources (Sala-i-Matin and Subramaian, 2013), which suffers from
complex political issues including endemic corruption, inequality within and between
ethnic groups, national disunity, oil disputes, environmental degradation, instability,
and poverty. It also faces three sources of violence: Boko Haram insurgency, Middle-belt
conflict, and the Niger Delta conflict.
Onshore oil operations are a key aspect related to environmental degradation. They
1“Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to
sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active
and healthy life. Household food security is the application of this concept to the family level, with
individuals within households as the focus of concern. Food insecurity exists when people do not have
adequate physical, social or economic access to food as defined above.” The State of Food Insecurity in
the World, pg.4. FAO, 2010.
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have damaged local soil and water resources, leading to problems in public health in
nearby locations (Bruederle and Hodler, 2019). When focusing on the specific effects of
oil spills in Nigeria it is useful to analyze negative externalities generated by extractive
industries on places distant from the sources of production, e.g. pipeline networks, where
traditional agricultural activities are the predominant source of subsistence. Oil spills
are the biggest environmental disaster in Nigeria and have exacerbated environmental,
social, and economic problems (Madu et al., 2018; Nwankwo, 2015).
The 2011 United Nations Environment Programme report on oil spills in Ogoniland,2
a region which covers close to 1,000 square kilometers in Rivers State, southern Nigeria,
is a turning point that further emphasizes the establishment of Corporate Social
Responsibility (CRS) to clean up the area. However, host communities argue a lack
of responsibility for environmental damage in the government of the federation and
multinational oil corporations. The study also reports that oil spills could affect more
territory than the areas estimated to be directly affected, through rivers and water
bodies, and that effects are long-lasting. Thus, the damage to the environment could
be greater than that directly calculated.
Keeping in mind the above conclusions, in this paper I attempt to assess an
externality effect of onshore oil operations specifically related to pipelines on the
agricultural sector. In particular, I study whether oil spillage shocks are associated
with an economically significant reduction in agricultural total factor productivity, and
hence, in agricultural production in nearby locations. The assumption is that the oil
spills analyzed may not have affected farms directly, but that their could be affected
indirectly by the filtration through the soil of nearby contaminated water and by air
pollution from fires around the spills. I further hypothesize that the impact could be
long-lasting. More specifically, I pose the following questions: Does the presence of
2“While oil exploration and production in the Niger Delta began in the late 1950s, operations
were suspended in Ogoniland in the early 1990s due to disruptions from local public unrest.
The oilfields and installations have since largely remained dormant. However, major oil
pipelines still cross through Ogoniland, and oil spills continue to affect the region, due to
such factors as a lack of maintenance and vandalism to oil infrastructure and facilities.”
United Nation Environmental Programme”. https://www.unenvironment.org/explore-topics/
disasters-conflicts/where-we-work/nigeria/ogonilands-oil-history
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oil spills lead to a reduction in agricultural total factor productivity among farmers in
nearby locations? Does the effect persist beyond the periods when oil spills happen?
Unlike previous literature that has studied the impact of oil spills on farming in
Nigeria, I focus on all regions of the country, using geospatial data from oil spills,
The Nigerian Oil Spill Monitor, which provides data collected by the National Oil
Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA), and geo-referenced micro-data from
farming households drawn from the Nigeria General Household Survey (GHS-Panel).
The former gives information on the locations and dates of around 12,000 oil spills from
January 2006 to December 2018. I have also calculated the geographical coordinates
of oil spills not reported, dating from before 2013. The latter provides information on
agricultural production and agricultural practices from around 1,425 farmers in four
waves, covering the harvesting periods from 2010 to 2018. To the best of my knowledge,
this is the first paper to use such data to assess the impact of oil spills on agricultural
output through agricultural total factor productivity.3
In my identification strategy, I first observe the effect of oil-spill pollution on
agricultural total factor productivity by estimating an agricultural production function.
I use the analytical framework of consumer-producer household models with incomplete
markets (Benjamin, 1992; Aragón and Rud, 2016). In these models, production and
consumption decisions are not entirely separable, and household endowments could
be used as inputs. The model helps to determine whether a variation a change in
total factor productivity brings about a change in agricultural output, that is whether
oil-spill pollution could affect the quality of essential inputs or whether the variation is
the result of a change in input uses. Taking this approach that identifies how farmers
act, I may be able to distinguish the channels through which pollution from oil spills
affects agricultural output.
Second, I consider the empirical challenge posed by the fact that agricultural output
could be regularly different in areas where oil spills happen. To overcome this issue, I
3This dataset has only been used before by Bruederle and Hodler (2019), who found clear evidence
for harmful effects of nearby oil spills on surviving children.
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also explore the methodology proposed by Fenske and Zurimendi (2017) and Aragón and
Rud (2016), using a difference-in-difference approach. With this technique, I explore two
sources of variation: A proxy of the quantity of pollution caused by spills that could also
be persistent over time, and the distance of households from oil spills. This identification
strategy means that in the absence of oil spills, any changes in agricultural output should
be similar in both areas over time.4
As a proxy of accumulated oil spill pollutants, I create a function that covers all oil
spill events per location in all the said periods. A key point in that function is that oil
spills follow an exponential decay pattern on cultivable land. The same conclusion can
be extended to labor productivity and crop yields. I also add further functions to check
the robustness of my results.
I find evidence of a significant reduction in both total factor productivity and
agricultural output attributed to oil spills. My estimations suggest that an increase of
one standard deviation in my measurement of cumulative oil spill pollution is associated
with a drop of around 8% in agricultural output in locations within 5 kilometers of
oil spills. However, the data also suggests significant effects in areas 7.5 kilometers
from oil spills. The results are similar if partial measurements such as crop yields
are used. The findings are also robust to different model specifications, e.g. the
inclusion of a definition of the proxy of oil-spill pollution based on different persistent
effects, quantity of oil lost, additional agricultural practices, soil characteristics, climate
variables, and heterogeneous location trends. The consumer-producer framework means
that a reduction in agricultural output directly affects the consumption potential of
households. Indeed, Oshienemen et al. (2018) report an increase in poverty as an
indirect effect in villages near oil spills.
I also explore alternative channels that could explain my results. For instance,
following Bruederle and Hodler (2019), I investigate whether the results only affect
the Niger Delta area, where there are events associated with oil operation around the
4In particular, Bruederle and Hodler (2019) also used locations nearby oil spills as a part of their
identification strategy.
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extraction sites in these regions, or whether the findings are the consequence of violent
attacks on oil infrastructures and other conflict incidents. I further focus on differences
in the characteristics of agricultural workers and changes in property rights. Empirical
evidence shows that households in locations near oil spills own less land. This result
could reflect the risk of land expropriation by the state. For example, oil companies could
require land close to pipelines to build access infrastructures. Thus, farmers could invest
less in such land, thereby further decreasing agricultural factor productivity. Finally, I
find a decline in labor incomes in urban areas close to oil spills, suggesting a drop in
labor productivity as a plausible mechanism. These results could support the notion
that a reduction in agricultural total factor productivity reflects the well documented
cyclical penury and poverty among host communities (Nriagu, 2019; Madu et al., 2018).
To the best of my knowledge, Akpokodje and Salau (2015), Ojimba (2011),
Ojimba(2012), and Inoni et al. (2005) also consider the economic effect of oil pollution5
on crop production in the Niger Delta. Akpokodje and Salau (2015) assess the
consequences of oil spills as a catalyst in accelerating deforestation and, hence, indirectly
reducing agricultural output. Ojimba (2011) focuses on the economic effects of oil spills
on crops, farms, and the size of farmland, while Ojimba (2012) examines the impact of
crude oil and gas pollution on crop production. Finally, the empirical evidence provided
by Inoni et al. (2005) focuses on the effect of oil spills on crop yield, land productivity,
and farm income. All these authors find a negative impact of oil pollution in their main
dependent variables. However, in Akpokodje and Salau (2015), the oil spillage variable
is not significant, and it acts indirectly, leading to a loss of forest mass
The above results are potentially noteworthy. However, my work differs
methodologically from their in several ways. Ojimba (2011) splits the dataset between
oil-polluted and non-polluted farms, whereas Inoni et al. (2005) focus on the presence
of oil spills with a dummy variable in the harvesting season. I consider that both the
number and the persistence of oil spills need to be included to assess the effect of oil-spill
55Oil and gas pollution could be driven by the pollution caused by all operations related to the
extraction, production, and transport of oil and gas. Like Inoni et al. (2005), I only consider the effect
of oil-spill pollution on agricultural output.
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pollution on agricultural output. Moreover, all the papers mentioned above consider the
impact of oil pollution only in particular regions of the Niger Delta,6 while my research
looks at the whole country, considering onshore oil spills far from oil-producing sites.
Thus, I may find evidence that the consequences of oil spills in areas close to the oil
transport network are at least as detrimental as in locations close to oil wells and gas
flares themselves.
Akpokodje and Salau (2015) use country-level data in their analysis, while Ojimba
(2011), Ojimba (2012), and Inoni et al. (2005) use data collected from interviews with
almost 290 farmers in different locations from of the same regions. The methodology
used in these last papers thus means that it is unlikely that their results could be
extrapolated to other areas. Geo-referenced data also makes it possible to consider
whether the consequences of oil spills can spread to nearby locations, which is a step
forward towards assessing the environmental impact of oil spills.
Earlier studies do not adequately address the issue of potential endogeneity, which
is particularly important in establishing a causal link between oil spills and agricultural
output. In this paper, I use three strategies to tackle this issue. The first is to
use district and time fixed effects to control for time-invariant factors affecting both
agricultural output and oil spills, such as geographical and seasonal features. The
earlier papers referenced do not use any fixed effects. I also use the above-mentioned
difference-and-difference approach with the geo-referenced dataset of oil spills to create
an oil-spill area around the pipelines and thus control for the issue of omitted variables.
Finally, I use instrumental variables to control for the endogeneity of inputs in estimating
agricultural production.
At a more general level, my paper contributes to the emerging body of literature at
the intersection of environmental economics and development economics. This literature
is filling an important gap given that most studies on the economic effects of pollution
have hitherto been conducted in developed countries. For instance, the main focus has
6Ojimba focuses on Rivers State, while Inoni et al focus on Delta State. Both regions are considered
part of the Niger Delta area, which is formed by nine regions, stretching over the Delta of the River
Niger, the biggest river in West Africa.
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been to assess the effect of pollution on labor productivity (Graff Zivin and Neidell,
2012), labor supply (Hanna and Oliva, 2011), and human capital accumulation (Currie
et al., 2009). Like me, Bruederle and Hodler (2019), Aragón and Rud (2016) and
Jayachandran (2009) also focus on the impact of pollution on the extraction of natural
resources in developing countries. In particular, Bruederle and Hodler (2019) study the
causal effects of oil spills on infant mortality in Nigeria, providing some evidence for
negative health effects of nearby oil spills on children. Aragón and Rud (2016) provide
evidence that the expansion of large-scale gold mining in Ghana lowers total agricultural
productivity in places within twenty kilometers of the mines. In contrast with this last
paper, I assess the consequences of unexpected events related to the transport of oil
on agricultural output, considering that the effects do not disappear in a single period.
Jayanchadran (2009) also investigates forest fires originated by palm oil producers and
logging companies which burn out of control and affect all of Indonesia. She finds a
strong link between air pollution from forest fires and infant mortality. My paper differs
from the above (except for the paper by Bruederle and Hodler (2019)) in that I trust in
the plausibly random timing of oil spills at locations that were affected at some point
during the period from January 2006 to December 2018.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the background to
oil spills and pollution in Nigeria, and their links with agricultural output, and presents
the model related to this framework. Section 3 describes the methods, covering the data
and the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the main results and several robustness
checks. Section 5 shows alternative specifications, and Section 6 deals with mechanisms.
Section 7 concludes.
4.2 Background
4.2.1 Oil Spill and Pollution
“Oil spill” means any spill of crude oil or distilled products such as diesel or jet
fuel, gasoline, kerosene, Stoddard solvent, hydraulic oils, hydraulic oils, and lubricating
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oils.7“Oil-spill pollution” means the negative effect of oil spills on the environment and
living organisms. When an oil-spill event occurs, location is an important predictor of its
impact. Onshore spills close to human populations have a greater economic impact. The
spillage rate and the number of oil leaks are also decisive determinants of the severity
of the consequences (Chang, et al. 2014).
The effect of crude oil pollution on wetland soil, which is what most of the Niger
Delta area comprises, is to lower soil fertility by increasing soil PH up to 80%, thus
reducing available phosphorus (AP). These effects can alkalinize marsh soil, affecting
soil fertility and causing deterioration on wetlands (Wang, et al. 2013). Oil spills often
also lead to fires, which release respirable particulate matter (PM from now on) into the
air (Bruederle and Hodler, 2019). These air pollutants can be carried over long distances
and deposited on the ground as acid rain, or directly absorbed by plants (Aragon and
Rud, 2016).
4.2.2 Oil Spills in Nigeria and Agricultural Output
My empirical analysis deals with pollution from oil spills in Nigeria. Nigeria is a West
African country in the Gulf of Guinea with a surface area of 923,773 km2 (Zabbey et al,
2017) and a population estimated at close to 201 million in 2019. The Niger Delta area in
Nigeria comprises diverse ecosystems of large forests, freshwater, mangrove, and swamps,
which are characterized by continual salt-water-inundations. It is the largest wetland
in Africa (Okonofua, 2011).8 The Niger Delta basin has been studied in depth because
of its vast deposits of petroleum resources. Oil operations were started there in the
1930s by the Royal/Dutch-Shell Company, operating under the name Shell Petroleum
Development Company (SPDC) (Madu et al, 2018). The first oil was produced in
December 1957, and the petroleum sector shaped the Nigerian economy in the early
7“Crude oil and its derivatives include various individual hydrocarbons. Hydrocarbons are constituted
“[...] from carbon and hydrogen atoms that bind together in various ways, resulting in paraffins (or
normal alkanes), isoparaffins (isoalkanes), aromatics (such as benzene or various PAHs), cycloalkanes
and unsaturated alkanes (alkenes and alkynes)” https://www.environmentalpollutioncenters.org/
oil-spill/. Other components are sulfur, nitrogen, and/or oxygen atoms.
8According to the United Nations Development Program Report (UNDP, 2006), most of the people
in the area depend on the natural environment for their livelihood. Good agricultural lands, fisheries,
and well-developed industries are part of the abundant resources in the region.
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70s, leading to a rapid accumulation of capital, declining total factor productivity, and
contracting utilization of capacity.
The increasing dependence of the Nigerian economy on hydrocarbon extraction has
placed severe pressure on components of the environment as a result of incidental and
accidental discharges of hydrocarbon components into the environment. “[..]The oil
companies operate over 5,284 oil wells and thousands of miles of oil pipelines networks
though the Niger Delta region” (Madu et al. 2018, pg. 79). The main environmental
challenge is that of oil spills. This is a common issue in many developing oil-producing
countries. However, in most cases spills are associated with operational or mechanism
failures,9 but in Nigeria they are also the result of oil theft, sabotage, and pipeline
vandalism.10
The 2011 United National Environmental Program (UNEP) report looks in depth
at the consequences of oil spills in Ogoniland, (River State, Niger Delta), finding “[..]oil
contamination severely impacting many components of the environment”. In addition,
Ogoniland frequently has high rainfall, and when oil spills are not properly cleaned up,
oil has been found “[..] being washed away, traversing farmland and almost always
ending up in the creeks” (UNEP report, 2011, p. 9). The report also focuses attention
on the importance of land/resource use policies in the Niger Delta, and the importance
of corporate social responsibility programs, including clean-up programs in the area.
Agriculture has traditionally been the dominant economic activity in Nigeria. In
1985, crop farming and fishing accounted for approximately 90% of all activity in the
Niger Delta area. The active labor force linked to these activities accounted for around
50%-68% of the total. More than 90% of farmers are subsistence farmers, working with
9Many pipelines are old and subject to corrosion. The estimated safe life span of a pipeline is fifteen
years, but in numerous places in the Niger Delta it is possible to find pipelines 20 or 25 years old. These
pipelines are thus prone to rupture and are major fire hazards (Nriagu, 2019).
10There are varying socio-political factors related to pipeline vandalism. One important problem
associated with unrest in the Niger Delta which results in the destruction of oil pipelines, and
consequently oil spills in the area, is who controls oil revenues. Since 1999, the federal government
has paid out 13% of the revenues derived from oil to oil-producing states. The federal government uses
a revenue allocation formula to distribute these tax revenues to states. The quest for self-determination
of young people in the Niger Delta area and a failure to consider the interests of host communities are
associated with the control of these rents. This has led to an increase in civil unrest and often to the
sabotaging of oil pipelines, thus causing oil spills in the area. (Madu et al. 2018).
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traditional techniques and basic tools. Land is still farmed using the bush fallow system
or land rotation. These organic farming techniques are very susceptible to environmental
changes that affect water or soil, and therefore lead to deforestation. This high level
of resource utilization based on land and labor-intensive methods makes the area more
susceptible to oil pollution.
I link oil pollution with agricultural productivity here through the impact of
pollutants on crop yields and health, soil quality, and human capital. Once crude
oil and petroleum products leak directly into the environment, different compounds
are absorbed by the soil, entering ground and surface water or evaporating in the
air depending on their physical characteristics (Bruederle and Hodler, 2019). These
pollutants lead to a rapid deterioration in the soil, a reduction in crop yield and, hence,
to a fall in agricultural output. Evidence from biological science (for example Maggs
et al, 1995; Marshall et al, 1997 between others) finds a “[..] reduction of around
20-60% in the yield of crops such as rice, wheat, and beans”. In particular, a case
study of the effect of oil pollution on soil properties and growth of tree crops11 showed
that seedling germination and plant heights are significantly affected at high levels of
pollution (Uquetan, U. et al. 2017). Besides, the effects on ground pollution could be
cumulative and long-lived. In fact, although the Nigerian crude oil has rapid evaporation
loss of around 50%, a study carried out about nineteen years after a major 1970 oil spill
at Ebubu, Ogoni, found that “[...]vegetation in areas downstream of the spill was still
being degraded due to a slow seepage of crude oil from the spill site” (Nriagu, 2019, pg.
761). Consequently, agricultural productivity could be affected not just in the period
when the spill occurs but also via a persistent effect that can continue to impact the
agricultural cycle years after the events.
Finally, agricultural output could also fall because of a drop in labor productivity.
There may be direct adverse health effects on workers through PM inhalation or indirect
effects through damage to livelihood resources, such as the quality of foods from degraded
lands and fishing grounds. In any case, a drop in labor productivity or labor supply
11Specifically, cocoa, cashew, pawpaw and mango.
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could result, leading to a decrease in agricultural output.
4.2.3 Analytical Framework
This subsection develops a simple framework for understanding how oil-spill pollution
could result in adjustments in the optimal behavior of households. I follow the simple
agricultural standard model of consumer-producer households used in development
literature as per Aragón and Rud (2016), who extend the framework set out by Benjamin
(1992). Oil spills can impact directly on land plots, or may have occurred some
periods before and soil could receive filtration that still affects agricultural total factor
productivity. Also, there may be no direct impact on plots, but indirect pollution
through air or water pollution that leads to changes in soil quality, biomass, and human
health.
I assume that farmers (households) are both consumers and producers of an
agricultural good with a price of p = 1. Households have a productive parameter A
and use land, X, and labor, L to produce the agricultural good Y = F (A,X,L). F
is a concave production function. Farmers have certain endowments (EX , EL), which
represent land and household endowments, respectively. Endowments are used as inputs
on the farm or can be sold at a local input market (Xs, Ls), as land and labor supply at
prices r and w. Labor endowments also can be used as leisure. In addition, farmers can
buy an additional quantity of land and labor (hired labor) when there are producers in
line with land and labor demand: (Xb, Lb).
The problem of farmers consists of maximizing household utility U(C, l) over
consumption, C, and leisure, l, subject to the budget constraint C = F (A,X,L) −
r(Xb − Xs) − w(Lb − Ls). Endowment constraints are X = EX + Xb − Xs, and
L = EL + Lb − Ls − l.
In the context of the Nigerian agricultural market,12 I assume that households are
12Even though agriculture is the main system of livelihood for Nigerian, the sector is characterized by
poor access to input markets. For example, “[..] an outdated land tenure system that constrains access
to land (1.8 ha/farming household), a very low level of irrigation development (less than 1 percent
of cropped land under irrigation), limited adoption of research findings and technologies, high cost
4.2. BACKGROUND 82
not homogeneous in their access to input markets. 13 In particular, there are two
types of farmer: Unconstrained farmers, who participate in competitive input markets,
and fully constrained farmers, who neither buy nor sell inputs. In the first case, if
input markets exist and work well it is possible to study production and consumption
decisions separately, and there is trade. Households maximize their profits and, given
the optimal profit, choose between consumption and leisure levels. Thus, the optimal
levels of output and inputs, Y ∗(A,w, r), X∗(A,w, r), and L∗(A,w, r), depend only on
the value of A, which means total factor productivity, and on input prices.
For fully constrained farmers, endowments shape the optimal decisions on inputs.
Farmers use all their land in the planting season X∗ = EX given that the opportunity
cost of land is zero. Given that there is no labor market, Ls = Lb = 0, and the optimal
level of labor depends on a trade-off between income and leisure. In this simplified
framework, the farmer’s problem is:
Max U(C,l)
s.a
C=F(A, EX , L)
L=EL − l
(4.1)
of farm inputs, poor access to credit, inefficient fertilizer procurement and distribution, inadequate
storage facilities and poor access to markets have all combined to keep agricultural productivity low
(average of 1.2 metric tons of cereals/ha) with high post-harvest losses and waste” (FAO in Nigeria
http://www.fao.org/nigeria/fao-in-nigeria/nigeria-at-a-glance/en/)
13Land acquisition is bound by the Land Use Act of 1978. There are three types of land market: 1)
Formal land markets, where the government allocates a certificate of occupancy; 2) combined formal
and informal markets where there is a certificate of occupancy in the transfer of land rights; and 3)
informal markets. The titles owned do not entail a certificate of occupancy because the bulk of the
transactions are not documented. Nevertheless, an estimated 95% of agricultural land in Nigeria is not
titled (Oluwatayo et al., 2019).
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The first order condition becomes: UcFL = Ul. Thus, the optimal level of labor
is a function that depends on both the level of total factor productivity and input
endowments, L∗(A,EX , EL).14
If oil spills directly impact plots in the growing season, the agricultural good that
has been planted is lost. In terms of the model, this can be interpreted as a reduction
of land endowment, leading to a diminishing land supply. However, there are two
indirect channels through which oil-spill pollution affects agricultural output and hence
household consumption. As described above, most oil spills are located in the Niger
Delta, and are most likely to occur in the pipeline networks close to oil wells. Thus,
oil companies that operate in this zone could have a demand for local inputs (land
and labor), leading to an increase in input prices, which would reduce input use and
consequently, agricultural output among unconstrained farmers. This channel also could
reduce the supply of inputs through government expropriation of land for oil extraction
and infrastructure access, and through population displacement. There would be no
effect on total factor productivity A.15
Moreover, oil pollution affects the quality of inputs, as discussed in the previous
section, and soil quality, crop yields, health, and labor productivity all decrease. This
argument is linked to a drop in the total productivity factor, which unambiguously
causes a decrease in agricultural output and household consumption, although input
uses may not change. It might also lead to a reduction in input uses. For unconstrained
farmers, this might mean a reduction in labor and land uses because input prices do not
change. Among constrained farmers, the drop in total factor productivity leads to labor
being replaced by leisure, while the use of land does not change.
In short, this model highlights the importance of studying the impact of oil-spill
pollution through its indirect effects on agricultural total factor productivity. Other
outcomes, such us input uses and agricultural output, may not be very informative
about the channels that determine a drop in agricultural output.
14Agricultural employment for a wage is relatively infrequent in Nigeria. GHS-Nigerian data shows
that only 3.5% of men and 1.4% of women are wage workers.
15I also explore the use of other inputs such as fertilizers, improved seeds, etc, later in my analysis.
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However, the unobservable heterogeneity in A could also impact input uses and the
engagement of the econometric identification of total factor productivity. Thus, in my
empirical approach, I follow the model prediction that relies on household endowments
as a key for determining input uses in the presence of imperfect input markets. This
assumption leads to consistent estimates of the parameters of the production function
4.3 Methods
4.3.1 Data
I merge geo-referenced household surveys containing agricultural, socioeconomic, and
weather variables from the Nigerian General Household Survey (GHS-Panel) (waves 1,
2, 3, and 4) with data from oil spills also geo-referenced from The Nigerian Oil Spill
Monitor16 to construct a final dataset of around 6,000 observations for my main analysis.
Agricultural output and inputs
My main data source is a repeated cross-section from the Nigeria General Household
Survey Panel (GHS-Panel).17 It is collected by the National Bureau of Statistics in
collaboration with the World Bank’s program on Living Standards Measurement Surveys
- Integrated Surveys for Agriculture (LSMS-ISA). This program was revised in 2010
to include a panel component (GHS-Panel). The GHS-Panel is a national survey of
5,000 households, which are also representative of geopolitical zones (at urban and
rural levels). Households were interviewed in 2010-2011 (Wave 1), 2012-2013 (Wave 2),
2015-2016 (Wave 3), and 2018-2019 (Wave 4). The Nigeria GHS-Panel is part of a larger,
regional project in Sub-Saharan Africa that involves eight countries and seeks to obtain
better agricultural statistics. The surveys collect data on agricultural activities, other
household income activities, household expenditure, and consumption. The finest level
is that of enumeration areas (EA), which approximately match neighborhoods (urban
areas) and villages (rural areas). In Wave 4, the GHS-sample was partially refreshed to
16https://oilspillmonitor.ng
17I cannot estimate a panel dataset because at the time of writing the longitudinal weights were still
being prepared. However, cross-section weights are available for each round.
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maintain the representativeness and integrity of the sample. A new set of 360 random
enumeration areas were incorporated into the sample, which meant 3600 new households.
Thus, a subsample of 1425 families from previous rounds was interviewed. Farmers are
located in 423 local government areas (LGAs), 37 states, and six Zones: North-Central,
North-East, North-West, South-East, South-West, and South-South. Figure B.2 in the
Appendix C shows a map of the six geographical zones of Nigeria.
Each wave consists of two visits to each household:18 A post-planting visit just
after the planting period to collect information on inputs used, planting preparation,
labor used for planting, and other information relating to the period; and a post-harvest
visit after the harvest season to collect information on crops harvested, labor used for
harvesting, and other variables related to the harvest cycle. I focus on the farming
household as a production unit in a period (the year) that represents a season-round pair.
A farmer may operate one or more plots of land, so I aggregate any information at the
plot level to household level. The GHS panel also provides a set of geospatial variables
using household locations and geo-referenced plots together with various geospatial
databases that are available to the survey team. Specifically, the geo-coordinates
of clusters (or an average of household GPS locations by EA in GHS-Panel) are
reported but slightly displaced within a specified range determined by an urban/rural
classification. The displacement is done randomly in terms of direction and distance up
to 5 km for the rural clusters, and 2 km for urban clusters. A 10 km distance-up is
applied for one percent of rural areas.19
To measure the real agricultural output (Y ), I construct a Laspeyres index of
production that aggregates the quantity produced of main cash and staple crops crops
(cassava, maize, yam, beans, cocoyam, millet, oil palm, and rice) produced by household
farms using proxies of prices in 2010 as weights. I also identify the other, minor crops
grown under a category named “other crops”. I use unit values as proxies of prices. To
calculate these proxies, I follow Aragón et al. (2019) and divide the value of sales by the
18The post-planting and post-harvest visit calendars are shown in the Appendix C.
19The reason for this modification of coordinates is to meet user interest in geo-referenced locations
while preserving the confidentiality of sample households and communities.
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quantity of each crop. I then calculate the median unit value of each crop at national
level.
For the main agricultural inputs, I construct land input by adding up the size of plots
harvested by households. Labor input is estimated by adding hired worked days to the
number of days that all members of the household spend working on the household
farm. I use the endowment of each household as an instrumental variable, following
the methodology of Benjamin (1992). Available land is the sum of the area of all plots
to which a farmer has access, either by the distribution of the community or family,
outright purchase, renting, or use free of charge. Labor endowment is the number of
equivalent adults in households.
The survey also provides information on household characteristics and agricultural
practices (age of head of household, literacy, an indicator of whether households own
their land, use of fertilizers, herbicides, pesticides, and improved seeds).20 I use these as
control variables in my main specification and robustness analysis.21 In the robustness
analysis, I also supplement household and agricultural practices data with a set of
geospatial variables that help to control for other characteristics that could also affect
the total agricultural productivity channel. These include long distances to main points
(federal roads, main towns, main markets, state capitals, and border posts), mean
rainfall levels and temperatures, soil characteristics (landscape type, level of toxicity,
excess salt, workability, nutrient retention and availability, and oxygen availability to
roots).
Table C.1 in the Appendix C presents summary statistics of the agricultural
characteristics, households variables, and weather and terrain conditions. There are
several relevant observations for my analysis. First, farmers have small scale operations
with no substantial differences between the plot areas harvested and their total plots
(the average total land harvested is 3.77 hectares and the average total plot size is
4.05 hectares, giving a figure of around 93%). Second, farmers use practices that
20In the database, there is also information on additional shocks that impact farms. There is not any
oil spill in the dataset.
21https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/1002
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can be described as subsistence farming, e.g. limited use of pesticides and herbicides.
Table C.2 presents summary statistics from the dataset which are not only restricted to
agricultural workers (rural or urban, population, sex, age). Some of these variables may
explain a drop in agricultural total productivity not associated with oil-spill pollution
(dummy variables if an individual, male or female, is employed, semi-employed or hired
in domestic production, works in agriculture, migration, literacy, secondary education,
and own business). I also present some household variables that help me to explain a
drop in labor productivity (dummy variable if any individual reports being ill in the
last four weeks, number of days for which an individual reports ceasing to engage in any
usual activity, number of total hours worked, and real employment income).
The oil spills dataset
The second database used is The Nigerian Oil Spill Monitor, which provides
geo-referenced data from January 2006 to December 2018 on oil spills registered
by the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA), the Nigerian
environmental regulator. The Nigerian Oil Spills Monitor visualizes oil spills on an
online map and allows data to be downloaded in a table.22 The data prior to 2013 is not
entirely well-referenced. In most cases, only the site location is provided. In these cases,
I use the geocoding23 tool from the geographical information system (QGIS)24 to obtain
their geographical coordinates. NOSDRA calls on the public to report oil spills by email
or via a hotline, but relies on voluntary engagement and on the support of oil companies
to provide data. The dataset reports some supplementary information, such as the
estimated quantity of oil spilt, the cause, the area covered, and the quantity recovered
among other items. However, not all oil spills are supported by this information. Oil
companies may be willing to provide information if oil spills are caused by sabotage or
theft, or through their own fault (as in the cases of pipeline corrosion, maintenance,
human operational errors, and equipment failures). There are 11,981 oil spills recorded
22The dataset of oil spills used in this paper was downloaded in January 2019.
23Specifically, I use the Geocode tool to geo-reference the exact site.
24QGIS is a user-friendly Open Source Geographic Information System (GIS) licensed under the GNU
General Public License. QGIS is an official project of the Open Source Geospatial Foundation (OSGeo).
It runs on Linux, Unix, Mac OSX, Windows and Android and supports numerous vector, raster, and
database formats and functionalities. https://www.qgis.org/es/site/about/index.html
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for the period analyzed, around 68% of them attributed to sabotage. Most of these oil
spills are concentrated on pipelines close to onshore oil and gas fields in the South-south
zone of Nigeria
Figure 4.1 illustrates the total number of oil spills per annum over my sample
period. There are no suitable references for oil spills before 2006. The figure shows a
steady increase in oil spills in 2013 but a sharp decrease in 2015. This last evidence is
consistent with the drop in oil prices in Nigeria25 from that year onwards, suggesting
that one reason for this decrease in oil spills could be a decrease in the sabotaging of
pipelines to steal oil.
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To link oil spills and household data, I use the QGIS program mentioned above.
Thus, I obtain the geographical coordinates for both oil spills and enumeration areas
on a map. On average, each enumeration area contains ten households. I focus on the
25See https://www.cbn.gov.ng/rates/crudeoil.asp, the Central Bank of Nigeria for historical oil
prices in Nigeria.
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enumeration areas located near oil spills. Thus, I create buffers around oil spills that
define proximity to them.26 27 Figure 4.2 is a map of Nigeria showing the location of
oil spills and the enumeration areas for each wave. The shaded areas are the union of
all buffers within radii of 5, 7.5, and 10 kilometers of all oil spills in my dataset.










Sources: Own work based on Nigerian GHS-PANEL data and Nigerian Oil Spill Monitor
NOSDRA.data
26I present results up to 5 km in the main text and 7.5 km in the Appendix C. Recall that the
coordinate modification strategy in the Nigeria GHS-panel surveys means that up to 99% of households
are located within a buffer zone of 5 km from the reported coordinates.
27Bruederle and Holder (2019) focus on mothers who live in clusters provided by the DHS survey at
a reported distance of less than 10 km from the closest oil spill. According to Aragóon and Rud (2016),
p. 1982 “[..]..using satellite imagery it is found that the concentration of (NO2), an indicator of air
pollutant, is higher in locations near mines and declines with distance”. They define buffer zones of
20 km from mine sites as the mining area. Nevertheless, oil spill pollution differs from that caused by
mines, and Nigerian oil is very light in chemical composition with high levels of evaporation. Thus, I
begin my analysis with the nearby locations. In a robustness analysis, I also consider longer distances
(20km to 50 km).
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Conflict Data
I also use spatially explicit data from The Armed Conflict Location and Event
Dataset (ACLED Dataset) (Raleigh et al., 2017). These data cover different countries
and periods. Events are collected from various sources, including humanitarian agencies,
research publications, and local, regional, and international press. In each dataset, the
unit of observation is the event. They contain latitude and longitude coordinates and
the exact day (in most cases) of conflict events. I construct a dummy variable that
indicates whether any conflict event causing at least one fatality took place within 25
kilometers28 of the reported enumeration area during the sample period of the Nigeria
GHS-Panel, i.e. from January 2009 to December 2018.
4.3.2 Empirical Strategy
The objective of my empirical analysis is to determine the extent of the effects of
oil-spill pollution on agricultural activity. To that end, I estimate a production function
and assess the impact of oil spills that occurred in zones near farms on total factor
productivity A.
I follow the empirical implementation method set out in Aragón and Rud (2016), who
study the expansion of mining activities in Ghana, for two reasons: First, pollutants
affect agricultural total factor productivity similarly in both cases; and second, their
impact may be higher on the areas near the main sources of pollution. However, in
Aragón and Rud (2016), the pollution comes from mines, which are in fixed locations
and pollute the air continuously. In this paper, oil spills are rare events on pipelines
that might recur over time,29and their effects are also persistent in the environment.
I also assume the following agricultural production function:30
28I follow the approach of Bruederle and Hodler (2019).
29An examination of the oil spills in the dataset shows several spills in nearby geographic coordinates
and in the same year, which hence affect the same farms. Thus, my oil spill pollution variable reflects
the number of oil spills near a given location and year.
30I am assuming Cobb-Douglas technology for the sake of simplicity and because I follow the








where Y is the agricultural output of farmer i, in enumeration area e, in time period t.
Ai,e,t is total factor productivity, Xi,t and Li,t are the actual land and labor inputs.
eεit captures unanticipated shocks not related to oil spills, which are by definition
uncorrelated with input decisions by farmers. Finally, α and β are the input shares
of land and labor respectively. Farmers may need other inputs for production, such
as fertilizers, herbicides, animals, etc., but these are not commonly used so, following
Aragón and Rud (2016), I decided to exclude them from the benchmark model, though
I do include them later in my robustness analysis.
Total factor productivity Ai,e,t is composed of three factors: Oet a function of the
total number of oil spills in the proximity of enumeration area e before time t; the
heterogeneity of farmers (χi,t) and time-invariant environmental conditions and the local
economy (νe). Hence, Ai,e,t=exp(δOet+χi+νe). The parameter of interest is δ. If δ < 0,
oil spills are affecting total factor productivity, but if δ = 0, the effect of oil spills could
be transmitted via the input competition channel through prices or availability of inputs.
A limitation arises when I only approximate accumulated pollution via the number
of oil spills. The amount of oil spilled and the spillage rate are key determinants of the
severity of the consequences (Chang et al. 2014). Madu et al. (2017) find no correlation
between these variables, but the estimated volume of the oil spills variable reported by
NOSDRA31 is incomplete for all events and implies an observation loss of approximately
one-third. Thus, I decided not to consider this variable in my main model, although the
volume spilled could be key in quantifying the damage to the environment.32 However,
a histogram of the variable shows that the density of its probability is concentrated in
a small quantity of oil spills: There are few medium or large oil spills.33
31NOSDRA gives the amount in barrels reported as spilled by each company. However, the time-series
data of both the estimated quantity of oil lost and the estimated quantity of oil recovered in each location
are incomplete.
32I present additional results with this variable in my robustness analysis.
33See Figure C.3 in the Appendix C.
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There are also some empirical challenges: Places around the pipelines, and hence
locations near oil spills could have permanent differences in productivity. In particular,
the sharp increase in oil spill data in 2013 could indicate that data from previous oil spills
was not fully reported.34 As Aragón and Rud (2016) point out, when I estimate the
coefficient of interest, this omitted variables problem may lead to endogeneity issues.35
To avoid such issues, I unify the buffer zones around oil spills as defined above to
create an oil spill area.36 I also use time variation in the repeated cross-section to
compare differences in productivity in oil-spill and non-oil-spill areas. As highlighted
by the aforesaid authors, this is basically a difference-in-difference methodology with
continuous treatment. In this case, proximity to oil spills defines the control group and
the intensity of treatment is the proxy for the estimated quantity of oil lost. Taking
this approximation, I assume that the trend in output in both areas would have been
similar without the presence of oil spills. In fact, most pipelines and oil spills are
concentrated in the Niger Delta, a specific area where oil exploration has impacted the
entire ecosystem.37 Assuming this empirical strategy, the variable Oet takes the value
of 0 in the enumeration areas farthest from the defined oil spill area.
Second, in estimating my production function, both agricultural output and input
choice could be affected by productivity being simultaneously determined. In this case,
unobserved heterogeneity in productivity is reflected in the error term, creating an
endogeneity problem in the estimation of input coefficients.
I address these issues in several ways. First at all, I use variables such as observable
characteristics of farmers as proxies for heterogeneity, χi and I take LGAs fixed effects to
capture differences in average output due to heterogeneity in the local economy. Taking
34See Bruederle and Hodler (2019).
35Zabbey et al. (2007) pg. 3, recall that “[..] An estimated 10 m to 13 m tons of hydrocarbons
have been reportedly spilled into the Niger Delta over the last 50 year. During this period over 77% of
spilled hydrocarbons are not recovery”. Thus, I can assume that the number of oil spills is greater than
reported.
36See Figures A4 and A5 in the Appendix C.
37Many activities associated with oil extraction have affected the Delta area negatively. In particular,
building infrastructures for oil exploration (such as access roads and canals, resulting in deforestation),
laying pipes and gas flaring seriously damage the environment. For instance, gas flaring introduces
toxic pollutants (such as PAHs and toxic metals, especially vanadium) into the air. In the Niger Delta,
gas flaring facilities are often close to local communities with no protection, leading to a high level of
exposure to pollutants among households (Nriagu, 2011).
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logs in the agricultural production function, I estimate the following equation:
yi,e,d,t = αxi,t + βli,t + δOet + νZi + κOilspillareae + µd + θt + εi,e,t (4.3)
where yi,e,d,t represents the log of the agricultural output of farmer i, in enumeration
area (village or urban neighborhood) e, in LGAs d, in period t, xi,t and li,t, are the log
of land and labor for household i in period time t, respectively. The variable Zi is a set
of farmer’s control set, Oet is the proxy for cumulative oil pollution in the proximity of
the enumeration area; Oilspillareae is a dummy that determines whether the land is
within 5 kilometers of an oil spill, µd is a set of LGAs fixed effects, and θt is a set of
time fixed effects. Finally, εi,e,t is the corresponding disturbance term.
The above identification assumption means exploring the presence of some
constrained farmers too. I estimate a standard IV model using input endowments as
instruments for my observed use of inputs. As mentioned above, traditional farming
is the main source of livelihood in Nigeria, which means that most farmers could have
constrained access to the inputs market. As Benjamin (1992) points out, the greater
the proportion of constrained farmers, the closer the correlation between household
endowments and input uses. However, I can only use this approach in cases where
correlation is strong enough and endowment affect output only through input uses
and not through the productivity parameter A. That means that endowments are not
conditionally correlated with the residual unobserved heterogeneity term, εi,e,t, which
corresponds to the error term, ei,t, heterogeneity in locations, and unaccounted farmers.
Under this assumption, I can estimate my model with OLS regression. 38
38In a robustness analysis in the Appendix C, following Aragón and Rud (2016), I also consider the
possibility that endowments may be correlated with the error term, εi,e,t. In that case, the exogeneity
assumption in the IV strategy does not entirely apply. That situation emerges for more productive
farmers who have systematically larger plots or households. To solve this issue, I apply the partial
identification strategy used by Nevo and Rosen (2012), which implements an imperfect instrumental
variables (IIV) strategy to identify a set of parameter values instead of point values. Recall that IV
strategy relies on identifying point values. IV permits partial correlation with the error term. In
particular, this approach implies that “[..] (i) the correlation between the instrument and the error term
has the same sign as the correlation between the endogenous regressor and the error term, and (ii) that
the instrument is less correlated with the error term than is the endogenous regressor” (Nevo and Rosen,
2012, p. 659). Given that I use the same instrumental variables as previous literature, I carry out the
same exercise to check the validity of my instrument variables.
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Finally, changes in agricultural productivity could be driven by other events that
correlate in time and space with oil spills. Oil spills are likely to occur simultaneously
with other events specific to oil production. Thus, following Bruederle and Hodler
(2019), I use total factor productivity to compare the effect on agricultural output
in the oil-producing states in the Niger Delta with the effect for agricultural output
elsewhere. Oil spills are often also the result of vandalism. Sometimes military
groups attack pipelines, which entails violence against civilians (U.S. Energy Information
Administration, 2016). I use total factor productivity to compare the effect of oil spills
on agricultural output for household farms close to conflict areas and households far
from conflict areas.
Oil spills location and the oil spills pollution function
Oil-spill pollution is measured based on the location of oil spills near to households
and, hence, near cultivated plots. As a proxy of oil-spill pollution, I use a function of
the number of oil spills until period t. It is plausible that the enumeration areas near oil
spills may receive the greatest impact both directly or indirectly through air and water
contamination, because of the proximity of wetlands. As mentioned above, I consider
the survey enumeration areas at a reported distance of less than 10 kilometers from
the closest oil spill as my treatment group.39 However, the effect on total agricultural





g(n) ∗ Total oilspille,t−n (4.4)
where Total oilspille,t−n is the number of oil spills close to an enumeration area e,
t is the period of the wave, n is the number of years before each wave, and at is the
total number of years before each wave. 40 The persistent effect is defined by g(n).
39The results show that the best specification in this case is to choose buffer zones of up to 5km.
Taking enumeration areas up to 10 kilometers from oil spills is not significant.
40In particular, at could be a2011 = 5, a2013 = 7, a2016 = 10, a2018 = 12.
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This function takes different specifications depending on how persistent is the effect of
oil spills on soil quality and human capital is. In particular, in my benchmark model,
g(n) = exp−n.
With this formulation, I consider the possibility that oil spill incidents during the
period of the wave have the most impact on total factor productivity. That means
that contemporaneous oil spills impact agricultural output strongly in present crop
seasons. I also consider that productivity depends on previous oil spills that may have
impacted both the quality of soil and human capital. However, these impacts decline
exponentially over n years. The main processes that influence the degradation of oil spills
include evaporation, auto-oxidation, and microbial degradation. The first known model
to describe a process of decomposition of organic matter is the simple exponential model,
which was initially proposed by Jenny et al. (1949) and discussed in detail by Olson
(1963). I decided to take this approximation to create my oil spills pollution variable,
given that the oil would affect soil quality at a lower rate over time. In particular, the
original function is: X = X0e
−kt, where X is the amount of litter remaining at the time
t from an initial amount X0. For the sake of simplicity, I consider the value of k to
be 1. To the best of my knowledge, there are no previous studies that determine how
many years this effect will persist in the soil.41 It probably depends on the degree of
evaporation, the chemical composition of the hydrocarbon contaminants, the physical
characteristics of the terrain, weather issues, other environmental factors (including PH
and soil aeration), and clean-up aspects. To the best of my knowledge, there is no way
of determining how the process works or how long chemicals of these types can affect the
quality of land. Thus, I consider all oil spills up to the last day of the harvest survey for
each wave as a cumulative, persistent effect on total factor productivity. Nevertheless,
I also use different measurements in the robustness analysis. For example, oil spills
may have the same impact on soil independently of the year when they happen. Thus
g(n) = 1 → ∀n.42 Another approach is to identify the number of oil spills that affect
41The UNEP report (2011) concludes that contamination persists for many years.
42In my analysis, the biota of soil quality could be lost for many years because of pollution. Another
reason may be that oil spills could affect labor productivity permanently through chronic diseases suffered
by the labor force. Thus, I decided to do a robustness analysis with no degrading effect.
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land from the beginning of the planting period to the end of the harvest period given
by each survey.
g(n)=
1 si n =00 si n> 0
In this case, the effect is not persistent over time. Finally, I consider oil spills that
occurred up to five years before the planting period. In this last case, I apply the same
number of years to each wave. Thus, g(n)=
exp
−n si n =0, 1,.....,5
0 si n> 5
In short, my cumulative oil spills function depends on the total number of oil spills
near location e and on the year of each spill. Effects are always greater if oil spills
occur during the year of each survey, given that they could affect both agricultural
productivity and input uses in that year directly or indirectly. However, if there are
events before each survey, agricultural productivity may probably be affected by their
persistent effects on the quality of soil and human capital. The extent of that persistence
over time will depend on how I parameterize the function g(n).4344
Table 4.1 presents a simplified difference-in-difference estimation of the main
variables, comparing mean values in all waves for farmers located in oil-spill and non-oil
spill areas. The first observation is that in both areas the log of agricultural output
decreases in 2012-2013 and in 2018-2019. However, the impact is stronger for oil-spill
areas in 2012-2013. In that period the number of oil spills increased. In fact, there
is a stronger significant difference in this variable when the two zones are compared.
There is also a clearly significant difference in the use of labor input. Land harvested
is slightly significant at 10%, but labor is negative and significant at 1%, suggesting an
adjustment of this input in the spill area. Concerning household characteristics, I find
clear evidence that less land is owned by farmers who live near oil spills. The head
of the family also tends to be younger, but careful examination of this variable reveals
that the significant impact may be due to the inclusion of new households in wave 4.
43See Table C.3 in the Appendix C for summary statistics of the oil-spill pollution variables.
44See Table C.4 in the Appendix C for data on collection dates of surveys and oil-spill incidents
considered for each period for the main analysis and the second approach.
97 4.4. MAIN RESULTS
However, these differences disappear in both cases when I control for other household
characteristics. Finally, the greater use of fertilizer may suggest that farmers take action
because of the pollution perceived on their land.
Table 4.1: Mean of main variables, by wave and location
VARIABLE
Within 5 km of oil spill More than 5 km from oil spill Diff. columns
2010-2011 2012-2013 2015-2016 2017-2018 2010-2011 2012-2013 2015-2016 2018-2019 (4-3-2-1)-(8-7-6-5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Cumulative Oil Spill 1.065 2.619 1.128 7.042 — — — — —
Ln Real Agricultural Output 10.193 9.529 10.554 7.428 10.370 10.158 10.577 6.896 -0.02***
(0.005)
Land harvested (hectares) 0.783 0.920 1.177 1.027 7.233 3.596 3.121 1.311 0.08*
(0.042)
labor (days) 154.870 78.335 299.809 708.565 215.904 218.284 381.436 725.299 -7.378***
(2.542)
No members in household 2.758 3.823 5.175 3.416 2.929 3.497 4.460 3.527 -0.023
(0.024)
Owner-occupied farmland (%) 82.185 80.539 66.212 72.868 81.483 75.596 75.820 75.906 -0.01***
(0.003)
Age of head of family (years) 48.384 60.368 56.135 45.632 50.649 53.123 54.416 49.604 -0.18**
(0.071)
Literacy (%) 75.361 50.913 58.035 80.670 52.353 58.207 55.509 69.329 0.000
(0.001)
Fertilizers 0.429 0.155 0.218 0.400 0.442 0.459 0.599 0.483 0.00**
(0.001)
Improved Seed 1 0.952 0.989 1 0.977 0.958 0.977 1 -0.00
(0.000)
Small Business 0.699 0.346 0.428 0.472 0.524 0.444 0.469 0.539 -0.01
(0.005)
Observation 38 54 156 188 1,639 1,235 1,757 1,881
Notes: Columns 1-8 report mean values for the sub-samples of farmers less and more than 5 kilometers from an oil spill for each wave of the Nigerian
GHS. Means are estimated using simple weights. Column 9 displays the coefficient of the regression estimate for each variable. This is obtained by
regressing each variable on Cumulative Oil Spill and a dummy for being 5 kilometers from an oil spill. As in the baseline regressions, standard errors
are clustered at LGA level. Fixed effects are included, but no control variables. By definition, Cumulative Oil Spills more than 5km from an oil spill are
zero in all periods. The total number of observations is 5,998. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The standard errors are in parentheses.
4.4 Main Results
4.4.1 Effect on Agricultural Productivity
This section provides the results for the main hypothesis, evidencing that oil spills
near farmers are associated with significant reductions in agricultural productivity.
I start with the baseline specification using the total cumulative oil-spill function in
locations up to 5 kilometers from the oil spill.
Table 4.2 presents the main results. Column 1 examines the link between
agricultural output and the proxy for total accumulated oil-spill pollution in nearby
locations, without controlling for input use. I find that link to be negative and significant,
and consistent with oil spills affecting agricultural output through both pollution and
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Table 4.2: Oil spill pollution and Agricultural Productivity.
VARIABLES Ln Agricultural Output LnYield LnYield Cas LnYield Maize
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cumulative OilSpill -0.0236* -0.0234*** -0.0273*** -0.0288*** -0.0373* -0.0152
(0.013) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.022) (0.019)
LnLand 0.2572*** 0.5384***
(0.024) (0.171)
Lnlabor days 0.2001*** 0.2954*
(0.025) (0.153)
Estimation OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 6390 6130 6114 9051 1177 2564
R-squared 0.612 0.640 0.618 0.308 0.300 0.294
Waves dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
LGAs fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at LGA level. All regressions
include a dummy for being 5 kilometers from an oil spill. Controls on farmers: columns 2 to 4 and column 6
give household head age and literacy and an indicator of whether farms are owner-occupied. Denotes significance
at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Column 3 is estimated using 2SLS. Column 3 is estimated using 2SLS. The
instruments excluded are the log of the area of land managed and the log of the number of equivalent adults in
the household.
input competition as the model developed by Aragón and Rud (2016) suggests. Next, I
explore the channels likely to be driving the link. Column 2 estimates the agricultural
production function defined in (1) with the OLS model, while column 3 estimates the
2SLS regression using input endowments. 45 All regressions include a set of controls for
farmers, wave dummies, and LGA fixed effects. All specifications use cluster errors at
LGA level and sample weights to account for both autocorrelation spatial patterns and
sample design.
Results suggest a negative link between the presence of nearby oil spills and
agricultural output once input use is controlled for.46 Following the identification
strategy, I interpret these results as evidence of a reduction in agricultural productivity.
Thus, oil-spill pollution affects the agricultural sector negatively in the areas affected.
To further quantify the results in column 3, following the standard procedure in the
literature, I find that an increase of one unit of the accumulated total number of oil
spills leads to a decrease in agricultural production of around 2.73%; alternatively, an
45The results of the First Stage show a positive, significant correlation between inputs and input
endowments. See Table C.5 in the Appendix C. As a further check, in Figure C.7 and Table C.6 in the
Appendix C I present the estimations using the imperfect instrumental variable (IIV) approach. Figure
C.7 shows that the effect on residual productivity is negative in more than 96% of all combinations.
46Using the 2SLS estimation in column 3, the results of α and β do not reject the null hypothesis of
constant returns to scale at 5%.
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increase of one standard deviation in the measuring of accumulated oil spills is associated
with a reduction of almost 8% in agricultural productivity. 47
Columns 4 to 6 show the effect of oil spills on crop yield, which is defined as physical
output per unit of land. Column 4 shows the sum of the yields from cassava, maize, and
yam; column 5 those from cassava; and column 6 those from maize. These are the main
crops in both oil-spill and non-oil spill areas. Crop yield is a standard measurement of
agricultural productivity that abstracts from deflation and output aggregation issues.
However, it gives no information about whether changes in agricultural productivity are
generated by changes in inputs or in total factor productivity, A. In all cases, I estimate
an OLS regression that includes controls for farmers and fixed effects. As expected,
the results are negative, suggesting again that the effect of oil spills on agricultural
productivity is negative and significant.
Spatial disaggregation
Recall that I consider areas within 5 kilometers of oil spills as being hit harder.48
I now disaggregate the effects by distances between oil spills and farming plots.
Specifically, I focus on how spatial proximity to oil spills affects the extent of their effect.
To that end, I construct indicator variables for the geographical distance between the
reported enumeration area and the closest oil spill. Thus, I replace Oe,t by a linear spline
of the main variable included in each distance bracket b.






−n ∗Total oilspillp,ke,t−n. This refers
to the sum total of oil spills close to enumeration area e, within the distance brackets
with lower and upper limit p, and k, respectively,49 allowing for previous total oil spills
in exponential decay. The estimates of γp,k are presented in Table C.7 and Figure 4.3.
47The impact is computed as marginal effects as follows. It is given by the standard deviation times
the estimated coefficient multiplied by 100.
48Remember that the effect of pollution is located in places near oil spills, although it could spread
through water and filtration into the ground through rivers, and by air through the fires caused by oil
spills.
49The distances are the following: 0-5km, 5-7.5km, 7.5-10km, 10-20km, 20-30km, 30-40km, 40-50km.
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Figure 4.3: The Effect of Oil-Spill Pollution on Agricultural Productivity measured in





5Km 7.5Km 10Km 20Km 30Km 40Km 50Km
Notes: This figure shows the estimates of γp,k for the following values of p and k:
0-5km, 5-7.5km, 7.5-10km, 10-20km, 20-30km, 30-40km, 40-50km. Circles represent
point estimates, while lines indicate the 95 percent confidence interval.
The effect of oil spills on total agricultural productivity is greatest for oil spills
that occurred less than 7.5 km from the cluster location. The loss of productivity
becomes smaller and positive in locations more than 10km from an oil spill. However,
the confidence intervals are large, given that the number of enumeration areas considered
is much lower for each individual treatment than for the combined treatment. Because
of the larger decrease in total agricultural productivity in the 5km to 7.5 km interval,50I
also include enumeration areas up to 7.5 km away as a focus for my treatment. I present
the results in Table C.8 in the Appendix C. The table is organized in the same way as
Table 4.2. The results show that the effect of cumulative, persistent oil pollution on
locations within 7.5 km are still significant in most cases. However, the effect is not so
50Columns 1 to 4 of Table C.7 show a large decrease in total agricultural productivity in areas between
5 and 7.5 km away, but that difference disappears once additional variables are introduced into the model.
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strong as the previous choice. This could also be due to the random displacement of
1% of clusters, so I take this as a validation of the idea that I should focus on locations
within 5 km of oil spills.51 I repeat the exercise in Table C.9 with locations 10, 20, 30,
40, and 50 km from oil spills. Surprisingly, I find that the effect is again negative and
significant only at locations up to 30 km from oil spills. Thus, these results should be
interpreted with caution because most oil spills occur closer to wetland areas, and the
oil spilled could flush over the surface of the water and affect large areas. The design
of the analysis with distanced buffer zones around oil spills may not be the best choice,




Table 4.3 presents several checks on the robustness of the main model. First,
following Benjamin (1992), I introduce variables to control for additional heterogeneity
that could bias my results. First, I estimate OLS without land and labor variables
but including controls for whether a farm uses fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, and
improved seeds. The prices of these inputs have a significant effect on labor demand,
suggesting that they could be a substitute for this input (Benjamin, 1992). In Column
2 I also reintroduce the main input variables. Column 3 expands these specifications
by adding an array of heterogenous trends to the enumeration area level. Specifically,
I add indicators of distance trends (nearest federal road, nearest major market, border
post on the main road, major towns, distance to the capital of the state of residence).
In column 4 I also introduce variables that affect total productivity and could capture
other confounding factors for productivity and quality of plots. In particular, I use mean
temperature and rainfall, rooting, slope, nutrient retention, excess salt, oxygen supply
to roots, toxicity, and workability. These last characteristics are important to control
for the quality of plots independently of oil-spill shocks. All my results show that the
51I do likewise with locations within 10 km. The results are not significant in any specification. These
additional tables are available on request.
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negative effect of cumulative oil-spill pollution plus real agricultural production is still
significant when possible confounding factors are included.52
Alternative Measurements of Oil Pollution
As mentioned above, my oil pollution measurement is based on the hypothesis
that the impact of pollution on agricultural productivity is greater in the present
crop season. The variable is also cumulative and persistent, although it fades over
time with exponential decay. I also use the total number of oil spills rather than
the estimated quantity of oil spilt in terms of barrels lost to formulate my proxy of
cumulative, persistent oil pollution. My findings, however, may be affected by these
choices. Therefore, as an additional robustness check, I examine the extent to which the
above results depend on the definition of oil spill pollution used to construct the main
variable in the model.
First, I consider the three additional specifications for my function g(n), in order
to formulate Oe,t, present in the above section. Figure C.8 and Table C.11 in the
Appendix C present the results for each additional measure. As can be seen, all results
are negative and significant in OLS estimates on the agricultural output. Results show
that the consequences of oil pollution are greater during the crop seasons for each wave.
However, the effect is also persistent over time.
As a second approach, I reformulate all the oil pollution proxies used53 with the
estimated quantity of oil split, measured in barrels.54 Figure C.9 and Table C.12 present
52In the Appendix C, I present the results using a 2SLS estimator. The results are very similar to the
OLS estimation. See Table C.10.
53Recall that the volume of oil lost is an important indicator of environmental damage, but one third
of the data for the variable is missing, which could bias my results.
54Specifically, the cumulative oil pollution proxy is formulated as follows:
Oe,t =
∑at
n=0 g(n) ∗ Total estimated quantity barrelse,t−n(4.5)
where Total estimated quantity barrelse,t−n is the estimated quantity number of barrels spills close
to enumeration area e, t is the year of the wave, n is the number of years before each wave, and at is total
number of years after each wave. For this variable, g(n) = exp−n. In addition, I construct the following
oil pollution measurements: Volumen of OilSpill (barrels) measures the estimated number of barrels
lost nearby a location in the year of each wave. Thus, g(n) =
{
1 si n =0
0 si n> 0
. FCum Volumen of OilSpill
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Table 4.3: Additional checks
VARIABLES Ln Agricultural Output
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cumulative OilSpill -0.0249* -0.0238*** -0.0260*** -0.0224*** -0.0244***
(0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
LnLand 0.2466*** 0.2459*** 0.2566*** 0.2463***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Lnlabor days 0.1904*** 0.1911*** 0.1978*** 0.1876***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Fertilizers 0.3272*** 0.2611*** 0.2638*** 0.2734***
(0.079) (0.076) (0.075) (0.074)
Pesticides 0.3404*** 0.2196*** 0.2156*** 0.2102***
(0.069) (0.066) (0.067) (0.066)
Herbicides 0.1845* 0.0955 0.1067 0.1099
(0.099) (0.095) (0.095) (0.094)
Improved Seeds 0.2547 0.1516 0.1612 0.1496
(0.353) (0.274) (0.274) (0.272)
Rooting 0.4526* 0.4450*
(0.262) (0.248)








Nutrient Retention 0.2565 0.2816
(0.253) (0.248)
Nutrient Availability -0.2581 -0.2556
(0.222) (0.218)
Mean temperature 0.0137 0.0173
(0.015) (0.015)




Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 6324 6076 6076 6130 6076
R-squared 0.618 0.643 0.643 0.641 0.644
Waves dummies YES YES YES YES YES
LGA fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at LGA level. All
regressions include a dummy for being within 5 kilometers of an oil spill. Controls for farmers are
as follows: columns 1 and 2 show age of head of household and literacy (an indicator of whether
a household owns its farm plot). Columns 3 to 5 show indicators from time trends with distances
to federal road, main towns, main markets, states capitals, and border posts on the main road.
Significance levels are denoted as follows *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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the estimation results with different measurements of oil pollution based on this variable.
In qualitative terms, the results are quite similar to those presented in Figure C.8 and
Table C.11. The effect of cumulative oil pollution on both agricultural production and
crop yields is negative in all regressions. However, if I only consider the estimated
number of barrels lost in the year of each wave, the variable is insignificant in all cases.
4.5 Possible Confounders and Alternative Explanations
I interpret the above findings as a credible channel through which oil-spill pollution
has affected agricultural productivity. In this section, I explore two possible confounders
and four plausible alternative explanations.
4.5.1 Possible Confounders
I test whether the loss of productivity could be caused by events in just one part of
the country. The General Household Survey divides Nigeria into six geopolitical zones.55
In all zones, surveys report enumeration areas affected by oil-spill events. In the Niger
Delta area there could be events linked to oil operations and extractions that drive this
loss of productivity but are not exclusively oil-spills per se. 56 Moreover, violent events
could also lead to a loss of agricultural output, affecting both agricultural total factor
productivity and labor use. Specifically, I take the approach in Bruederle and Hodler
(2019) by considering cluster locations within 25 km of conflict events that involve at
least one fatality during the period.57
First, I rerun my main regression six times dropping these geographical zones one
by one. Columns 1 to 6 in Table C.14 and Figure C.11 present the coefficient estimates.
My oil spill pollution measurement remains negative and statistically significant in five
(barrels) measures cumulative oil spills that persist for only five years, g(n) =
{
exp−n si n =0, 1,.....,5
0 si n> 5
.
TCum Volumen of OilSpil (barrels) is the total estimated number of barrels spilt near locations up to
the last day of the harvest survey for each wave, g(n)=1.
55Recall that Figure C.2 in the Appendix C gives a map of Nigeria showing its boundaries and
geopolitical zones.
56Figure C.10 in the Appendix C gives a map of the Niger Delta region.
57Figure C.12 in the Appendix C gives a map of conflicts and buffer zones within 25 km of conflicts.
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specifications, the exception being when I exclude the South-South zone, which covers
most of the Niger Delta. Column 7 in Table C.14 shows the results when I restrict the
data to just the Niger Delta area. The effect of oil pollution there is greater than when
I analyze oil spills throughout the country.
These results may indicate that productivity losses could be driven by events in one
specific zone. However, this interpretation should be taken with caution. The percentage
of farmers who have suffered an oil-spill event is around 25% in the Niger Delta, but
just 4% elsewhere. To clarify these results, I also conduct an additional test to examine
whether oil spills outside the Niger Delta area have not impacted agricultural output. I
address this issue by relaxing the baseline specification and comparing the effects of oil
spills on agricultural productivity in and outside the Niger Delta region. 58 The results
in column 8 of Table C.14 and in Figure 4.4, confirm that oil spills pollution affects
both the Niger Delta and other regions. However, the effect is greater in the Niger Delta
area, where both the number and the persistence of oil spills are higher.59
Second, I explore whether my results could be driven by violent conflicts. 91 percent
of the enumeration areas have suffered both oil spills and violent conflict. Columns 1
and 2 of Table C.15 show the figures for oil-spill pollution with the database constrained
to conflict areas and non-conflict areas, respectively.60 In both estimates, the results
are negative and significant, confirming that oil-spill pollution is a channel that reduces
agricultural productivity. Column 3 of Table C.15 estimates the main specification in
the same way as column 8 of Table C.14, to compare the effects of oil-spill pollution
in conflict and non-conflict areas. The result, which is also presented in Figure 4.4,
shows that the effect of cumulative oil-spill pollution is far greater for farms outside
58To that end, I estimate my model with panel data from wave 1 to wave 3, which enables me to
control for enumeration area time trends in the main specification. The inclusion of enumeration area
time trends enables me to check that local economic, social or political developments are not driving
the consequences of this difference between locations. Recall that I use a repeated cross-section in my
analysis because longitudinal weight, which includes wave 4, is not currently available, which means
that I cannot apply enumeration area time trends.
59Column 8 also displays the p-value of the test of equivalence.
60In both estimations, I decided to drop the North-East geographical zone because the Boko Haram
crisis, which is located in this area, could bias the results. Boko Haram, led by Abubakar Shekau, is
West Africa’s most active and lethal actor. Since 2009, events involving it have numbered more than
2,350 and it has been linked to more than 27,000 fatalities. See also Figure C.12. For more information,
see the ACLED website: https://acleddata.com/crisis-profile/boko-haram-crisis/.
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conflict areas. This difference is however not statistically significant at 5%.61 I therefore
conclude that loss of total agricultural productivity in farms close to oil spills is not only
a result of violent conflict.





-1.5 -1 -.5 0 -1.5 -1 -.5 0
Niger Delta/ Outside Niger Delta Conflict Area/Non Conflict Area
Niger Delta/Conflict Area Outside Niger Delta/Conflict Area
Notes: The left panel shows the coefficient estimates from a linear regression of
agricultural output on the interaction terms: Cumulative OilSpill ∗NigerDelta area,
and Cumulative OilSpill ∗ Non − NigerDelta area, controlling for LGAs, year
time effects and ea-specific time trends. The right panel shows the coefficient
estimates from a linear regression of the agricultural output on the interactions terms:
Cumulative OilSpill∗Conflict area, and Cumulative OilSpill∗Non−Conflict area,
controlling for LGAs and year fixed effects and ea-specific time trendss. The sample
is the same as in the main specification (Table 4.2, column (4)). Geometric figures
represent point estimates, while the horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the LGAs level.
4.5.2 Alternative Explanations
My next step is to consider alternative explanations for the drop in total factor
productivity following the approach in Aragón and Rud (2016). As mentioned above,
61Column 3 also displays the p-value of the test of equivalence.
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oil and gas companies may demand local inputs (land or labor) for oil operations.
For example, extractive companies could appropriate farmland to build additional
infrastructures. In my estimations, I disregard all households that have been displaced.
It is not possible to determine why these families decided to migrate, so farm reallocation
could be a reason. Thus, this is not a plausible channel for explaining the drop in
agricultural output.
Second, the fall in agricultural productivity might merely reflect changes in the
composition of agricultural workers. For example, if the effect of oil pollution is
permanent, members of the household could look for additional income by working
in other sectors. Thus, Table 4.4 shows whether oil-spills are related to changes in
various perceptible population characteristics. Columns 1 and 2 look at the probability
of a working-age individual (male or female) being employed, semi-employed or hired in
domestic production. Column 3 examines the probability of a worker being employed in
agriculture. I would expect a negative correlation if there is an occupational shift towards
non-agriculture activities. Columns 4 and 5 look at the demographics of agricultural
workers and short-term mobility. Column 4 shows the probability of a worker being a
prime-age male (20-40 years), while column 5 proxies the variable of migration with an
indicator of whether any member of a household has been away for more than 30 days.
Finally, columns 6 and 7 examine approximate measurements of the human capital of
agricultural workers, such as literacy and having completed secondary school. These last
measurements are informative because I am assuming that farming ability is positively
correlated with education level. In Table 4.2 literacy is associated with an increase
in total factor productivity and agricultural output. However, in Table 4.4, I find no
significant evidence of any change in population characteristics except in the first and
the fourth columns at the 10% level.
Another alternative reason that may explain a drop in agricultural productivity is
related to weak property rights in Nigeria and the Land Use Act of 1978. The LUA
replaced the previous plural land tenure system in Nigeria, with the idea of bringing
consistency to the Nigerian land system. However, the risk of expropriation did not
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Table 4.4: Population Characteristics
VARIABLES AnyWork AnyWork Works in agriculture Male prime age Migration Literacy Secondary
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Cumulative OilSpill -0.0058* 0.0056 -0.0036 0.0278* -0.0184 -0.0220 -0.0138
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.015) (0.018) (0.016) (0.028)
Sample
Males in Female in All Agricultural Agricultural Agricultural Agricultural
working age working age workers workers workers workers workers
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 16878 18204 35112 6976 11728 11776 7399
R-squared 0.428 0.323 0.293 0.300 0.093 0.245 0.152
Waves dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
LGA fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at LGA level. All regressions include a dummy for being within 5
kilometers of an oil spills, an indicator or ecological zone and urban area. “Any Work” is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if an individual (male or
female) is employed, semi-employed or hired in domestic production and 0 otherwise. Working age is between 15-65 years. “Works in agriculture” is a dummy
with a value of one if an individual works in agriculture as a producer or laborer and 0 otherwise. “Male of prime age” is a dummy that takes a value of one if an
individual is a male between 20 and 40 years old. “Migration” is a dummy variable with a value of one if any member of a family has been away for more than
30 days and 0 otherwise. “Literacy” is a dummy denoting whether an individual has literacy skills. “Secondary” is a dummy variable that denotes whether an
individual has completed secondary schooling. Farmer controls include: age of head of household and literacy, and an indicator of whether the household owns
its farm plot. Columns 1 to 3 include additional controls: age, age2, literacy, and household size. Significance is denoted as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
disappear under this legislation, and failure to provide compensation for oil pipeline
failures is an important issue in this area. Thus, I first check whether there is a change
in land ownership to examine property rights. Households could make less agricultural
investments in rented farms. Moreover, farmers who have suffered oil spills before or
who are located close to pipelines could use fertilizers or improved seed to minimize the
effects of oil-spill pollution.
Finally, other channels could also be important in accounting for falls in agricultural
output. For instance, a local oil operation boom may change the composition of workers,
and the non-farming sector is also gaining significance in Nigeria (for example, in the
South West region household enterprises account for half of all jobs (World Bank, 2015)).
I am unable to examine the first channel directly due to lack of data, but I analyze the
second by looking at whether any member of the family owns or manages a non-farm
enterprise at least one year before the post-harvest visit for each wave.
Table 4.5 shows the results. Firstly, I find that changes in land ownership are
concentrated significantly in locations near oil spills. Thus, there could be a risk of
expropriation in locations near pipelines, which could partly explain lower agricultural
productivity. Concerning agricultural practices, I find a significant increase in the use
of fertilizers that may suggest actions taken by farmers to offset the negative effects
of oil pollution on land. However, this contrasts with my finding that the coefficient
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Table 4.5: Agriculture Land Tenure and Practices. Small Business
VARIABLES Owns farm Fertilizers Improved Seeds Own Business
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cumulative OilSpill -0.0141*** 0.0025** -0.0007* -0.0034
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005)
Observations 6704 6340 6328 6369
R-squared 0.304 0.569 0.393 0.266
Waves dummies YES YES YES YES
LGA fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered
at LGA level. All regressions include a dummy for being 5 kilometers from an oil spill.
“Owns farm” is a dummy that takes value of one if the household owns land and 0 otherwise.
“Fertilizers” and “Improved Seeds” are dummies that take a value of one if farmers use
chemical fertilizers or improved seeds and 0 otherwise. “Own Business” is a dummy with a
value of one if any member of the household owns or manages a non-farm enterprise and 0
otherwise. Farmer controls in columns 2, 3, and 4 include the age of the head of landowning
households, literacy, and an indicator of whether a household owns its land. Significance is
denoted as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
for improved seeds is again negative. Finally, I find no change in non-farm businesses,
suggesting that there is no incentive to make additional efforts outside the farm in the
treatment group.
The findings discussed above are far from conclusive, but they suggest that
oil-spill pollution could be a plausible channel for explaining the decline in agricultural
productivity in locations near oil spills. The effects of oil-spill pollution are found to be
very local at first approximation, and the pollution caused by spills may explain this
drop well. Authors such as Bruederle and Holder (2019) also remark on the significance
of oil spills in the loss of health among children and adults. These findings are closely
related to a drop in labor productivity.
4.6 Mechanisms
Section 2, above describes the mechanisms by which oil-spill pollution affects the
total agricultural productivity factor. In particular, I consider three plausible channels:
First, oil-spill pollution affects crop yields and health directly. Second, oil pollution
deteriorates the quality of the soil and hence affects agricultural output. Third, oil spills
affect human health, and hence labor productivity. In this section, following Aragón
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where Y is agricultural output and X and L are the observable quantities of land
and labor. qX and qL are input-specific quantity shifters, which capture factors such as
quality of soil and labor productivity. qC captures all other unobservable factors such
as the crop health and yields. Thus, as analyzed above, oil-spill pollution might affect
any of these factors.




L. That is the residual that
I observe when I estimate agricultural output. My empirical analysis shows that the
effect of oil spills reduces A but, as Aragón and Rud (2016) pointed out ”[..]with the
data at hand we cannot identify its effect on each component as this would require
data on quality of soil, crop’s health and labor productivity”. Previous studies have
demonstrated that oil pollution has a significant influence on soil properties and crop
growth (Uquetan et al. 2017). Studies in the Niger Delta area find high prevalence
rates for symptoms in human heath which are associated with oil spills in other parts
of the world, including abnormalities in hematologic, hepatic, respiratory, renal, and
neurologic functions (Nriagu, 2011). In any case, I can assume that not all the reduction
in A is driven by a drop in labor productivity, qL, but I cannot then identify the effects
on soil quality or crop health, so I follow Aragón and Rud (2016); and conduct the
same exercises that they do to assess the impact of pollution on labor productivity with
additional tests.
First, I examine worker health indicators. I use self-reported data on the incidence of
illness and cessation of usual activities from the Nigerian GHS-Panel data62 to examine
62Specifically, the questions on household surveys are the following:
1. During the last four weeks, have you suffered any illness or injury?
2. For how many days did you stop your usual activities?
In both cases, I center on illness, not injury.
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the link between these health measurements and my main oil pollution variable. I focus
on working-age individuals (15-65) and splits between urban and rural populations.
Table 4.6: Oil Spill Pollution and Self-reported Illness
Variable
Ill in previous four weeks Ln (Number of days off work)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cumulative OilSpill -0.0062 -0.0092 -0.0006 -0.0017 -0.0034 -0.0026
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007)
Sample All Urban Rural All Urban Rural
Observations 36675 9498 26196 23001 5916 16491
R-squared 0.070 0.055 0.080 0.225 0.178 0.252
Waves dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
LGA fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at LGA
level. All regressions include a dummy for being 5 kilometers from an oil spill, and individual
controls such as age, age2, gender, an indicator of ecological zone and rural area. “Ill in previous
four weeks” is an indicator that takes a value of 1 if an individual reports being ill during the
last four weeks and 0 otherwise. This does not include injures. “Ln (Number of days off work)”
is the log of number of days than an individual reports having ceased his/her usual activity.
Significance is denoted as follows *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.6 displays the results. In no case is there any evidence of an increase in the
probability of being ill, or in the length of time for which activities are halted. I repeat
the analysis with the total oil spills in the year of the wave, given that the survey reports
short-term questions. Table C.16 in the Appendix C shows the results. In this case,
column 3 reveals a positive link between being ill and oil-spill pollution among workers
in rural areas. Thus, a spill during the year may affect workers in rural areas, reducing
their health and hence their labor productivity. This result is consistent with those of
Bruederle and Hodler, 2019.
Second, I also examine the effect of oil-spill pollution on non-agricultural urban
workers through the total number of hours worked and income from employment. If
the effect of oil-spill pollution is transmitted through a reduction in labor productivity,
drops in these variables could be observed. This group includes both employed and
self-employed workers, and I assume the following: first, labor demand for urban
workers depends on their productivity; and second, oil operations arising from oil
spills neither increase labor demand in urban areas nor affect the urban labor supply.
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These last assumptions are plausible in the Nigerian employment marker. Given the
capital-intensive nature of extractive sectors, their link with the rest of the economy is
small, as is their contribution to job creation. Indirect jobs tend to be high-value-added
jobs in the main urban areas, but this is probably not related to the issue at hand.
(World Bank, 2015).
Table 4.7: Oil Spill Pollution and labor Outcomes for urban workers
Variable
Ln(Total hours worked) Ln(Real Employment Income)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cumulative OilSpill -0.0054 -0.0042 -0.0509*** -0.0552***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.015) (0.015)
Sample
All Urban All Urban
urban non-agric. urban non-agric.
workers workers workers workers
Observations 4782 4369 2846 2788
R-squared 0.240 0.130 0.391 0.381
Waves dummies YES YES YES YES
LGA fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Notes: : Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered
at LGA level. All regressions include a dummy for being 5 kilometers from an oil spill and
industrial dummies. Columns 1 and 2 include individual controls such as age,age2, literacy,
and household size. Columns 3 and 4 add additional controls in the form of the log of the
total number of hours worked. All regressions exclude oil industry workers. Significance is
denoted as follows *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.7 presents the results. Although the no significant change is observed in
the number of hours, there is a significant drop in income from employment that relates
to a loss of labor productivity. In particular, an increase of one standard deviation in
cumulative oil-spill pollution is associated with a reduction of around 11% in employment
income in urban areas less than 5km from oil spills. I repeat the estimations in Table
C.17 with the oil-spill pollution variable during each wave (Oil spill). In this case
there is clear evidence in both the total number of hours and employment income that




This paper examines how oil-spill pollution affects total productivity and agricultural
output. This is a type of externality that polluting industries impose on agricultural
zones. Using geo-referenced data from the Nigerian Oil Spill Monitor and The Nigerian
General Household Survey (GHS), I apply a difference-in-difference approach following
the methodology in Aragón and Rud (2016). Previous literature has found that oil spills
mean high levels of pollution in the affected regions, but that literature has not so far
considered the cumulative, long-lasting effects of oil pollution on agricultural output
through total factor productivity. I build up a novel variable that reflects this effect
and obtain many interesting results. First, I find evidence that onshore oil spills near
certain locations reduce their total factor productivity and agricultural output compared
to other locations in the same LGAs but further from the spills. The effect for farmers
is economically significant: there is a decline of approximately 2.73% in total factor
productivity when an oil spill occurs nearby. Second, I show evidence that the effect
does not disappear in the period studied. The empirical evidence suggests that the
loss of productivity is also significant when only oil spills occurring in the year of the
relevant wave are considered, but consequences are also persistent over time. Third,
I find evidence that farmers are less likely to own their own land, and the drop in
labor productivity leads to a decrease in both the health of workers in rural areas and
employment income in urban areas. The number of oil spills recorded by the Nigerian
Oil Monitor has fallen since 2014, but the results still indicate that it is necessary to
pay attention to oil spills and their effects on nearby farmland. On the policy side,
these results could be interpreted in terms of a need not only to prevent new oil spills
but also to stress the effective clean-up of contaminated land, including surrounding
environments. A system of compensation with community hosts for the economic losses
suffered by farmers close to oil-spills is also required. The effects are long-lasting in
time, so the system should offset these losses.
The main limitation of this paper is that I cannot exactly assess the relative
importance of the various mechanisms through which oil-spill pollution may affect
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productivity, such as changes in soil quality. However, previous literature confirms effects
on crop health. Moreover, although I find evidence of a decrease in labor productivity,
I cannot properly estimate the effect on the input competition channel or quantify the
changes in input uses because of data limitations. These issues lie beyond the scope of
this study, but examining them is a matter for further research. Distance is a logical
indicator of the damage to soil quality caused by oil spills. However, most pipelines
are very close to wetlands and oil pollution effects may spread to farms through rivers.
In this case, an alternative empirical strategy based on the distance from oil spills to




This thesis applies novel empirical methodologies to analyze several causes and
consequences of conflict. A key aspect of the research is the considering of spatial
patterns and the use of geo-located data to find the direction of causality. This
framework helps to understand the processes underlying globalization and its effect
on conflict, with a view to finding policy tools to deal with this challenge. The main
conclusions of the studies reported are provided at the end of each chapter, but in this
section, I review the stand-out results from each chapter and describe future research
approaches.
Chapter 2 addresses the potential endogeneity of globalization variables, which is
particularly important in establishing a causal link between globalization and civil
conflict. Unlike previous literature, which relates several dimensions of globalization
and conflict, my co-adviser Roberto Ezcurra and I have sought to address the inherent
causality between the two phenomena. To that end, we introduce country fixed effects
to tackle omitted variables. However, finding instrumental variables for each dimension
of globalization to resolve the endogeneity issue was not an easy task. Once we observed
how trade and financial flows, cultural exchanges, and political issues spread around
the world, we decided that these phenomena followed a spatial pattern. Thus, each
dimension of the KOF index is related to the neighboring one, following the theories of
geography and spatial interdependence from theoretical models of the so-called “New
Economic Geography” (Krugman, 1998). This led us to create instrumental variables
115
Conclusions 116
that associate each index of globalization of a country with the globalization indexes for
the rest of the countries, applying an exogenous geographical distance matrix between
them. These variables (the KOF index and the variable for each dimension) open up a
way to resolve any endogeneity issue related to globalization.
One of the key implications of this chapter is that the non-statistical association
between globalization and civil war does not necessarily imply that the processes of
economic, social, or political globalization do not lead to conflict. Rather, it might mean
that there is no direct link because of the complexity of the interactions between the
different actors involved in the process. This conclusion drives us to wonder what factors
might indirectly connect globalization to conflict. We thus consider two implications of
our results: First, the need to isolate and quantify different transmission channels that
could link the two phenomena; and second, the idea that country-level analysis might
not be the best choice for studying certain causes of conflict. The results show that
there is no direct association at country level. But, the effect could be local, and it
could depend on factors such as spatial inequality, geography, ethnicity, cultural and
historical issues, and the quality of governance, among others.
For these reasons, I decided to study the role of external commodity prices as a proxy
of income shocks and their effect on conflict (which depends on ethnic characteristics)
using a micro-level analysis. The novel use of geo-located data has given us the chance
to apply the cell level to study conflict, which has ensured exogeneity to conflict events.
Using this approach, we have been able to match several geo-referenced databases, thus
providing a more detailed picture of the characteristics of each location.
The main contribution of Chapter 3, drawn up along with Fidel Pérez-Sebastián
and Miguel Angel Campo-Bescós, is to argue that the effect of ethnicity on conflict is
indirect. This proposition arose from the idea that the causes of conflict might not
be homogeneous and might depend on local characteristics such as political and ethnic
diversity. Several interesting conclusions emerge from the results of the chapter. For
instance, after an income shock that leads to violence, discriminating between kinds
of conflict is always preferable. We find it necessary to distinguish between organized
117 Conclusions
armed-force conflict and non-organized violence to establish the correct mechanisms
behind acts of violence. In addition, interaction with ethnic political variables leads us
to suggest that weak governments are less able to benefit from the rebellion-repressing
capability offered by positive income shocks. And the sense of grievance in some
ethnic groups is certainly more important in their becoming temporary rioters than
soldiers. From a policy perspective, these results hold the main lesson. We demonstrate
that agricultural price fluctuations lead to conflict at local level. An agricultural
price-stabilization mechanism might therefore needed, but addressing the right policy
also depends on the nature of the ethnic diversity and the type of violence. In line with
these findings, the analysis by Esteban and Ray (2017) shows that income inequality is
closely attached to ethnic identity, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Following that
approximation, ethnicity in our case acts indirectly in terms of how the distribution of
capital gains and economic rents among the population after a positive shock could lead
to conflict. Alesina (2016) points out that what it is most important for development is
the economic differences between ethnic groups that coexist in the same country. This
issue is more significant than the percentage of ethnic diversity in a given location. This
chapter demonstrates that this conclusion can be extended to conflict at local level.
Finally, the case of Nigeria is noteworthy. Nigeria is an example of failing to convert
oil windfalls into development. Oil exploration has also led to an increase in oil pollution
in the country, especially in the Niger Delta area. Some ethnic groups located in this
area have been particularly hard hit by the negative impact of pollution from both oil
operations and oil spills. Oil spills constitute a major ecological disaster that has resulted
in environmental, social, and economic problems. Most oil spills are caused by sabotage
motivated by issues of self-determination, grievance protests over the dangerous impact
of oil exploitation, and theft.
For these reasons, Chapter 4, examines the effect of oil spills on agricultural
productivity. The aforementioned conflicts have impoverished farmers close to pipelines.
The displacement of farmers from rural areas due to continuous environmental
degradation has trapped a significant percentage of local inhabitants in cyclical poverty
Conclusions 118
and penury. To determine the effect of oil spills on agricultural productivity, I also use
novel geo-located data on oil spills and on the location of farmers within specific local
government areas (LGAs). I apply a difference-in-difference methodology to properly
identify the effect of oil spills on agricultural productivity. I consider all types of oil-spill
events since their effect on agricultural productivity is indifferent to their causes. That
said, most are caused by sabotage.
I find that the effects of oil spills on agricultural productivity are concentrated
on farms less than 10 kilometers from the oil spills and are persistent over time. I
also develop an oil-spills pollution measurement that takes into consideration both the
number of oil spills at farms and their degradation in an exponential decay pattern.
From a policy viewpoint, this result suggests that a policy for preventing new oil spills
should be implemented and the need of effective clean-up of polluted land on both
affected farms and surrounding lands must be stressed. A compensation formula in host
communities affected by past and present oil spills is also needed. Given that most
pipelines are close to wetlands, and with a view to finding a suitable radius of action
around oil spills, future research could incorporate an empirical strategy based on the
distance from oil spills to households along river courses.
Concerning future lines of research, finding ways to properly identify the role of
income inequality in conflict might be a logical continuation of this dissertation. Future
studies might consider the effect of spatial inequality on conflict, in particular using
the new income inequality variable, e.g. the spatial Gini index per capita calculated
with the average nighttime light emission from the DMSP-OLS Nighttime Lights Time
Series dataset, and population data from the World Pop geospatial open database. This
could be an area for future research into the link between inequality and conflict, using
geo-localized data. Another relevant point that has been overlooked in most research
on civil conflict is that conflicts are correlated in space and time. Internal conflicts and
wars are likely to be contagious, given that refugee flows, poaching, disease, lawlessness,
and the illicit trades in drugs, weapons, and minerals may generate spillover effects in
regions close to conflict zones. These findings regarding the role of space suggest that
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such interdependence needs to be factored into the modeling process and that an explicit
accounting for spatial effects is required, using spatial econometric models.
Understanding the causes and consequences of conflict is a task of first-order
importance for development and environmental economists. This thesis contributes
to this goal by presenting two specific examples of causes of conflict and a certain







Table A.1: Components of the KOF index of globalization.
Indices and Variables Weights
Economic Globalization [36%]
Actual flows [50%]
Trade (percent of GDP) (21%)
Foreign direct investment, stocks (percent of GDP) (28%)
Portfolio investment (percent of GDP) (24%)
Income payments to foreign nationals (percent of GDP) (27%)
Restrictions [50%]
Hidden import barriers (24%)
Mean tariff rate (27%)
Taxes on international trade (percent of current revenue) (26%)
Capital account testrictions (23%)
Social Globalization [37%]
Data on personal contacts [34%]
Telephone traffic (25%)
Transfers (% of GDP) (4%)
International tourism (26%)
Foreign population (percent of total population) (21%)
International letters (per capita) (25%)
Data on information flows [35%]
Internet users (per 1000 people) (33%)
Television (per 1000 people) (36%)
Trade in newspapers (percent of GDP) (32%)
Data on cultural proximity [31%]
Number of McDonald’s restaurants (per capita) (44%)
Number of Ikea (per capita) (45%)
Trade in books (% of GDP) (11%)
Political globalization [26%]
Embassies in country (25%)
Membership in international organizations (28%)



















































































































































































































































Table A.3: Descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Conflict incidence: Prio25 0.17 0.38 0 1
Conflict incidence: Priocw 0.13 0.34 0 1
Conflict incidence: Priowar 0.05 0.21 0 1
Conflict onset (Prio25) 0.02 0.15 0 1
Overall globalization 47.18 18.26 12.26 92.84
Economic globalization 49.60 19.42 9.42 97.52
Social globalization 38.66 21.45 6.01 93.25
Political globalization 57.95 21.81 4.28 98.56
GDP per capita (log) 8.30 1.30 4.76 11.92
Economic growth 0.02 0.07 -0.97 0.80
Democracy 0.44 0.50 0 1
Anocracy 0.23 0.42 0 1
Natural resources 9.02 15.22 0 214.49
Overall globalization in neighbouring countries 42.33 13.68 8.66 83.82
Economic global. in neighbouring countries 46.55 14.09 14.92 86.25
Social globalization in neighbouring countries 36.42 14.30 8.62 80.45
Political globalization in neighbouring countries 49.25 14.90 7.15 89.35





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.7: Robustness analysis: Globalization and conflict onset.
FE- FE- FE- FE- FE-
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable Onset Onset Onset Onset Onset
Overall globalization -0.003
(0.002)
Economic globalization -0.001 0.010
(0.001) -0.012
Social globalization -0.003* -0.010
( -0.001) (0.010)
Political globalization 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
GDP per capita (log) 0.024* 0.013 0.028** 0.011 0.054
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.044)
Economic growth 0.008 0.037 -0.002 0.008 -0.054
(0.028) (0.036) (0.028) (0.028) (0.102)
Democracy 0.012 0.014 0.007 0.008 -0.012
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.03)
Anocracy 0.015 0.020* 0.010 0.018* 0.0061
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.019)
Natural resources -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Root mean square error 0.142 0.137 0.141 0.142 0.148
Countries 159 139 159 160 139
Observations 4,864 4,431 4,864 4,884 4,431
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. * Significant
at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
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B.1 Data Description and Sources
1.1 Structure of the dataset. Our baseline unit of analysis is a full grid of Africa
divided into sub-national units of 0.5 x 0.5 grades latitude and longitude (which
corresponds to a cell of roughly 55 x 55 kilometers at the equator). This is the result of
intersecting grid cells provided by the PRIO-GRID1 structure, with a map of the entire
Africa and their national political borders provided by The Global Administrative Unit
Layers (2010), a project from the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization
(FAO). The use of the PRIO-GRID allows us to easily include cell specific data from
this dataset. All conflict events are aggregate at the level of the cell. Administrative
boundaries are taken at the end of our sample period. The country which stands for
the largest share of a cell’s area is assigned to this cell.
1.2 Conflict events. We make use of two different datasets containing the geo-location
of conflict events in Africa: the UCDP-Georeferenced Event Dataset (UCDP-GED),
version 5.0 (Croicu and Sundberg, 2016), and the Armed Conflict Location and Event
Dataset (ACLED Dataset) (Raleigh et al., 2017). These data cover different countries
and time periods. The events are collected from various sources, including humanitarian
agents, research publications, and local, regional or international press news. In each
dataset the unit of observation is the event. They contain latitude and longitude
information, and the precise day (in most cases) of conflict events. UCDP defines an
event as an incident where armed force was used by an organised actor against another
organized actor, or against civilians, resulting in at least 1 direct death at a specific
location and a specific date. In addition, only events linkable to a UCDP/PRIO Armed
Conflict (or State Conflict), a UCDP Non-State Conflict or a UCDP One-Sided Violence
instance are included are recorded separately. Events are included for the entire period
of consecutive years during which conflicts were active as long as at least one of those
years have crossed the 25 battle related deaths threshold.
1http://www.prio.no/Data/PRIO-GRID/
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Meanwhile, the ACLED Dataset registers “a range of violent and non-violent actions
by political agents, including governments, rebels, militias, communal groups, political
parties, rioters, protesters and civilians”. In a broader perspective, ACLED records
violent activity both within and outside the context of a civil war. To that end, there
is not specifically a battle-related deaths threshold.
More specifically, we consider the following dependent variables:
• UCDP incidence. We aggregate to the cell-year level, coding the variable as
one if any conflict from UCDP data took place, zero otherwise.
• ACLED riots. We aggregate to the cell-year level, coding the variable as one
if conflicts from ACLED data took place defined as “a protest [that] describes a
non-violent, group public demonstration, often against a government institution”,
and zero otherwise.
• ACLED violence against civilians. We aggregate to the cell-year level, coding
the variable as one if conflicts from ACLED data took place defined as “violence
against civilians [that] occurs when any armed/violent group attacks civilians”,
and zero otherwise. “By definition, civilians are unarmed and not engaged in
political violence. Rebels, governments, militias, rioters can all commit violence
against civilians.”
• ACLED battles. We aggregate to the cell-year level, coding the variable as
one if conflicts from ACLED data took place defined as “battle-no change of
territory”, “battle-non-state actor overtakes territory” and “battle-government
regains territory”, and zero otherwise.
1.3 Crop cover data.
• Agricultural commodities: FAO-GAEZ. Following the approximation
of Berman and Couttenier (2015), we consider as our main crop database
the FAO’s Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ). Specifically, the “GAEZ
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modeling framework for crop potential assessment using detailed agronomic-based
knowledge to assess land suitability, potential attainable yields and potential
production of crops for specified management assumptions and input levels, both
for rain-fed and irrigated conditions”. Suitability is defined as the percentage of
potential production capacity that could be attained in each cell.
For our 18 crops, we have considered the data that corresponding to low input
levels conditions. Which means that yields are based on the use of traditional
ways of farming without any additional mechanical, chemical or irrigation
methods (only rain-fed cases). The model is applied considering the average
climate conditions of the baseline period 1961-1990. A cell is suitable for crop
production if it could achieve at least 40% of its maximum capacity.
• Alternative crop production database: M3 crops. Data on the actual
production of agricultural crops in each cell is drawn from the M3-Crops dataset
by Monfreda et al. (2008).2 Total production is the crop production in metric
tons per hectare of a grid cell. We aggregate the raster information for production
at the 5 arc minutes x 5 arc minutes resolution (about 9.2 km x 9.2 km at the
equator) at the resolution of our grid structure. Thus, we match the crop maps
raster with our grid structure, taking the statistical medium value of each crop
on each cell.
1.4 FAO food balance sheets: Consumer prices index. We construct our
Consumer Price Index taking the approximation of McGuirk and Burke (2020). In
particular, we use country-level data on food consumption patterns from the FAO
Balance Sheets. This webpage gives complete information concerning three components
of a particular country’s food system: “1) Domestic food supply of the food commodities
in terms of production, imports, and stock changes. 2) Domestic food utilization which
includes feed, seed, processing, waste, export, and other uses. And 3) per capita values
for the supply of all food commodities (in kilograms per person per year) and the
calories, protein and fat content. Annual food balance sheets show the trends in the
2http://www.earthstat.org/
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overall national food supply, disclose changes that may have taken place in the types
of food consumed, and reveal the extent to which the food supply of the country is
adequate in relation to nutritional requirements.”3 For each type of commodity, “the
food consumption is constructed as the calorie per person and per day available for
human consumption” (McGuirk and Burke, 2020, pg. 23). Besides, we have also
followed the methodology of these authors constructing time-invariant consumption
shares based on averages of the series 1990-2013 because of possible lack in the quality
of the data.
1.5 Climate variables.
• Drought SPEI growing season. The variable droughtcrop-speigdm as is cited
by PRIO-GRID v.2.0 datasets “gives the proportion of months in the growing
season that are part of the longest streak of consecutive months in that growing
season with SPEI-I values below -1.5. The growing season is the growing season
for the cell’s main crop, defined in the MIRCA2000 dataset v.1.1. For growing
seasons that cross 1 January, we define the whole season to belong to the year in
which the season ended. Thus, a year with two consecutive months below -1.5
during the growing season that started in September the previous year and ended
in March in the current year, is given a value of 2/7. Each year only has defined
one growing season.”
SPEIbase is based on precipitation and potential evapotranspiration PET) from
the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) of the University of East Anglia CRU
v.3.22. The PET estimation used by CRU is the Penman-Montheith method,
considered to be better than the Thornthwaite estimation. Source: Standardized
Precipitation and Evapotranspiration Index SPEIbase v.2.3 from the SPEI Global
Drought Monitor.
• Drought SEPI. The variable droughtyr-speigdm from PRIO-GRID v.2.0
datasets “gives the proportion of months out of 12 months that are part of the
3This is an original text from http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/fbs/en/.
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longest streak of consecutive months ending in the given year with SPEI-I values
below -1.5. For a year where the longest consecutive streak of months below -1.5
is three, the cell will be given a value of 3/12 = 0.25. When the longest streak
starts in the previous year, it is only counted and included in the year in which
the streak ended. Theoretically, the proportion can become higher than 1”. The
original source is SPEI Global Drought Monitor.
• Temperature. Temperature is also taken from PRIO-GRID v.2.0 datasets
and “gives the yearly mean temperature (in degrees Celsius) in the cell, based
on monthly meteorological statistics from GHCN/CAMS, developed at the
Climate Prediction Center, NOAA/National Weather Service”. It is based
on Y. Fan and H. van den Dool (2008): A global monthly land surface air
temperature analysis for 1948-present, Journal of Geophysical Research, 113,
D01103, doi:10.1029/2007JD008470.
• Rainfall. “Rainfall gives the yearly total amount of precipitation (in millimeter)
in the cell, based on monthly meteorological statistics from the GPCP v.2.2
Combined Precipitation Data Set. Since the original data only reported the
daily average for each month, the authors multiplied the daily average by
the number of days in each month in order to obtain approximate monthly
totals, from which yearly totals were estimated”. Definition provided by
PRIO-GRID v.2.0 based on G.J. Huffman, D.T. Bolvin and R.F. Adler
(2012): Estimating climatological bias errors for the Global Precipitation
Climatology Project (GPCP), Journal of Applied Meteorology and Climatology,
51, 84-99. Last updated 2012: GPCP Version 2.2 SG Combined Precipitation
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– Excluded. Excluded accounts for the quantity of excluded groups that
are settled in the grid cell for the year 1997. This variable is provided
in PRIO-GRID v.2.o and derived from the GeoEPR/EPR 2014 update 2
datasets. The excluded variable “counts the number of excluded groups
(discriminated or powerless)”. Powerless means “that elite representatives
hold no political power at either national or the regional level without being
explicitly discriminated against”. On the other hand, discrimination means
“that group members are subjected to active, intentional, and targeted
discrimination, with the intent of excluding them from both regional and
national power. Such active discrimination can be either formal or informal”.
See Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010).
– Monopoly. It is a dummy variable which means that a monopoly group
is settled in the grid cell for the year 1997. This variable is built matching
the settlement areas from Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Dataset Core 2014
with the grid structure provided in PRIO-GRID v.2.0. Monopoly means
“that elite members hold monopoly power in the executive to the exclusion
of members of other ethnic groups”. See Cederman, Wimmer and Min
(2010).
• Spatial ethnic diversity We use data form Geo-referencing Ethnic Power
Relation (GeoEPR 2014) from M. Vogt, N.C Bormann, S. Rüegger, L.E.
Cederman, P. Hunziker and L. Girardin (2015), Integrating data on ethnicity,
geography, and conflict: The ethnic power relations data set family, Journal
of Conflict Resolution, 59(7), 1327-1342. It “codes the settlement patterns of
politically relevant ethnic groups in independent states with more than 500,000
inhabitants from 1946-2009 based on the group list in the Ethnic Power Relations
dataset version 2014”. For each grid cell, we construct two diverse types of
measures of ethnic diversity: Ethnic Fractionalization and Ethnic Polarization
in 1997.
– Spacial ethnic fractionalization and polarization. The Spatial Ethnic
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Fractionalization index (EFi) is based on the standard Herfindahl-Hirschman







j=1 πj(1− πj); (B.1)where πj is the proportion of area
that belongs to ethnic group j.






1.7 Natural resources and local commodity price indices. In each cell-year, we
merge information on Natural Resources from PRIO-GRID v.1.2 and v.2.0 with the
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) dataset. We construct our indexes of Petrol Prices and
Mineral Prices with this information.
Specifically, the construction of the local commodity price index for oil and gas uses
geocoded data of the localization of oil and gas fields in Africa from PRIO-GRID v.1.2.
This information is employed to build a time-invariant dummy variable (eij) coded as
1 if oil (j = 1) or gas (j = 2) or oil and gas ((j = 3)) are present in a cell at any time
during the period 1990-2013. Finally, we combine the dummy with the IMF data on








where eci is a gas or/and oil dummy variable for cell i; and P
E
it is the annual price for
oil if i = 1, for gas if i = 2, and the average of PE1t and P
E
2t if both oil and gas are found
in the cell. The index is normalized to 1 in the year 1990.
A similar methodology is employed to compute the mineral-commodity price index
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(PIMct ). We use the information from the Mineral Resources Data System provided by
the USGS. Following Berman et al. (2017), we define a mineral-specific dummy variable
coded as 1 in cells where at least one mine has been registered as active in the period
1990-2013 after its discovery or known production, and 0 otherwise. Because we no
not have data on international commodity prices of gems and diamonds, the dummy
variables only capture the presence of other mines. Specifically, we cover the following
minerals: bauxite (aluminum), coal, copper, diammonium phosphate, gold, iron ore,
lead, nickel, manganese, phosphate, potash, silver, tin, uranium, and zinc. We combine
the time-invariant dummies with price series from the IMF and the Global Economic







where mij is the dummy variable of mineral-j mine-presence in cell i; and P
M
jt is the
annual price for minerals produced in the mine j normalized to 1 in the year 1990. If
we have more than one mineral mine-presence, mij equals 1 divided by the number of
mines in the cell.
1.8 Urban area. Source: PRIO-GRID v. 2.0. “To measure the coverage of urban
areas the dataset includes the percentage of urban areas in a cell extracted from the
Integrated Science Assessment Model-Historical Database of the Global Environment
(ISAM-HYDE).” In PRIO-GRID, this indicator is available for the years 1950, 1960,
1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010. We interpolate these values to build our percentage
of urban area in a cell.
B.2 Robustness Analysis
Here, we perform several robustness checks. Each of them proposes a modification of
the basic regression specification. All the tables containing the results are located below,
in the Tables section of this appendix.
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First, we study how results change if the dependent variable is conflict intensity,
instead of conflict incidence. The intensity data comes from the same sources
than incidence. Tables B.15 to B.17 show how the results in Tables B.10, B.12
and B.13 change when the dependent variable is the number of events related to
UCDP-GED organized armed-conflict, ACLED riots and ACLED violence against
civilians, respectively. In general, our main findings hold in terms of sign or sign and
significance. An interesting difference, though, is the negative significant signs shown
by the CP index for riots (Table B.16) and the interaction between consumer prices and
excluded groups in the factor conflict (Table B.15) and riots regressions. As explained
previously, this time the only force that can be behind the sign is an increase in state
capacity to control insurgence, especially in areas where the government is relatively
strong, shown by its capacity to exclude certain ethnic groups from politics.
Second, Tables B.18 to B.20 revise the same conflict-incidence tables (B.10, B.12
and B.13) when, instead of the GAEZ suitability and potential yield information, actual
crop yields from the M3-Crop database (Monfreda et al., 2008) are employed to calculate
the crop weights in the APP and CP indices.4 Given the strong endogeneity concerns
that surround the relationship between actual crop yields and conflict, numbers for year
2000 are employed to compute a time-invariant share for each crop in each cell, and
the regressions are estimated for the years between 2001 and 2013 to try to diminish
those problems. In this occasion we find some differences compared to our benchmark
results. The main one being that the interactions of the price indices and the ethnic
monopoly-group variable show sometimes the opposite signs than before.
Third, we change the source of the measure of factor conflict. It could be thought
that the UCDP-GED is a very specific and non-exhaustive dataset, because it contains
only certain large conflicts. To address this potential issue, Table B.21 adopts the
category Battles from ACLED, which assesses violent interaction between two politically
organized armed groups. Recall that, unlike UCDP-GED, ACLED does not have a lower
bound requirement of at least 25 battle-related deaths in at least one year. Compared
4The M3-Crop database is available at https://mygeohub.org/groups/drinet/cropdata.
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to the Table B.10, the main difference is that monopoly groups and the CP index
show stronger importance as determinants of factor conflict. Nevertheless, the signs
of all significant coefficients are the same that were estimated in Table B.10, and the
interpretation of the results can follow the same logic as in the previous subsection.
Fourth, we consider spillover effects from income shocks in neighboring cells. This
type of effects are important on their own and have been emphasized by previous
literature, like HF in the case of droughts and MB for agricultural prices, because of
their potential correlation over space and time. The shocks can spill over bordering cells
directly, through changes in food-prices and climate conditions, or indirectly, through
changes in conflict incidence triggered by income shocks. Given that the spillovers can
persist over time, we follow MB and re-estimate the regressions including as explanatory
variables the contemporaneous value and two lags of the APP index and the drought
index averages across the 1- and 2-degree neighboring cells.5 Results are presented in
Table B.22. This table shares the same structure with Tables B.23 to B.28. Columns
(1) to (3), (4) to (6) and (7) to (9) must be compared to Tables B10, B12 and B13,
respectively; and in particular, to the results in columns (2), (10) and (12). Table
B.22 shows that our main findings again hold in terms of sign and significance, because
spillovers do not show any power to explain conflict.
Fifth, in the main analysis, we have allowed for location-specific 5-year-lag serial
correlation and cross-sectional spatial correlation in a radius of 110 km. Now, Table
B.23 considers spatial kernels of 55 and 1000 km and serial correlations of 2 lags and
100,000 years. Results are robust to these modifications.
Sixth, we address the modifiable areal unit problem by enlarging the cell surface. In
particular, we consider cells of 110 km x 110 km and 220 km x 220 km and present the
findings in Tables B.24 and B.25, respectively. When the areal unit is 110 km x 110 km
(Table B.24), results are robust in terms of sign and many times significance. Moving
5Estimation of the effects derived from the CP index cannot be implemented because it is a
country-level aggregate. Notice also that we do not include the realizations of the outcome variable
in bordering cells in this spillover regressions. As argued by Berman et al. (2017) and MB, among
others, the reason is that the identification of spillovers is problematic, and introducing spatial lags of
the dependent variable can generate a clear simultaneity bias due to its temporal persistence.
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now to Table B.25, where the areal unit is 220 km x 220 km, we see that using a larger
cell as unit of the analysis substantially modifies the results. The difference possibly
comes from a greater degree of coexistence of food-producing and food-consuming areas
in the same cell as its surface is enlarged; which makes more difficult separate the
effects of the APP and CP indices. We can see that the significance of many coefficients
vanishes. For example, only five coefficients remain strongly significant in columns (3),
(6) and (9); importantly, out of those, most are consistent with our main results.
Seventh, we extend the number of lags of all the variables included in the regression
from two to five (Table B.26). As we can see, our main results are generally robust:
the estimated coefficient signs are maintained and many times their significance.
Interestingly, we find again a negative and significant sign for the CP index in the
riots regression as we did in our first robustness test that adds evidence in favor of state
capacity as a way to control rebellion.6
Eighth, an alternative estimation method for binary dependent variables is
employed, namely, a conditional fixed-effect logit model (Table B.27). Results are most
of the time robust in terms of signs, but coefficients many times are not significant. This
loss of significance is not surprising, because the conditional logit only uses observations
that show an incidence equal to one for the estimation, and then the number of
observations is reduced from about 140,000 in the main analysis to around 20,000 with
the logit.
Finally, the annual average SPEI indicator along with the variables temperature and
rainfall are added to our benchmark regressions (Table B.28). As we can see, our main
results are robust to this modification.
6When urban area and its interaction with the CP index are introduced in the riots regression, the
CP index maintains its negative sign and CP*Urban shows a positive sign, and both are significant.
This occurs with the intensity and 5-lags specifications.
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B.3 Tables
Table B.1: Conflict Variables Statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
UCDP Incidence 170112 0.025 0.157 0 1
Riots and Violence against civilians 170112 0.061 0.240 0 1
ACLED Riots 170112 0.025 0.157 0 1
ACLED Violence 170112 0.040 0.197 0 1
ACLED Battles 170112 0.039 0.193 0 1
events UCDP Incidence 170112 0.110 1.699 0 245
events ACLED Riots 170112 0.104 2.473 0 779
events ACLED Violence 170112 0.147 1.903 0 222
Table B.2: Independent Variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Ln(APP Index) 170112 1.392 2.029 0 5.918
Drought SPEI GS 170112 0.050 0.565 -8.382 3.272
Ln(CP Index) 141801 0.231 0.373 -0.380 0.970
Excluded groups 132960 0.494 0.666 0 5
Monopoly groups 132960 0.059 .236 0 1
Fractionalization Index 169488 0.164 0.221 0 0.823
Polarization Index 169488 0.300 0.393 0 1
Urban (% cell) 164704 0.127 0.66 0 23.905
Ln(Mine Price Index) 170112 0.016 0.238 -1.920 6.455
Ln(Petrol&Gas Index) 170112 0.056 0.258 -0.564 1.653
SPEIbase 164144 0.059 0.079 0 0.833
Precipitation 170112 682.84 612.294 0.123 3275.409
Note: From FAO-GAEZ, PRIO-GRID, GeoEPR/EPR 2014, USGS and
author’s elaboration
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Table B.3: Summary UCDP-GED Sample
Country N # events Max. # events Country N # events Max. # events
Algeria 13936 2573 72 Libya 10448 230 63
Angola 6960 744 44 Madagascar 4064 42 11
Benin 640 7 5 Malawi 624 0 0
Botswana 3280 1 1 Mali 6816 161 13
Burkina Faso 1392 14 9 Mauritania 5888 12 1
Burundi 176 1139 104 Morocco 4480 5 2
Cameroon 2496 26 4 Mozambique 4816 16 3
Central African Republic 3232 344 31 Namibia 4912 13 5
Chad 6256 184 10 Niger 6432 52 5
Congo 1792 192 36 Nigeria 4992 1505 123
Congo DRC 12208 1942 87 Rwanda 144 182 40
Djibouti 128 11 4 Senegal 1200 125 11
Egypt 6304 0 0 Sierra Leone 480 639 79
Equatorial Guinea 192 0 0 Somalia 3872 2630 245
Eritrea 816 39 5 South Africa 7728 45 13
Ethiopia 5952 1347 18 South Sudan 615 270 28
Gabon 1488 0 0 Sudan 12825 1641 36
Gambia 48 14 4 Swaziland 80 0 0
Ghana 1360 2 1 Tanzania 4960 12 3
Guinea 1360 75 12 Togo 304 90 47
Guinea-Bissau 208 35 10 Tunisia 1168 13 3
Ivory Coast 1808 268 67 Uganda 1280 1404 48
Kenya 3072 420 23 Zambia 4000 5 2
Lesotho 192 2 2 Zimbabwe 2160 49 7
Liberia 592 130 28
Period 1998-2013. N: Number of observations by country. # events: total number of UCDP events in the country over the sample period.
Max. # events:: maximum number of yearly UCDP events in the country over the sample period.
Table B.4: Summary ACLED RIOTS Sample
Country N # events Max. # events Country N # events Max. # events
Algeria 13936 535 46 Libya 10448 313 62
Angola 6960 119 19 Madagascar 4064 299 72
Benin 640 59 11 Malawi 624 129 8
Botswana 3280 25 5 Mali 6816 175 37
Burkina Faso 1392 158 23 Mauritania 5888 33 4
Burundi 176 67 7 Morocco 4480 401 41
Cameroon 2496 68 6 Mozambique 4816 161 17
Central African Republic 3232 23 4 Namibia 4912 285 44
Chad 6256 14 2 Niger 6432 90 8
Congo 1792 95 26 Nigeria 4992 1061 33
Congo DRC 12208 528 45 Rwanda 144 63 12
Djibouti 128 23 6 Senegal 1200 206 35
Egypt 6304 2648 779 Sierra Leone 480 23 5
Equatorial Guinea 192 1 1 Somalia 3872 669 31
Eritrea 816 5 4 South Africa 7728 3830 102
Ethiopia 5952 223 19 South Sudan 615 32 5
Gabon 1488 59 21 Sudan 12825 472 54
Gambia 48 9 4 Swaziland 80 93 31
Ghana 1360 74 7 Tanzania 4960 100 6
Guinea 1360 213 57 Togo 304 142 39
Guinea-Bissau 208 44 7 Tunisia 1168 754 164
Ivory Coast 1808 372 29 Uganda 1280 479 56
Kenya 3072 1363 71 Zambia 4000 478 48
Lesotho 192 3 1 Zimbabwe 2160 587 51
Liberia 592 145 27
Period 1998-2013. N: Number of observations by country. # events: total number of ACLED riots events in the country over the sample
period. Max. # events:: maximum number of yearly riots events in the country over the sample period.
145 B.3. TABLES
Table B.5: Summary ACLED VIOLENCE Sample
Country N # events Max. # events Country N # events Max. # events
Algeria 13936 397 12 Libya 10448 244 45
Angola 6960 513 32 Madagascar 4064 108 16
Benin 640 14 2 Malawi 624 82 6
Botswana 3280 5 1 Mali 6816 192 24
Burkina Faso 1392 31 4 Mauritania 5888 8 1
Burundi 176 1235 78 Morocco 4480 81 15
Cameroon 2496 81 7 Mozambique 4816 151 11
Central African Republic 232 483 28 Namibia 4912 73 5
Chad 6256 202 7 Niger 6432 54 7
Congo 1792 135 21 Nigeria 4992 1818 67
Congo DRC 12208 2375 71 Rwanda 144 417 102
Djibouti 128 11 2 Senegal 1200 136 11
Egypt 6304 413 89 Sierra Leone 480 837 98
Equatorial Guinea 192 3 1 Somalia 3872 3065 222
Eritrea 816 88 8 South Africa 7728 713 28
Ethiopia 5952 432 27 South Sudan 615 284 41
Gabon 1488 13 3 Sudan 12825 1832 64
Gambia 48 22 7 Swaziland 80 26 5
Ghana 1360 73 7 Tanzania 4960 148 12
Guinea 1360 177 20 Togo 304 22 3
Guinea-Bissau 208 41 7 Tunisia 1168 90 15
Ivory Coast 1808 434 74 Uganda 1280 1669 63
Kenya 3072 1477 42 Zambia 4000 249 33
Lesotho 192 10 2 Zimbabwe 2160 3813 163
Liberia 592 229 21
Period 1998-2013. N: Number of observations by country. # events: total number of ACLED violence events in the country over the sample
period. Max. # events:: maximum number of yearly riots violence in the country over the sample period.
Table B.6: Commodity Prices. CROPS. Serie 1990-2014
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
bananas 25 1.148 0.374 0.691 1.820
barley 25 1.509 0.615 0.893 2.981
cocoa 25 1.420 0.542 0.713 2.469
coconut oil 25 2.196 0.985 0.945 5.141
coffe 25 1.403 0.598 0.677 3.065
cotton 25 0.893 0.277 0.560 1.873
groundnuts 25 1.017 0.426 0.609 2.172
maize 25 1.326 0.581 0.807 2.731
olive oil 25 1.175 0.283 0.830 1.857
oranges 25 1.283 0.432 0.684 2.085
palm oil 25 2.198 0.995 0.995 4.495
rice 25 1.283 0.536 0.638 2.587
soybeans 25 1.333 0.527 0.770 2.454
sugar 25 0.974 0.207 0.714 1.633
sunflower oil 25 1.380 0.628 0.628 2.806
tea 25 1.140 0.260 0.808 1.717
tobacco 25 1.002 0.203 0.779 1.471
wheat 25 1.271 0.437 0.725 2.117
AgPrices 25 24.718 41.168 0 371.57
B.3. TABLES 146
Table B.7: Average over series of Food Crops: 1990-2013
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Average Bananas 14205 2.265 22.78 0 488.792
Average Barley 14205 1.109 14.579 0 311.417
Average Cocoa 14205 0.153 0.940 0 12.417
Average Coconut 14205 0.836 14.325 0 345.625
Average Coffee 14205 0.052 0.300 0 3.917
Average Maize 14205 24.810 124.52 0 1339.75
Average Nuts 14205 0.564 3.620 0 41.708
Average OilPalm 14205 4.755 25.320 0 313.208
Average OliveOil 14205 0.401 4.805 0 93.958
Average Rice 14205 20.716 106.605 0 1004.875
Average Sorghum 14205 7.903 48.666 0 679.591
Average Soybean 14205 0.234 1.769 0 25.750
Average Sugar 14205 11.461 48.369 0 365.417
Average Sunflower 14205 1.452 10.997 0 154.625
Average Tea 14205 0.029 0.181 0 2.167
Average Wheat 14205 23.93 134.325 0 1611.875
Average Food 14205 32158.23 11267.66 2353 60640
Consumer Price 14205 1.286 0.071 0.0985 1.934


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.24: Conflict: Agricultural Producer Prices, Drought SPEI Growing Season and
Consumer Prices: Spatial and Serial Correlations. STANDARD ERRORS ANALYSIS.
Continuation
Type of CONFLICT UCDP Incidence UCDP Incidence UCDP Incidence ACLED Riots ACLED Riots ACLED Riots ACLED Violence ACLED Violence ACLED Violence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
APP Index x Excluded groups -0.0269 -0.0265 -0.0086 -0.0095 -0.0111 -0.0101
Standard error 55km, Time: 2 years (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Standard error 55km, Time: Infinite (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Standard error 1000km, Time: 2 years (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013)
Standard error 1000km, Time: Infinite (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013)
Drought SPEI GS x Excluded groups 0.0076 0.0076 -0.0007 -0.0008 0.0068 0.0067
Standard error 55km, Time: 2 years (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Standard error 55km, Time: Infinite (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Standard error 1000km, Time: 2 years (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Standard error 1000km, Time: Infinite (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
CP Index x Excluded groups -0.0030 -0.0029 0.0006 0.0010 0.0154 0.0158
Standard error 55km, Time: 2 years (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Standard error 55km, Time: Infinite (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Standard error 1000km, Time: 2 years (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
Standard error 1000km, Time: Infinite (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
APP Index x Monopoly groups -0.0885 -0.0887 -0.0512 -0.0509 -0.1549 -0.1553
Standard error 55km, Time: 2 years (0.032) (0.032) (0.021) (0.021) (0.041) (0.041)
Standard error 55km, Time: Infinite (0.034) (0.034) (0.021) (0.021) (0.042) (0.042)
Standard error 1000km, Time: 2 years (0.032) (0.032) (0.023) (0.023) (0.037) (0.037)
Standard error 1000km, Time: Infinite (0.033) (0.033) (0.023) (0.023) (0.038) (0.038)
Drought SPEI GS x Monopoly groups -0.0019 -0.0019 0.0028 0.0030 0.0423 0.0422
Standard error 55km, Time: 2 years (0.003) (0.003) (0.028) (0.028) (0.022) (0.022)
Standard error 55km, Time: Infinite (0.003) (0.003) (0.028) (0.028) (0.021) (0.021)
Standard error 1000km, Time: 2 years (0.005) (0.005) (0.038) (0.038) (0.031) (0.031)
Standard error 1000km, Time: Infinite (0.005) (0.005) (0.037) (0.037) (0.031) (0.031)
CP Index x Monopoly groups 0.0245 0.0245 0.0371 0.0372 0.0798 0.0805
Standard error 55km, Time: 2 years (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014)
Standard error 55km, Time: Infinite (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014)
Standard error 1000km, Time: 2 years (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.025) (0.025)
Standard error 1000km, Time: Infinite (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.025) (0.025)
APP Index x Ethnic Fraction. 0.0379 -0.0087 0.0699
Standard error 55km, Time: 2 years (0.014) (0.017) (0.019)
Standard error 55km, Time: Infinite (0.014) (0.017) (0.019)
Standard error 1000km, Time: 2 years (0.018) (0.019) (0.022)
Standard error 1000km, Time: Infinite (0.018) (0.019) (0.025)
Drought SPEI GS x Ethnic Fraction. -0.0039 -0.0153 0.0041
Standard error 55km, Time: 2 years (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Standard error 55km, Time: Infinite (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Standard error 1000km, Time: 2 years (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Standard error 1000km, Time: Infinite (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
CP Index x Ethnic Fraction. 0.0108 0.0207 -0.0035
Standard error 55km, Time: 2 years (0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
Standard error 55km, Time: Infinite (0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
Standard error 1000km, Time: 2 years (0.009) (0.010) (0.012)
Standard error 1000km, Time: Infinite (0.009) (0.010) (0.012)
APP Index x Ethnic Polariz. 0.0195 -0.0031 0.03621
Standard error 55km, Time: 2 years (0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
Standard error 55km, Time: Infinite (0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
Standard error 1000km, Time: 2 years (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
Standard error 1000km, Time: Infinite (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
Drought SPEI GS x Ethnic Polariz. -0.0014 -0.0068 0.0020
Standard error 55km, Time: 2 years (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Standard error 55km, Time: Infinite (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Standard error 1000km, Time: 2 years (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Standard error 1000km, Time: Infinite (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
CP Index x Ethnic Polariz. 0.0066 0.0093 -0.0046
Standard error 55km, Time: 2 years (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Standard error 55km, Time: Infinite (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Standard error 1000km, Time: 2 years (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Standard error 1000km, Time: Infinite (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Observations 139,136 109,968 109,968 139,136 109,968 109,968 139,136 109,968 109,968
Cell FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country-specific time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: LPM estimations. Conley (2008) standard errors in parentheses, allowing for spatial and serial correlation. The table is the same as Table 3, Table 4, and Table 5 (columns (2), (10) and (12) ) of main text,
except that we allow different radius and time periods of spatial and serial correlation. The Agricultural price Index (APP Index), the drought SPEI growing season, and the Consumer Price Index (CP Index)
coefficients displayed capture the sum of price impacts at t, t-1, and t-2. Control variables include the interactions between oil prices and oil dummy indicating the presence of an oil field in a given cell, and the


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































167 B.4. ADDITIONAL FIGURES
B.4 Additional Figures
Figure B.1: Cells Africa
Source: PRIO-GRID grid structure matched with the African countries by the Global
Administrative Unit Layers.
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Figure B.2: Ethnic groups from Geo-referencing Ethnic Power Relation. Year 1997
Source: Each color represents a settlement group of politically relevant ethnic groups
in independent states with more than 500,000 inhabitants from 1946-2009. Own work
based on the group list in the Ethnic Power Relations dataset version 2014. The database
is filtered by the year 1997.
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Figure B.3: Excluded and monopoly groups. Year 1997
Source: Own work based on data from Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Dataset Core
2014. Year 1997.
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Figure B.4: Crops potential production
(a) Banana (b) Barley (c) Cacao (d) Maize (e) Oil Palm
(f) Olive (g) Oranges (h) Rice Dry Land (i) Rice Wet Land (j) Sorghum
(k) Soybean (l) Sugarcane (m) Sunflower (n) Tea (o) Tobacco
(p) Coffee (q) Wheat
Source: Own work based on data from FAO’s Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ)
data.
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Figure B.5: Natural Resources
Sources: Own work based on data from Petroleum Dataset v. 1.2 and U.S. Geological
Survey (USGS) dataset.
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Figure B.6: Droughts SPEI growing season
(a) Drought SPEI growing season 1997
(b) Drought SPEI growing season 2014
Source: Own work based on SPEI Global Drought Monitor data.
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APP Index Interaction with Excluded groups. Model 10







































SPEI GS Index interaction with Excluded groups. Model 10







































APP Index interaction with Monopoly groups
Average Marginal Effects with 95% CIs































CP Index interactions with Monopoly groups
Average Marginal Effects with 95% CIs






























APP Index interactions with Ethnic Fractionalization











(e) APP index interaction Ethnic
fractionalization
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APP Index interaction with Excluded groups







































SPEI GS Index Interaction with Excluded groups







































APP Index interaction with Monopoly groups
Average Marginal Effects with 95% CIs































CP Index interaction with Monopoly groups
Average Marginal Effects with 95% CIs






























APP Index interaction with Ethnic Polarization











(e) APP index interaction Ethnic Polarization
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AAP Index interaction Monopoly groups
Average Marginal Effects with 95% CIs






























CP Index interactions with Monopoly groups
Average Marginal Effects with 95% CIs



























SPEI GS Index interaction with Ethnic Fractionalization






































CP Index interaction with Ethnic Fractionalization










(d) CP index interaction Ethnic fractionalization
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APP Index interaction with Monopoly groups
Average Marginal Effects with 95% CIs






























CP Index interaction with Monopoly groups
Average Marginal Effects with 95% CIs


























SPEI GS Index interaction with Ethnic Polarization






































CP Index interaction with Ethnic Polarization










(d) CP index interaction Ethnic polarization
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SPEI GS Index interaction with Excluded groups. Model 10






































CP Index interaction with Excluded groups






































APP Index interaction with Monopoly groups
Average Marginal Effects with 95% CIs

































CP Index interaction with Monopoly groups
Average Marginal Effects with 95% CIs





























APP Index interaction with Ethnic Fractionalization










(e) APP index interaction Ethnic
fractionalization
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SPEI GS Index interaction with Excluded groups







































CPRICE Index interaction with Excluded groups. Model 12






































APP Index interaction with Monopoly groups
Average Marginal Effects with 95% CIs

































CP Index interaction with Monopoly groups
Average Marginal Effects with 95% CIs



























APP Index interaction with Ethnic Polarization
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C.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table C.1: Nigerian GHS-PANEL (2010-2018) Main variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Agricultural characteristics
Real Agricultural Output 6948 121853.8 1424141
Land area 6881 3.776 39.699
Labor days 6936 403.274 683.606
Total area plot 6934 4.054 144.296
Endowment Labor 6946 3.709 2.12
Harvest Cassava 6112 461.996 6036.478
Harvest Maize 6112 320.691 1224.193
Land Harvested Cassava 6112 0.278 11.275
Land Harvested Maize 6112 0.492 10.841
Fertility 6904 0.474 0.499
Pesticide 6932 0.232 0.422
Herbicide 6932 0.268 0.443
Improved Seeds 6877 0.980 0.140
Yield Maize 2107 9268.011 122933.2
Yield Cassava 1502 7027.574 25916.07
Yield 6649 11390.3 167277.5
Household characteristics
Age head household 6946 51.232 14.997
literacy 6592 0.595 0.491
Migration 6363 0.689 1.369
household size 6948 7.683 3.995
Weather and terrain conditions characteristics
Temperature mean 6948 26.314 0.955
Rainfall mean 6948 1264.633 409.651
Slope 6948 3.224 3.266
Elevation 6948 298.059 213.416
PotentialWetness 6948 14.19 3.152
Nutrient Availability 6948 1.824 0.815
Nutrient Retention 6948 1.574 0.602
Rooting 6948 1.415 0.719
Oxygen to roots 6948 1.197 0.501
Exces salt 6948 1.024 0.273
Toxicity 6948 1.008 0.217
Workability 6948 1.482 0.747
Notes: Real Agricultural Output measured in 2010 Naira. Land is measured in hectares.
Temperature is measured in degrees Celsius. Sample restricted to farming households. Own
work using data from the Nigeria GHS-Panel.
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Table C.2: Nigerian GHS-PANEL (2010-2018). Additional variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Sex 117888 1.506 .5
Age 110167 23.908 21.478
Industry 33245 3.898 4.086
AnyWork 61117 0.555 0.497
Work (agriculture) 61117 0.286 0.452
Dummy for migration 121690 0.365 0.481
Prime age male 121690 0.158 0.364
Literacy 98601 0.633 0.482
Secondary 75105 0.185 0.389
Total hours 31887 40.551 21.897
Real Employment Income 10216 56175.91 591485.5
Illness 61384 0.097 0.296
Number days Ill 40121 0.710 3.196
Rural 223356 0.712 0.453
Urban 222996 0.287 0.452
Notes: Full Sample. Own work using data from the Nigeria
GHS-Panel.
Table C.3: Summary Functions for Oil-Spill Pollution
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Cumulative Oilspill 6948 0.388 3.139
FCumulative Oilspill 6948 0.388 3.137
Oil Spill 6948 0.238 1.987
TCumulative Oilspill 6948 2.276 17.985
Dummy Oil5Km 6948 0.063 0.243
Cum Volumen OilSpill 6854 37.803 360.02
Volumen OilSpill 6854 37.793 359.989
FCum Volumen OilSpill 6697 10.035 99.128
TCum Volumen OilSpill 6854 216.577 2068.179
Summarize Oil pollution variables for locations within 5 km.
Own work using data from NOSDRA.
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C.2 Additional Tables
Table C.4: Data Collection Dates for Surveys and Oil-Spill Incidents
Post-Planting Post-Harvest Oil-spill Incident
Wave Survey Start End Start End Start End
1 2010-2011 31/8/10 15/10/10 1/2/11 1/4/11 1/1/06 31/3/11
2 2012-2013 1/9/12 1/11/12 1/2/13 1/4/13 1/1/06 31/3/13
3 2015-2016 1/9/15 1/11/15 1/2/16 1/4/16 1/1/06 31/3/16
4 2018-2019 1/7/18 1/9/18 1/1/19 28/2/19 1/1/06 31/12/18
Notes: The table shows the data collection dates from the Nigeria GHS-surveys, and the dates used
on the main variable of proxy for Oil Spill Pollution, from The Oil Spill Monitor. Note that the
agriculture data on the post-harvest period of wave 4 ends in December 2018.
Table C.5: First Stage Regression. Column 3 of Table 2
VARIABLES LnLand LnLabor days
(1) (2)
Ln(Total Own land) 0.3784*** 0.1824***
(0.020) (0.016)
Ln(Number of adult equivalents) 0.1311*** 0.4386***
(0.036) (0.034)
Observations 9689 10190
F-test excluded instruments 63.18*** 159.21****
R-squared 0.640 0.470
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at LGA level. All
regressions include a dummy for being within 5 kilometers of an oil spill and the interaction between that
dummy and the trend. Farmer controls are included. See Table 2 for more details. Significance is denoted
as follows: *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1
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Table C.6: Imperfect Instruments with Multiple Endogenous Variables
λland λLabor δ̂ α̂
0 0 -0.03 0.50 0.33
0 0.1 -0.02 0.35 0.53
0 0.2 0.00 -1.39 2.86
0 0.3 -0.03 1.14 -0.53
0 0.4 -0.03 0.88 -0.18
0 0.5 -0.03 0.81 -0.08
0 0.6 -0.03 0.77 -0.04
0 0.7 -0.03 0.75 -0.01
0 0.8 -0.03 0.74 0.01
0 0.9 -0.03 0.73 0.02
0 1 -0.03 0.72 0.03
0.1 0 -0.03 0.82 0.20
0.1 0.1 -0.03 0.59 0.40
0.1 0.2 -0.10 6.27 -4.76
0.1 0.3 -0.04 1.39 -0.33
0.1 0.4 -0.03 1.22 -0.16
0.1 0.5 -0.03 1.15 -0.11
0.1 0.6 -0.03 1.12 -0.08
0.1 0.7 -0.03 1.10 -0.06
0.1 0.8 -0.03 1.09 -0.05
0.1 0.9 -0.03 1.08 -0.04
0.1 1 -0.03 1.07 -0.04
0.2 0 0.07 -7.00 3.48
0.2 0.1 -0.01 -1.02 1.25
0.2 0.2 -0.03 0.98 0.51
0.2 0.3 -0.04 1.97 0.13
0.2 0.4 -0.05 2.57 -0.09
0.2 0.5 -0.06 2.97 -0.24
0.2 0.6 -0.06 3.26 -0.35
0.2 0.7 -0.06 3.47 -0.43
0.2 0.8 -0.07 3.64 -0.49
0.2 0.9 -0.07 3.77 -0.54
0.2 1 -0.07 3.88 -0.58
0.3 0 -0.02 -0.32 0.68
0.3 0.1 -0.02 -0.07 0.75
0.3 0.2 -0.03 0.53 0.95
0.3 0.3 -0.08 4.67 2.27
0.3 0.4 0.03 -3.80 -0.44
0.3 0.5 0.01 -2.04 0.12
0.3 0.6 0.00 -1.61 0.26
0.3 0.7 0.00 -1.41 0.33
0.3 0.8 0.00 -1.30 0.36
0.3 0.9 0.00 -1.23 0.39
0.3 1 0.00 -1.18 0.40
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Table C.6: Continued
λland λLabor δ̂ α̂
0.4 0 -0.02 -0.07 0.57
0.4 0.1 -0.02 0.04 0.70
0.4 0.2 -0.03 0.37 1.11
0.4 0.3 0.04 -4.55 -5.04
0.4 0.4 -0.01 -0.74 -0.27
0.4 0.5 -0.01 -0.51 0.01
0.4 0.6 -0.01 -0.43 0.12
0.4 0.7 -0.01 -0.39 0.17
0.4 0.8 -0.02 -0.36 0.20
0.4 0.9 -0.02 -0.34 0.22
0.4 1 -0.02 -0.33 0.24
0.5 0 -0.02 0.02 0.53
0.5 0.1 -0.02 0.08 0.67
0.5 0.2 -0.02 0.28 1.20
0.5 0.3 0.00 -1.08 -2.28
0.5 0.4 -0.02 -0.28 -0.25
0.5 0.5 -0.02 -0.19 -0.01
0.5 0.6 -0.02 -0.15 0.08
0.5 0.7 -0.02 -0.13 0.13
0.5 0.8 -0.02 -0.12 0.16
0.5 0.9 -0.02 -0.11 0.18
0.5 1 -0.02 -0.11 0.19
0.6 0 -0.02 0.07 0.51
0.6 0.1 -0.02 0.10 0.66
0.6 0.2 -0.02 0.23 1.25
0.6 0.3 -0.01 -0.43 -1.78
0.6 0.4 -0.02 -0.10 -0.24
0.6 0.5 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02
0.6 0.6 -0.02 -0.03 0.07
0.6 0.7 -0.02 -0.02 0.11
0.6 0.8 -0.02 -0.01 0.14
0.6 0.9 -0.02 -0.01 0.16
0.6 1 -0.02 -0.01 0.17
0.7 0 -0.02 0.10 0.50
0.7 0.1 -0.02 0.11 0.65
0.7 0.2 -0.02 0.19 1.28
0.7 0.3 -0.02 -0.16 -1.56
0.7 0.4 -0.02 0.00 -0.23
0.7 0.5 -0.02 0.03 -0.03
0.7 0.6 -0.02 0.04 0.06
0.7 0.7 -0.02 0.04 0.10
0.7 0.8 -0.02 0.05 0.13
0.7 0.9 -0.02 0.05 0.15
0.7 1 -0.02 0.05 0.16
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Table C.6: Continued
λland λLabor δ̂ α̂
0.8 0 -0.02 0.11 0.49
0.8 0.1 -0.02 0.12 0.65
0.8 0.2 -0.02 0.17 1.31
0.8 0.3 -0.02 -0.02 -1.44
0.8 0.4 -0.02 0.07 -0.23
0.8 0.5 -0.02 0.08 -0.03
0.8 0.6 -0.02 0.08 0.05
0.8 0.7 -0.02 0.09 0.10
0.8 0.8 -0.02 0.09 0.12
0.8 0.9 -0.02 0.09 0.14
0.8 1 -0.02 0.09 0.16
0.9 0 -0.02 0.13 0.49
0.9 0.1 -0.02 0.13 0.65
0.9 0.2 -0.02 0.15 1.33
0.9 0.3 -0.02 0.08 -1.37
0.9 0.4 -0.02 0.11 -0.22
0.9 0.5 -0.02 0.11 -0.03
0.9 0.6 -0.02 0.12 0.05
0.9 0.7 -0.02 0.12 0.09
0.9 0.8 -0.02 0.12 0.12
0.9 0.9 -0.02 0.12 0.14
0.9 1 -0.02 0.12 0.15
1 0 -0.02 0.14 0.48
1 0.1 -0.02 0.14 0.64
1 0.2 -0.02 0.13 1.34
1 0.3 -0.02 0.14 -1.32
1 0.4 -0.02 0.14 -0.22
1 0.5 -0.02 0.14 -0.03
1 0.6 -0.02 0.14 0.04
1 0.7 -0.02 0.14 0.09
1 0.8 -0.02 0.14 0.11
1 0.9 -0.02 0.14 0.13
1 1 -0.02 0.14 0.15
Notes: The tables show the estimates used to
construct Figure 3
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Table C.7: Additional checks: Spatial disaggregation
VARIABLES Ln Agricultural Output
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Spills 5 -0.0328* -0.0335 -0.0383 -0.0390* -0.0395* -0.0373*
(0.018) (0.021) (0.025) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
Spills 7 -0.0822 -0.0864 -0.1267 -0.1040 -0.0799 -0.0584
(0.107) (0.130) (0.126) (0.130) (0.138) (0.134)
Spills 10 -0.0066 -0.0085 -0.0096 -0.0124 -0.0116 -0.0107
(0.014) (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Spills 20 0.0096 0.0062 0.0038 0.0039 0.0039 0.0028
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Spills 30 0.0067 0.0119 0.0291 0.0089 0.0087 0.0139
(0.076) (0.061) (0.070) (0.063) (0.064) (0.063)
Spills 40 -0.0027 -0.0018 -0.0011 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0014
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Spills 50 0.0109** 0.0116** 0.0126** 0.0120** 0.0119** 0.0120**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
LnLand 0.2577*** 0.5403*** 0.2474*** 0.2467*** 0.2471***
(0.023) (0.171) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
LnLabor days 0.2010*** 0.2940* 0.1915*** 0.1918*** 0.1883***
(0.024) (0.153) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
Estimation OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 6369 6115 6114 6059 6059 6059
R-squared 0.610 0.640 0.619 0.643 0.643 0.644
Farmer controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Other inputs NON NON NON YES YES YES
Heterogeneous trend NON NON NON NON YES YES
Climate & environmental variables NON NON NON NON NON YES
Waves dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
LGA fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the LGAs levels. Spill 5 to Spill 30 are the
total number of Oil spills in with an exponential decay over time, at distance of 5 km to 30 km from nearby locality e.
Farmers controls: age of head of household and literacy, an indicator of whether the household owns its farm plot, Heterogenous
trend: distances to federal road, main towns, main markets, states capitals, and border post on the main road. Climate and
environmental variables: mean temperature and rainfall, rooting, slope, nutrient retention, excel salt, oxygen to roots, toxicity,
and workability. Significance is denoted as follows: *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 Columns 3 is estimated using 2SLS. The
excluded instruments are the log of the area of land managed, and the log of the number of adults equivalents in the household.
Table C.8: Additional checks: Main Results in enumeration areas up to 7.5km from oil
spills
VARIABLES LnAg. Output LnAg. Output LnAg. Output LnYield LnYield Cassava LnYield Maize
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cumulative OilSpill -0.0307 -0.0248* -0.0241** -0.0157*** -0.0210** -0.0047
(0.027) (0.015) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011)
LnLand 0.2577*** 0.5373***
(0.023) (0.171)
LnLabor days 0.1992*** 0.2967*
(0.024) (0.153)
Estimation OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 6342 5998 5935 9056 1101 2493
R-squared 0.612 0.632 0.604 0.312 0.293 0.290
Waves dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
LGAs fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at LGA level. All regressions include a dummy for being within
7.5 kilometers of an oil spill. Farmer controls: columns 2 to 4 and column 6 include age of head of household, literacy, and an indicator of whether
the household owns its farm plot. Significance is denoted as follows: *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 Column 3 is estimated using 2SLS. The
excluded instruments are the log of the area of land managed and the log of the number of equivalent adults in the household.
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Table C.10: Additional checks: 2SLS Estimation
VARIABLES Ln Agricultural Output
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cumulative OilSpill -0.0276*** -0.0284*** -0.0257*** -0.0264***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
LnLand 0.5356*** 0.5494*** 0.5780*** 0.5933***
(0.177) (0.179) (0.184) (0.191)
LnLabor days 0.2717* 0.2636* 0.2690* 0.2332
(0.155) (0.156) (0.162) (0.165)
Fertilizers 0.2129*** 0.2173*** 0.2254***
(0.073) (0.072) (0.072)
Pesticides 0.1313* 0.1290* 0.1189
(0.073) (0.073) (0.074)
Herbicides 0.0135 0.0202 0.0172
(0.097) (0.099) (0.100)












Nutrient Retention 0.3319 0.3698
(0.243) (0.242)
Nutrient Availability -0.2897 -0.2917
(0.222) (0.220)
Mean temperature 0.0003 0.0032
(0.013) (0.013)




Estimation 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 6058 6058 6114 6058
R-squared 0.622 0.620 0.615 0.617
Waves dummies YES YES YES YES
LGA fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the
LGAs levels. All regressions include a dummy for being within 5 kilometers of an oil spill.
Farmer controls: columns 1 to 5 include age of head of household, literacy, and an indicator
of whether a household owns its farm plot. Columns 3 to 5 include indicators from time
trends with distances to federal roads, main towns, main markets, states capitals, and border
posts on the main road. The excluded instruments are the log of the area of land managed
and the log of the number of equivalent adults in the household. Significance is denoted as
follows*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1.
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Table C.13: Additional checks: Additional checks: Additional robustness in enumeration
areas within 7.5km of oil spills
VARIABLES LnAg. Output LnAg. Output LnAg. Output LnAg. Output LnAg. Output
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cumulative OilSpill -0.0317 -0.0256* -0.0280* -0.0232* -0.0259*
(0.027) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
LnLand 0.2471*** 0.2464*** 0.2571*** 0.2468***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023)
LnLabor days 0.1895*** 0.1900*** 0.1969*** 0.1865***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Fertilizers 0.3235*** 0.2591*** 0.2614*** 0.2707***
(0.076) (0.073) (0.072) (0.072)
Pesticides 0.3397*** 0.2192*** 0.2151*** 0.2098***
(0.066) (0.064) (0.065) (0.064)
Herbicides 0.1921** 0.0876 0.0997 0.1025
(0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095)
Improved Seeds 0.2539 0.1518 0.1608 0.1487
(0.338) (0.263) (0.262) (0.261)
Rooting 0.4520* 0.4450*
(0.253) (0.239)








Nutrient Retention 0.2577 0.2847
(0.243) (0.238)
Nutrient Availability -0.2598 -0.2581
(0.214) (0.210)
Mean temperature 0.0134 0.0170
(0.014) (0.014)




Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 6275 5943 5943 5998 5943
R-squared 0.618 0.636 0.636 0.634 0.638
Waves dummies YES YES YES YES YES
LGA fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at LGA level. All regressions include a
dummy for being within 7.5 kilometers of an oil spill. Farmer controls: Columns 1 to 5 include age of head of household,
literacy, and an indicator of whether a household owns its farm plot. Columns 3 to 5 include indicators from time
trends with distances to federal roads, main towns, main markets, states capitals, and border posts on the main road.
Significance is denoted as follows: *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1.
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Table C.15: Additional checks: Conflict versus Non Conflict Areas
VARIABLES LnAg. Output LnAg. Output LnAg. Output
(1) (2) (3)
CONFLICT AREA NON CONFLICT AREA
Cumulative OilSpill -0.0086* -1.2303*
(0.005) (0.630)
(A) Cumulative OilSpill*Conflict Area -0.8038***
(0.274)




LnLand 0.3323*** 0.1686*** 0.2478***
(0.032) (0.055) (0.028)
LnLabor days 0.1703*** 0.1741*** 0.1602***
(0.038) (0.044) (0.032)
Observations 2917 1014 3310
R-squared 0.656 0.489 0.451
Waves dummies YES YES NON
Year fixed effects NON NON YES
LGA fixed effects YES YES YES
EA X trend NON NON YES
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at LGA level. All regressions include a dummy for
being within 5 kilometers of an oil spill. Farmer controls: Columns 1 to 3 include age of head of household, literacy, and an indicator
of whether a household owns its farm plot. Significance is denoted as follows: *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1.
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Table C.16: Oil Spill Pollution during the year and Self-reported Illness
Variable
Ill in previous four weeks Ln (Number of days off work)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OilSpill 0.0004 -0.0021 0.0010** -0.0012 0.0594 -0.0045
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.049) (0.003)
Sample All Urban Rural All Urban Rural
Observations 36675 9498 26196 23001 5916 16491
R-squared 0.070 0.056 0.080 0.225 0.178 0.252
Waves dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
LGA fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at LGA level. All
regressions include a dummy for being within 5 kilometers of an oil spill and individual controls such
as age, age2, gender, an indicator of ecological zone, and rural area. “Ill in previous four weeks” is an
indicator that takes a value of 1 if any individual reports being ill during the last four weeks. This does
not include injures. “Ln (Number of days off work)” is the log of the number of days that an individual
reports ceasing to engage in any usual activity. Significance is denoted as follows: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table C.17: Oil Spill Pollution and Labor Outcomes for urban workers
Variable
Ln(Total hours worked) Ln(Real Employment Income)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OilSpill -0.0108*** -0.0084*** -0.2201*** -0.2275***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.012) (0.012)
Sample
All Urban All Urban
urban non-agric. urban non-agric.
workers workers workers workers
Observations 4782 4369 2846 2788
R-squared 0.240 0.130 0.398 0.389
Waves dummies YES YES YES YES
LGA fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at LGA levels.
All regressions include a dummy for being within 5 kilometers of an oil spill, and an industrial
dummy. Columns 1 and 2 include individual controls such as age, age2, literacy status, and
household size. Columns 3 and 4 add additional controls in the form of the log of the total
number of hours worked. All regressions exclude oil industry workers. Significance is denoted
as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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C.3 Figures














Notes: The figure shows a map of Nigeria with enumeration areas, rivers, and gas flares.
Sources: Own work based on Nigerian GHS-PANEL data, gas flares shapefile from the
Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (NOAA National Centers for Environmental
Information), and wetlands data from Tropical and Subtropical Peatland Distribution
(Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR)).
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Sources: Own work based on data from the Nigerian Oil Spill Monitor (NOSDRA) and
the Database of Global Administrative Areas (GADM) map for Nigeria.
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(b) Estimated quantity of oil lost (in barrels) (less
than 100 barrels)
Notes: The figures show the density function for the variable “estimated quantity of
oil lost in spills (in barrels)” from the table reported in the data from the Nigerian Oil
Spill Monitor NOSDRA. Panel a) shows the density function for all the data reported,
and Panel b) shows that for data reported with less than 100 barrels.
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Figure C.4: Map of Areas 5km to 10km from Oil-Spills
Sources: Own work based on Nigerian GHS-PANEL data and Nigerian Oil Spill Monitor
NOSDRA data.
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Figure C.5: Zoom of locations of onshore oil spills, enumeration areas, and buffer zones









Sources: Own work based on Nigerian GHS-PANEL data and Nigerian Oil Spill
Monitor NOSDRA data.
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Sources: Own work based on Nigerian GHS-PANEL data and Nigerian Oil Spill Monitor
NOSDRA data.
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Figure C.7: Estimates of δ with IIV approach.
Notes: This figure shows the estimates of δ with the IIV approach.Vertical axis shows the
value of δ for different values of λland harvested and λLabor. Under the IIV methodology,
I identify parameter bounds rather than points estimated. Each parameter measures
the ratioof correlation of the instrumental variable and the regressor with the error
term, which measures how well the instrument satisfies the exogeneity assumption.
For instance, λj = corr(Zj,ε)/corr(Xj,ε) where j = (land harvested, Labor), X is the
input used, Z is the instrumental variable, and ε is the error term. The instrument is
considered to be less correlated to the error term than the endogenous variable when
ε < 1. I find that in 96% of all combinations of λland harvested and λLabor, the effect on
residual productivity is negative, and for all combinations where λland harvested > 0.4 and
λLabor > 0.2, the corresponding estimate of the effect of oil-spill pollution on agricultural
output is negative.
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Notes: This figure shows the estimates of regressions for the effect of oil-spill pollution
on agricultural output when alternative specifications are considered for the function
g(n). (Cumulative OilSpills) is the variable used in the main analysis. (OilSpill)
is the total number of oil-spill events per location during the year of each wave.
(FCumulative OilSpill) takes the same approach as the main analysis but I only
consider the number of spills up to five years before as a persistent effect for inclusion
in the exponential decay. (TCum Volumen OilSpil) is the total number of oil-spill
events per location and wave, with no degradation effect. Circles represent point
estimates, while lines indicate the 95 percent confidence interval.
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Figure C.9: Effects of oil-spill pollution on agricultural output. Different measurements















Notes: This figure shows the estimates of regressions for the effect of oil-spill pollution
on agricultural output when alternative specifications are considered for the function
g(n). (Cum Volumen OilSpill barrels) is the variable used in the main robustness
analysis. (Volumen OilSpill barrels) measures the estimated number of barrels lost
near a location in the year of each wave. (FCum Volumen OilSpill (barrels) is the
total estimated number of barrels spilt near locations until the last day of the harvest
survey for each wave, with no degradation effect. Geometric figures represent point
estimates, while lines indicate the 95 percent confidence interval.
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Sources: Own work based on data from the Nigerian Oil Spill Monitor NOSDRA and
the Database of Global Administrative Areas (GADM) map for Nigeria.
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No North Central No North East
No North West No South East
No South South No South West
Notes: This figure shows the estimates of regressions for the effect of oil-spill pollution
on agricultural output when geographical zones are dropped one by one. Geometric
figures represent point estimates, while lines indicate the 95 percent confidence interval.
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Notes: The figure shows buffer zones of 25 km around violent conflicts. Years:






El objetivo de esta tesis es abordar las causas y las consecuencias de los conflictos
en un mundo globalizado. Para ello se considera la importancia de los patrones
espaciales y el uso de datos geolocalizados, a la hora de abordar los problemas
de causalidad en modelos econométricos con datos en panel y con datos de corte
transversal repetidos. En el segundo caṕıtulo de esta tesis, analizamos el v́ınculo
entre la globalización y la incidencia de los conflictos civiles para un conjunto de datos
de panel de 159 páıses durante el peŕıodo 1972-2009. Para ello, distinguimos varias
dimensiones de la globalización identificadas en la literatura de economı́a poĺıtica, como
son la globalización económica, social y poĺıtica. Abordamos la endogeneidad potencial
de las variables de globalización con la introducción de efectos fijos por páıs en el
análisis. Además, utilizamos un enfoque de variables instrumentales para estimar el
efecto causal del grado de integración sobre el conflicto. En el tercer caṕıtulo, utilizamos
información geolocalizada para estudiar cómo los factores étnicos se interrelacionan con
las variaciones de ingresos relacionadas con los alimentos, en los conflictos africanos,
con el fin de explicar los procesos subyacentes del mismo. Para ello, proponemos el uso
de una base de datos de panel, de una cuadŕıcula completa de páıses africanos divididos
en unidades subnacionales de 0,5 por 0,5 grados de latitud y longitud (10.638 celdas),
que cubre el peŕıodo 1998-2013. Contribuimos a la literatura anterior analizando varias
teoŕıas sobre los efectos de los shocks de ingresos en los conflictos, utilizando datos
geolocalizados que consideran la interacción entre estas variaciones de ingresos y la
diversidad étnica. Finalmente, en el cuarto caṕıtulo, examino el daño ambiental que
podŕıa derivarse de los conflictos, como son los derrames de petróleo en Nigeria, y su
impacto en la producción agŕıcola. Utilizo un marco conceptual sobre la producción
y consumo en los hogares, para comprender cómo la contaminación por derrames
de petróleo, puede generar ajustes en el comportamiento óptimo de los hogares. A
continuación, estimo una función de producción agŕıcola utilizando un modelo de corte
transversal repetido, con microdatos georreferenciados para un conjunto de hogares
agŕıcolas, y cuatro paneles de encuestas entre los años 2009 y 2018, ambos incluidos,
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de la base de datos Nigeria General Household Survey (GHS-Panel). Para calcular
una variable proxy de la contaminación por derrames de petróleo, creo una función
que utiliza datos geoespaciales con información sobre alrededor de 12.000 derrames de
petróleo del Nigerian Oil Spill Monitor.
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D.2 Conclusiones
En esta tesis se ha aplicado novedosas metodoloǵıas emṕıricas para analizar varias
causas y consecuencias del conflicto. En este sentido, un aspecto clave de la misma,
ha sido el considerar los patrones espaciales y utilizar datos geolocalizados para hallar
la dirección correcta de causalidad. Este marco de análisis ayuda a comprender los
procesos que subyacen a la globalización y su efecto en los conflictos para encontrar
herramientas de poĺıtica para enfrentar este desaf́ıo. Aunque las principales conclusiones
de los estudios llevados a cabo de la misma se proporcionan al final de cada caṕıtulo,
en esta sección, reviso algunos resultados destacables de cada art́ıculo y señalo futuras
ĺıneas de investigación.
El Caṕıtulo 2 ha llevado a abordar adecuadamente la potencial endogeneidad de
las variables de globalización, lo que es particularmente importante para establecer
el v́ınculo causal entre globalización y conflicto civil. A diferencia de la literatura
anterior que relaciona varias dimensiones de la globalización y el conflicto, he buscado
junto con mi co-director Roberto Ezcurra, abordar la causalidad inherente entre los
dos fenómenos. Con ese fin, hemos introducido efectos fijos de páıs para abordar las
variables omitidas. Sin embargo, no ha sido sencillo encontrar variables instrumentales
para cada dimensión de la globalización para resolver el problema de endogeneidad.
De hecho, cuando hemos observado cómo los flujos comerciales y financieros, los
intercambios culturales y las cuestiones poĺıticas se extienden por el mundo, nos hemos
dado cuenta de que estos fenómenos siguen un patrón espacial. Aśı, cada dimensión
del ı́ndice KOF se relaciona con la del vecino, siguiendo las teoŕıas de la geograf́ıa y la
interdependencia espacial de los modelos teóricos de la denominada ”Nueva geograf́ıa
económica” (Krugman, 1998). En consecuencia, hemos creado variables instrumentales
que asocian cada ı́ndice de globalización de un páıs con el ı́ndice de globalización del
resto de páıses, aplicando una matriz espacial exógena basada en distancia geográfica
entre ellos. Con estas variables (una para dimensión) abrimos un camino para resolver
cualquier problema de endogeneidad relacionado con la globalización.
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Una de las conclusiones clave de esta tesis es considerar que la asociación no
significativa entre globalización y guerra civil no implica necesariamente que los procesos
de globalización económica, social o poĺıtica no conduzcan al conflicto. Mas bien,
podŕıa significar que no existe un v́ınculo directo debido a la complejidad de las
interacciones entre los diferentes actores involucrados en el proceso. Esta conclusión
lleva a preguntarse por el estudio de factores que indirectamente podŕıan conectar la
globalización con el conflicto. Por lo tanto, consideramos dos implicaciones de mis
resultados: Primero, la necesidad de aislar y cuantificar diferentes canales de transmisión
que puedan vincular ambos fenómenos, y segundo, considerar que el análisis a nivel de
páıs podŕıa no ser la mejor opción para estudiar ciertas causas de conflicto. Es decir,
los resultados muestran que no existe una asociación directa entre las dos variables a
nivel de páıs. Pero, podŕıamos afirmar que el efecto podŕıa ser local, y podŕıa depender
de factores como la desigualdad espacial, aspectos geográficos, étnicos, culturales e
históricos, y la calidad de la gobernanza, entre otros.
Por estas razones, he decidido estudiar el papel de las variaciones en los precios
externos de las materias primas agŕıcolas como proxy de variaciones en los ingresos y su
efecto sobre el conflicto, dependiendo de las caracteŕısticas étnicas desde una perspectiva
a nivel micro. El uso novedoso de datos geolocalizados me ha dado la oportunidad de
aplicar el nivel de celda para estudiar el conflicto, que debeŕıa haber asegurado que
sea exógeno a los eventos de conflicto. Bajo este enfoque, he podido combinar varias
bases de datos georreferenciadas, lo que ha dado una imagen más detallada de las
caracteŕısticas de cada ubicación.
Aśı, la principal contribución en el Caṕıtulo 3, junto con Fidel Pérez Sebastián
y Miguel Angel Campo-Bescós, ha sido considerar que la diversidad étnica actúa
indirectamente sobre el conflicto. Nuestra propuesta surgió de la idea de que las
causas del conflicto pueden no ser homogéneas y dependen de las caracteŕısticas locales,
cómo en este caso tanto diversidad poĺıtica como la étnica podŕıa indicarnos diferentes
mecanismos por los cuáles se activan los conflictos.
Los resultados obtenidos en este caṕıtulo nos conducen a varias conclusiones
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interesantes. Por ejemplo, después de una variación de ingresos que conduce a la
violencia, siempre es preferible tomar en consideración qué tipo de conflicto ha surgido
tras esa perturbación. Puntualizamos que es necesario distinguir entre el conflicto
armado organizado y la violencia no organizada para establecer los mecanismos correctos
detrás de estos actos de violencia. Además, la interacción con variables poĺıticas étnicas
lleva a sugerir que los gobiernos débiles poseen menos capacidad para beneficiarse de
la capacidad de represión a la rebelión que ofrecen los shocks de ingresos positivos. Y
definitivamente, el sentimiento de agravio en algunos grupos étnicos es más importante
para convertirse en alborotadores temporales que en soldados.
Desde una perspectiva de poĺıtica, los resultados contienen una lección clara. Hemos
demostrado que las fluctuaciones de los precios agŕıcolas provocan conflictos a nivel local.
Por lo tanto, podŕıa ser necesario un mecanismo de estabilización de precios agŕıcolas,
pero abordar la poĺıtica adecuada también depende de la naturaleza de la diversidad
étnica y el tipo de violencia.
En ĺınea con estos hallazgos, el análisis de Esteban y Ray (2017) muestra que,
particularmente en el África sub-sahariana, la desigualdad de ingresos está ı́ntimamente
ligada a la identidad étnica. Siguiendo esta aproximación, la etnicidad en nuestro caso
actúa de forma indirecta, respondiendo a cómo tras un shock positivo, la distribución de
las plusvaĺıas y rentas económicas entre la población podŕıa generar conflicto. Alesina
(2016) señala que el aspecto más importante en el desarrollo económico es paliar las
diferencias económicas entre grupos étnicos que conviven en un mismo páıs. Este último
es más significativo que el porcentaje de diversidad étnica que convive en un lugar. En
este caṕıtulo, demostramos que esta conclusión también es extensible al conflicto a nivel
local.
Finalmente, quiero destacar el caso de Nigeria. Nigeria es un ejemplo de fracaso
en convertir sus ganancias extraordinarias del petróleo en desarrollo. La exploración
de petróleo ha provocado un aumento de la contaminación por petróleo en Nigeria,
regularmente en el área del Delta del Nı́ger. La mayoŕıa de los derrames de petróleo se
dan por sabotajes motivados por cuestiones de autodeterminación, protesta por agravios
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por el peligroso impacto de la explotación petrolera y el robo.
Por estas razones, he decidido estudiar en Caṕıtulo 4 el efecto de los derrames de
petróleo en la productividad agŕıcola ya que son consecuencia de este tipo de conflictos.
Estos conflictos han aumentado el nivel de pobreza de los agricultores alrededor de
los oleoductos. El desplazamiento de los agricultores de las zonas rurales, debido
a la continua degradación ambiental, ha llevado a un porcentaje significativo de los
habitantes locales a permanecer en la pobreza y la miseria ćıclicas. Para encontrar el
efecto de los derrames de petróleo en la productividad agŕıcola, también he utilizado
datos novedosos de ubicación geográfica tanto de los derrames de petróleo como de la
ubicación de los agricultores dentro de un área de gobierno local (LGA) espećıfica. He
aplicado una metodoloǵıa de diferencias en diferencias para identificar adecuadamente
el efecto de los derrames de petróleo en la productividad agŕıcola. No obstante, he
considerado todo tipo de derrames de petróleo ya que el efecto sobre la producción
agŕıcola es indiferente a la causa del derrame del petróleo, aunque la mayoŕıa de ellos
son provocados por sabotajes.
Aunque las principales conclusiones se incluyen en el caṕıtulo, es un hallazgo notable
que el efecto de los derrames de petróleo sobre la productividad agŕıcola se localice en
fincas a menos de 10 kilómetros de los puntos de los vertidos, aśı que sean persistentes
en el tiempo. Además, he desarrollado una medida de polución medioambiental basada
en el número total de derrames de petróleo que se ha producido a una distancia del
vertido determinada teniendo en cuenta un patrón de degradación exponencial. Desde
el punto de vista de las medidas poĺıticas, este resultado sugiere la realización de un
tipo de poĺıtica adecuada a prevenir nuevos derrames, y enfatizar una limpieza efectiva
de las tierras contaminadas, tanto sobre las parcelas directamente afectadas, como en
las tierras circundantes. También es necesaria una fórmula de compensación en las
localidades que hayan sido afectadas por los derrames de petróleo en cualquier momento.
Dado que la mayoŕıa de los oleoductos están cerca de los humedales y para encontrar
un radio de acción adecuado alrededor de los derrames de petróleo, las investigaciones
futuras podŕıan incorporar una estrategia emṕırica basada en la distancia más cercana
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entre los vertidos de petróleo y los hogares a través del cauce de los ŕıos.
De acuerdo con futuras ĺıneas de investigación, la búsqueda de la identificación
adecuada del papel de la desigualdad de ingresos en los conflictos podŕıa ser una
continuación lógica de esta tesis. Los próximos estudios podŕıan considerar el efecto
de la desigualdad espacial sobre el conflicto. En particular, utilizando la nueva variable
de desigualdad de ingresos, por ejemplo, el ı́ndice de Gini espacial per cápita calculado
con la emisión de luz nocturna promedio del conjunto de datos DMSP-OLS Nighttime
Lights Time Series, y los datos de población de la base de datos abierta Geospatial World
pop. Esta aproximación podŕıa ser una futura área de investigación en el v́ınculo entre
desigualdad y conflicto utilizando datos geolocalizados. Además, otro punto relevante
que ha sido pasado por alto por la mayoŕıa de las investigaciones sobre conflictos civiles
es que los conflictos están correlacionados en el espacio y el tiempo. Es probable que los
conflictos internos y las guerras sean contagiosos, dado que los flujos de refugiados, las
enfermedades, la anarqúıa y el comercio iĺıcito de drogas, caza furtiva, armas y minerales
pueden generar efectos indirectos en las regiones vecinas de las zonas de conflicto. Estos
hallazgos con respecto al papel del espacio sugieren que es necesario acomodar tal
interdependencia en el proceso de modelado y que se requiere una explicación expĺıcita
de los efectos espaciales utilizando modelos econométricos espaciales.
Comprender las causas y consecuencias de los conflictos es un desaf́ıo de primer orden
de importancia para los economistas de economı́a poĺıtica, de desarrollo y del medio
ambiente. Esta tesis contribuye a esta búsqueda al presentar dos ejemplos concretos de
causas de conflicto y una determinada consecuencia ambiental derivada de la violencia
con el fin de proporcionar las acciones poĺıticas adecuadas.
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